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ABSTRACT 
 
Smith, Rochelle E.  PhD.  University of Saskatchewan, Saskatoon, December 2007.  The 
Relationship Between Saskatchewan’s Co-operative Community Clinics and the 
Government of Saskatchewan:  Toward a New Understanding. 
 
Supervisor:  Dr. Lou Hammond Ketilson 
 
 
This dissertation is a study of the public policy-making process, the role of ideas and 
relationships in this process, and their effect on social economy enterprises, in particular co-
operatives.   It is concerned with a central problem in all social economy organizations today: 
understanding the impact of public policy on funding, decision-making and strategy.  The 
relationship between Saskatchewan‘s co-operative Community Clinics and the provincial 
government is of particular interest.  In spite of a seeming congruence between the goals of 
the Community Clinics and the government, the Clinics have not been allowed to play a 
significant role in reforming the delivery of health care services in the province.   
 
The dissertation draws on models and concepts from the literatures on business–government 
relations, public policy and the policy-making process, the role of ideas and ideology in 
public policy, the social economy and public policy, and government–co-operative relations.  
A case study of the Community Clinics is elaborated through key informant interviews and 
supported by examination of primary and secondary literature.   
 
This research shows that the Community Clinics are unique organizations and that a new 
understanding can be developed if the Clinics are viewed as hybrids – some combination of 
co-operative, public, and perhaps even private organizations.  The ambiguity in the 
relationship arises at least in part from the differing and conflicting ways that the Community 
Clinics have been conceptualized by the politicians, government officials, the health regions, 
and even the Clinics themselves.  The research also shows that the dominant idea at play in 
the health care policy domain in Saskatchewan remains that of private medical practice, with 
fee-for-service remuneration, and that the conditions necessary for a major policy change 
with respect to the role of the Community Clinics do not exist. 
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―When we began to plan Medicare, we pointed out that it would be in two phases.  The first 
phase would be to remove the financial barrier between those giving the service and those 
receiving it.  The second phase would be to reorganize and revamp the delivery system – and 
of course, that‘s the big item.  It‘s the big thing we haven‘t done yet.‖ 
 
      Former Premier Tommy Douglas, 1982 
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CHAPTER ONE:  INTRODUCTION 
 
1.0 Introduction 
 This dissertation is a study of the public policy-making process, the role of ideas and 
ideology in this process, and their combined effect on the relationship between social 
economy enterprises, particularly co-operatives, and government.  It is also concerned with a 
central problem for all social economy organizations today: the impacts of public policy on 
funding, decision-making and strategy. 
The central focus of this research is the relationship between three of Saskatchewan‘s 
co-operative Community Clinics and the provincial Government of Saskatchewan.  In spite 
of a seeming congruence between the goals of the Community Clinics and successive 
provincial governments, the Clinics have not played a significant role in the reform and 
restructuring of the delivery of health care services in the province.  This study seeks to 
examine this paradox with specific focus on the following overarching concerns: 
 What role do ideas and ideology play in the policy-making process related to the 
co-operative Community Clinics? 
 What accounts for the ambiguity in the relationship between the Clinics and the 
government? 
 Under what conditions can the dominant paradigm in health policy, specifically 
regarding the co-operative Community Clinics, be changed?  
 This dissertation draws on models and concepts from the literatures on business-
government relations, public policy and the policy-making process, the role of ideas and 
ideology in public policy, the social economy and public policy, and government-co-
operative relations.  A case study of the Community Clinics is elaborated through key 
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informant interviews and supported by examination of primary and secondary literature.  A 
key aim of this dissertation is to explore the application of a framework for understanding co-
operative-government relationships. 
 
1.1 The Context of the Study 
Saskatchewan‘s co-operative Community Clinics were established at a pivotal point 
in the province‘s history.  Many of the province‘s doctors went on strike in the summer of 
1962 when the provincial government implemented legislation to establish publicly 
administered and funded health care, now known as Medicare.  The doctors believed that the 
people of Saskatchewan should use private insurers and that the provincial government was 
interfering in the practice of medicine.  In response to the impending withdrawal of doctor‘s 
services, citizens in 38 communities across the province organized to provide themselves 
with health care services.  They chose to organize as co-operatives, whereby the members 
exercise democratic control on the basis of one-member, one-vote.  Doctors paid by salary or 
contract, multidisciplinary teams characterize the Community Clinic model, and a health 
promotion and prevention focus.  Five Community Clinics still exist. 
Over the years, the opposition of the medical establishment has continued and 
government has been ambivalent in its support (Lawson and Theriault 1999). Relations with 
the provincial government have been problematic, despite evidence that the Co-operative 
Clinics‘ costs were lower than those of fee-for-service practitioners.  Lawson and Theriault 
(1999) note that the Devine government actually suppressed a survey done by the Department 
of Health on the Prince Albert and Saskatoon Community Clinics in 1983.  A later study 
found that members were less likely to be hospitalized, had shorter hospital stays and lower 
prescription drug costs. Clinic physicians were more productive and Clinics implemented 
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several innovations in health care (Angus and Manga 1990). The first medical social worker 
in Canadian group practice was employed by the Saskatoon Clinic in the 1960s, and this 
Clinic introduced its own prescription drug plan in the late 1960s (Lawson and Theriault 
1999).  It developed a drug formulary for use by its non-profit pharmacy, which lowered 
costs considerably through competitive tendering and use of generic drugs.  In 1975 the 
provincial government established a province-wide drug plan based on the model developed 
at the Saskatoon Community Clinic. This was Canada‘s first and only universal drug plan at 
that time (Lawson and Theriault 1999).   The plan introduced by then Premier Tommy 
Douglas eventually became a national plan. 
 In spite of this, the co-operative Community Clinic model has largely been ignored by 
the provincial government (Lawson and Theriault 1999). After the 1991 re-election of the 
New Democratic Party, Clinic supporters hoped for greater recognition and support in the 
government‘s plan for health reform because of their common co-operative roots.  Changes 
were necessitated by the rising costs of health care and lack of co-ordination among the 
hundreds of health care providers.  The reforms that were implemented involved closure of 
52 hospitals and a complete reorganization of the governance of health care provision in the 
province. Saskatchewan was the first province to undertake this kind of sweeping health care 
reform (Lawson and Theriault 1999). 
 The Clinics endorsed the province‘s plan for health reform because of a seeming 
congruence of goals, principles and models – and in order to show their willingness to be 
team players. However, they were disappointed when in 1994, it was announced that the 
government intended to transfer funding responsibilities for the Clinics to the new district 
health boards (Lawson and Theriault 1999). Among other concerns, Saskatoon‘s Community 
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Clinic especially feared the loss of its political and social action role. The Clinics organized 
to oppose the transfer. In a brief to the government in November 1994, they requested 
continued funding to the Clinics directly and that the decision to transfer responsibility be 
deferred for three years; the Minister of Health promised to review the proposed transfer and 
committed funding for another year (Lawson and Theriault 1999). 
 In 1997 the Saskatchewan Community Co-operative Health Federation (the 
Federation) adopted a set of principles to form the basis of a tripartite agreement with the 
Department of Health and district health boards (Lawson and Theriault 1999). The Federation 
was formed by the Community Clinics to represent their interests to the provincial and the 
federal governments.  The principles emphasize Clinic autonomy, continued funding by the 
province, provision of incremental funding through the district health boards for additional 
community programming, and co-operation and co-ordination between health boards and 
Clinics to identify and address health needs in the communities they serve. The Federation 
met with the Department of Health in April of 1998. It was agreed at that meeting that a 
committee with representatives of the three parties would be established to fast-track signing 
of the agreements by the end of June of that year; however, no agreements were signed that 
year. The Department of Health and the Saskatchewan Association of Health Organizations 
(the districts‘ umbrella organization) did not agree to the principles set out by the Federation 
(Lawson and Theriault 1999).  
 Subsequently, the provincial government established the Fyke Commission on 
Medicare in June 2000 (Caring for Medicare:  Sustaining a quality system.  2001) and the 
tripartite agreements were put on hold to await the results of the Commission‘s work. The 
purpose of this independent commission was to identify challenges to Medicare, outline 
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potential solutions, and engage the public and health care providers in discussions of new 
ideas for meeting the challenges. The commission issued a Challenges Paper to stimulate 
discussion; this report did not discuss governance at all, let alone the co-operative health care 
model. 
 A Primary Care Branch was then established within the Department of Health.  The 
department‘s position on the Clinics was that they should remain independent but establish 
partnerships with their respective Health Regions.  The Primary Care Branch was to address 
other forms of group practice and physician remuneration but did acquire responsibility for 
the Community Clinics as well. 
 The more recent federal Commission on the Future of Health Care in Canada 
(otherwise known as the Romanow Commission) failed to address the possible role the 
Community Clinics could play in health care reform, except to say that the Clinics are a good 
model for the delivery of primary health care.  This commission was chaired by Roy 
Romanow, former NDP Premier of Saskatchewan, so the lack of attention to the potential 
role of the Community Clinics was particularly notable.   
In the meantime, the Clinics have tried to strengthen their relationships with their 
respective Health Region boards. There have been no new cuts and some modest increases in 
their global funds, but these are much less than inflationary costs and much less than those 
given to the district health boards. The Clinics continue to operate and, in some cases, to fill 
gaps in services that were lost when the province closed health care facilities. The pressures 
of bringing health care costs under control continue, as do pressures to conform to the new 
governance model. The Community Clinics are trying to adjust and survive, but their future is 
uncertain. The government has provided global funding on a year-by-year basis, but appears 
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to still want the Clinics to fall under the jurisdiction of the Health Region boards.  Partnership 
agreements have been or are being developed between individual Clinics and their respective 
Health Regions.  The provincial government also reduced the number of health districts from 
32 to 12 Health Regions with new legislation proclaimed on August 1, 2002, ostensibly to 
further reduce duplication and improve province-wide planning and delivery of service (An 
Act respecting Regional Health Services, Chapter R-8.2 of The Statutes of Saskatchewan, 
2002).  Most recently, the provincial and federal governments have undertaken a new joint 
awareness campaign to help the public understand what ―primary care‖ means.  This is a 
component of primary health care reform, and corresponds to the second part of Premier 
Tommy Douglas‘s original plan. 
The Primary Care Branch now requires the Clinics to enter into service agreements 
with the Department of Health (Transcripts 16, 28).  These began as one-year agreements but 
have recently become three-year agreements.  The latter are intended to provide the Clinics 
with a measure of financial stability and to indicate to them that they have the support of the 
government.  However, the Clinics are now also required to apply to retain any surplus they 
achieve and demonstrate that they will make appropriate use of government funding in their 
delivery of primary health care services.  In addition, they must also receive permission to 
use any previous years‘ surplus retained from previous funding from the department 
(Transcript 1). 
 
1.2 Theory and Methodology  
 Examining the policy-making process and the dominant ideas at play is critical to an 
understanding of the relationship between the Community Clinics and the government. The 
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provincial government exercises power and control over the Community Clinics through the 
policy environment it has established.  The literature on public policy theory and the policy-
making process (Bardach 2009; Doern and Phidd 1992; Stanbury 1993; Pal 1989), and the 
literature on the role of ideas and ideology in policy-making (Hall 1993; Howlett and Ramesh 
2003; Scogstad 2000) inform an understanding of how the Community Clinics have fared in 
terms of the policies of the Government of Saskatchewan regarding health care delivery.   
 The theoretical approach used in this study is also informed by the literature on the 
relationship between governments and co-operatives in general, the role of co-operatives in 
society, the role of the social economy in Canada, and business-government relations.  A 
framework for understanding the latter is utilized to organize the findings of this research and 
modifications are proposed to ensure its applicability to social economy organizations, and 
specifically the Community Clinics.  Hoyt (1989) identifies a continuum of government 
orientations towards co-operatives ranging from outright hostility to controlling.  This 
typology helps to further elucidate the kinds of orientations that have existed in the 
relationship between successive provincial governments and the Community Clinics.   
 A case study method has been adopted to gather the primary data for this research.  
Interviews with key informants were conducted to solicit their views, observations and 
understandings of the relationship between the Community Clinics and the provincial 
government.  Findings from the transcripts were organized and analyzed through the use of 
Qualitative Data Analysis software, and these are assessed against a series of propositions 
that arise from the literature. 
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1.3 Potential Contributions and Limitations of the Study 
 
1.3.1 Potential Contributions of the Study 
 
 The present study makes a contribution to the literature on co-operative community 
health clinics and their relationships with various levels of government.  Further, the research 
contributes to the understanding of a relationship that has been little studied in the past, the 
relationship between the Government of Saskatchewan and the Community Clinics.  Much 
has been written about the birth of Medicare but little has been written about how the co-
operative Community Clinics fared subsequently.  The documentary resources that exist are 
primarily non-academic – commissioned histories of the Clinics, a few monographs by Clinic 
supporters and the Clinics‘ own documents.  The perspectives gathered from the key 
informant interviews constitute the creation or documentation of new knowledge including 
behind the scenes observations, candid judgments, and evidence of the discourse and 
mythology of events that has been told and re-told but not recorded elsewhere.  This thesis 
addresses an important gap in the literature, though a comprehensive history of the Clinics 
remains to be written. 
 
 
1.3.2 Scope and Limitations 
 
 There are challenges in doing historical research owing to the limitations of the 
documentary evidence, which is an important source in this dissertation.  The few 
monographs that exist have been written by people who actively supported the Community 
Clinics or who were commissioned by the Clinics to prepare organizational histories.  The 
Clinics‘ annual reports and other documents such as submissions to various health care 
commissions have been prepared by people closely involved with, and supportive of, the 
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Clinics.  There is likely a certain measure of self-censorship and of bias reflected in these 
documents. 
 My background and experience have no doubt influenced the study, including 
interpretations of the data.  I came to this research with the possibility of adopting one of 
several standpoints.  I was employed as a Senior Policy and Program Development Officer in 
the Co-operatives Directorate in the Saskatchewan Department of Economic and Co-
operative Development from May 1992 to September 1997.  At the time of writing, I was 
employed by the Ministry of Energy and Resources.  I have worked for the Government of 
Saskatchewan in this and other capacities for over 30 years, and was on (unpaid) leave to 
finish this research.  Thus, I have been a government official but worked only briefly at the 
very beginning of my career in the Department of Health.   
 In the early part of my PhD studies, I was also a member of the Board of Directors of 
the Saskatoon Community Clinic, serving from 1998 to 2001.  I was not working on the topic 
of this dissertation during that time but this experience was useful in providing me with 
insight into the views of the Board with respect to its relationship with the provincial 
government.  I have, in essence, been an ―insider‖ in a Community Clinic.  In addition, three 
members of my graduate advisory committee have served on the Board of Directors of the 
Saskatoon Clinic in the past, and all are affiliated with the Centre for the Study of Co-
operatives at the University of Saskatchewan in some manner. 
 A third standpoint is obviously that of social scientist and researcher.  My experience as 
both a government official and as a member of a Community Clinic board provided me with 
a greater understanding of the co-operative organizational form and its application in the 
provision of a wide variety of economic and social projects.  It also facilitated access to some 
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of the key informants interviewed for the development of the case studies.  As a social 
scientist, I recognize the risk of biased interpretations, which might lead to an uncritical 
treatment of co-operatives, on the one hand, or of the provincial government‘s position, on 
the other.  Because I have been an ―insider‖ in both camps, I have endeavoured to maintain 
an informed, but balanced view of each party to the relationship I have been studying. 
 The selection of key informants interviewed for the case study may also be an 
opportunity for the entry of bias. The selection of certain individuals and the exclusion of 
others might influence the mix of the experiences and perceptions being recorded and 
analyzed.  Moreover, because there are only five existing community health care co-
operatives in the province, the pool of potential informants for this research was quite small.  
There were, for example, a maximum of five Clinic administrators and five chairs of the 
boards of directors.   Although there were other board members who might have been 
interviewed, the Clinics‘ boards generally adhere to a board policy of speaking with one 
voice.  Additional key informants were drawn from among former members of the NDP 
Cabinet, health care consultants, and current and former members and staff of the Clinics. 
Each Clinic operates within a Regional Health Authority, each of which has one board 
chair and one executive administrator, as well as a senior executive in charge of primary care.  
The number of informants from other relevant organizations, including the provincial 
government, was also limited.  Every attempt was made to ensure that the informants 
interviewed included both elected and appointed officials. 
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1.4  Presentation of the Study 
 
This dissertation is presented in five chapters following this introduction.  Chapter 
Two provides the context in which social economy organizations operate in Canada, 
examines the roles that co-operatives, as social economy organizations, can play in society, 
and reviews literature on government-co-operative sector relations in Canada.  The 
government‘s relationship with the Community Clinics since recent health reform initiatives 
began is also discussed.  
Chapter Three provides an overview of the public policy-making and policy analysis 
processes, and then explores the roles of the social economy, organizations, interest groups 
and ideas and ideologies in policy-making.  The relationship between the co-operative 
Community Clinics and the government is conceptualized and a framework for analysis 
presented. Conclusions from the literature and propositions arising from it appear in both 
Chapters Two and Three.   
Chapter Four describes the data collection and analysis methodologies. Chapter Five 
presents the case studies of the co-operative Community Clinics, and provides information on 
the services, staffing, budget, mission, membership and programs of each Clinic; the chapter 
also presents findings from the application of Qualitative Data Analysis software to the 
transcripts from the key informant interviews.  
Chapter Six provides a discussion of the results and juxtaposes the experience of the 
Community Clinics with the propositions developed in Chapters Two and Three.  Chapter 
Seven concludes this dissertation with conclusions drawn from this study.  It reflects on the 
utility of the framework applied to the case of the Community Clinics, and provides 
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suggestions for the applications of this research, and recommendations for further study in 
this area. 
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CHAPTER TWO:  CO-OPERATIVES AND GOVERNMENT IN CANADA 
 
 
2.0 Introduction 
 
This chapter focuses on ideas that governments hold regarding the roles that social 
economy organizations, specifically co-operatives, play in society. The first section discusses 
the roles of the social economy in Canada and then the roles that co-operatives, as social 
economy organizations, have played in society.  The second section examines co-operatives 
in Saskatchewan and paints a picture of co-operative – government relations over the last 60 
years.  It then reviews three streams of the literature – one that categorizes co-operative – 
government relations, one that focuses on the legal structure of co-operatives, and one that 
focuses on co-operatives and the policy process.  In particular, this chapter considers the 
dominant ideas and paradigms at play by reviewing key factors affecting the participation of 
co-operatives in the policy-making process, and the policy instruments that have been applied 
to co-operatives in Canada and Saskatchewan. 
 
2.1 The Social Economy in Canada 
In Canada, the ability of governments to provide goods and services was eroded or 
profoundly changed in the 1990s by the need to address debt and deficits, increased global 
competition, growing pressures for tax relief and other concessions from the   corporate 
sector, shifting citizen demands and the availability of new information technologies.  
Governments at all levels undertook extensive program reviews and restructuring, and 
eliminated many programs and services (Lindquist 1996; MacNeil 1996).  Many of the 
values, political powers, and social relationships that define Canadian society were called into 
question, including the notion of ―public‖ and its link to government (McBride 2001; Teeple 
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2000).  This realignment has had implications not only for public services, but also citizens, 
communities and broader civil society.  As a result of extensive cutbacks and the ongoing 
discourse around the need for efficiency, the perception has developed that the traditional 
roles and responsibilities of governments are unable to meet the pressing challenges facing 
society (Jessop 2002).  
The growing body of literature on the social economy shows that there are many 
interpretations of what the category actually includes and how it is defined.  The use of the 
term ―social economy‖ is relatively new, while the organizational forms it takes have long 
existed.  Bouchard, Ferraton and Michaud (2008) propose a definition based on five 
principles: 
…1) objective of service to the members and the community rather than of 
profit; 2) management autonomy (the primary element distinguishing it from 
the public sector; 3) democratic decision-making process; 4) primacy of 
persons and of work in the distribution of revenues and surpluses…with the 
addition of a fifth principle: that of participation, empowerment, and 
responsibility (Bouchard, Ferraton and Michaud 2008). 
 
Social economy organizations are further characterized as follows: 
…organization of economic activity; non-capitalist rules of distribution and 
accumulation; legal and decisional autonomy; democratic powers of users or 
their representatives.  The choice of emphasis is likely due to different ideas of 
the social economy‘s contribution: as a producer of goods and services; as an 
alternative and sustainable form of development; as an organization of the 
civil society; as a means of social and economic democratization (Bouchard, 
Ferraton and Michaud 2008). 
 
People in the social economy have developed a wide range of responses to the 
withdrawal of governments from the provision of many programs and services.  For instance, 
in Quebec social economy initiatives have developed early childhood day care centres, home 
care services, and social housing; in Saskatchewan, the co-operative Community Clinics have 
provided health care services for over forty years; and in New Brunswick, social economy 
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initiatives have been emerging in connection with the environmental, women‘s and social 
justice movements (Vaillancourt and Tremblay 2002). 
Levesque and Mendell (2004) note that the social economy has developed in two 
main areas: 
…as a strategy to combat poverty and social and occupational exclusion —
initiatives in response to urgent social needs and critical social situations; and 
in the creation of new wealth—initiatives in response not only to needs but to 
opportunities in which neither the market nor the state are effectively engaged 
(Levesque and Mendell 2004: 5). 
 
Social economy organizations have also been important sites of social innovation to 
address social and economic challenges (Goldenberg et al. 2009; Bouchard 2009).  In her 
review of the literature on social innovation, Bouchard (2009) notes that social innovations 
are a collective process of invention and diffusion, and that they result in new ways of 
managing and organizing work, and new methods of performing it.  Goldenberg et al. (2009) 
has found that social innovation has come to be regarded as ―legitimate public policy in both 
the economic and social arenas‖.  Further, social innovation can: 
…bring about transformative change if it is implemented successfully.  At the 
highest level, the goal of social innovation is to address the social challenges 
the world faces through innovative means.  These challenges can be as large-
scale as fighting global climate change and reducing poverty or as small-scale 
as creating a community garden (Goldenberg et al. 2009: iv). 
 
Although the social economy has long existed, it received more attention from 
governments in response to challenges they have faced during and since the 1980s.  For 
instance, the challenges that the federal government in Canada faced in the 1980s and 1990s 
led it to consider alternate means of delivering programs and services as part of its 
restructuring efforts.  The intent was not only to improve efficiency but also service to the 
public.  To try to ensure that the co-operative model was considered as a mechanism, in 1996 
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the Canadian Co-operative Association, the Conseil de la Co-opération, and the Institute of 
Public Administration of Canada partnered to undertake the Co-operative Alternatives for 
Public Services (CAPS) project.   In spite of the advantages that the co-operative model 
would have offered in terms of improving responsiveness, performance and accountability, as 
well as innovation, cost efficiency and local empowerment (Restakis and Lindquist 2001), 
the ASD/CAPS project appears to have ended without significant uptake by government 
(Restakis 2005).  Restakis and Lindquist (2001) found that the biggest barriers to advancing 
the project were the large gaps in knowledge of the co-operative model.  This was true of 
governments at all levels, which appeared not to appreciate and how this model might fit into 
plans to restructure service delivery. 
 It appears that governments have subsequently become interested in the social 
economy to address gaps in programs and services that need to be filled, but recognition of 
and support for social economy organizations by governments has varied according to 
political ideology. 
Interest by governments in the social economy was evident through federal initiatives 
and corresponding provincial involvement.  For instance, by 2000, the Liberal government of 
the day had already begun to strengthen the relationship between the federal government and 
the voluntary sector, which culminated in the establishment of the Voluntary Sector Initiative 
(Government of Canada.  Voluntary Sector Initiative web site).   Former Premier Lorne 
Calvert of Saskatchewan, leading an NDP minority government, mirrored this initiative by 
establishing the Premier‘s Voluntary Sector Initiative in recognition of the contribution of 
voluntary sector activities to the quality of life in Saskatchewan.  
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However, the interest of governments in the social economy was not always benign.  
Browne and Welch (2002), for instance, provide a critique of how social economy 
organizations providing health and welfare services in Ontario were affected by the Harris 
government: 
Federal cuts in social expenditures and provincial policies of fiscal restraint 
and privatization have had a serious impact on Ontario.  The neo-liberal right 
— both the Conservative Party at the provincial level and the Reform 
Party/Alliance at the federal level — has drawn some of its popularity from 
people‘s disenchantment with government.  Of course, it did not respond to 
this disenchantment by promoting greater democracy in the delivery of 
services through the social economy; it extolled the market and consumerism.  
Thus, the neo-liberal response to the critique of the state is the privatization 
and commercialization of services.  With the Conservative government of 
Mike Harris, all progressive social forces have had their backs against the wall 
and have suffered major setbacks.  Consequently, there is today hardly any 
coherent or explicit movement left to build a new progressive social economy 
in Ontario.  On the contrary, in the fields of health and welfare the non-profit 
sector in Ontario lives in the shadow of privatization and commercialization, 
that is, in the shadow of the market (Browne and Welch 2002: 105). 
 
Changes in the governing party also affected governments‘ interest in and support for 
the social economy.  Federal activity included a National Roundtable on the Social Economy 
(Human Resources and Social Development Canada website) and the Policy Research 
Initiative launched a project on ―New Approaches for Addressing Poverty and Exclusion‖ 
(Policy Research Initiative 2005).  The social economy was examined as part of this project   
In November 2005, the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada 
(SSHRC) awarded $9 million to fund a suite of projects to link university researchers with 
social economy organizations (Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada 
web site). 
When Stephen Harper‘s Conservatives came to power in January 2006, the social 
economy initiatives of the federal government were cancelled or scaled back considerably, 
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along with other social policy and development initiatives focusing on the voluntary sector.  
The public policy environment for these initiatives changed; where lobby and advocacy 
groups previously had access to the policy-making process, the new government instead 
focused on service provision to individuals, thus limiting groups‘ ability to influence policy 
decisions.   
Critics have noted that the promotion of the social economy by governments may 
mean leaving governments unchanged and off the hook with respect to social programs and 
services because they are shifting responsibility to non-governmental organizations without 
providing the resources necessary to provide good programs and services (Armstrong 2004; 
Rekart 1993).  The social economy could thus become a scapegoat for government.  
Dependence on government funding may also force social economy organizations to drop 
their advocacy roles, diminishing both their autonomy and their democratic nature.  Further, 
workers in the social economy are generally paid lower salaries than government workers so 
shifting program and service delivery to them could allow governments to achieve cost 
savings (Browne and Welch 2002).   Finally, moving programs and services out of public 
administration could leave them subject to trade liberalization agreements and organizations 
(Armstrong 2004).  
These criticisms of government behaviour with respect to social economy 
organizations provide important context for the study of social economy organizations such 
as co-operatives.  These organizations are products of their social, economic, political and 
cultural environments and histories.  While there can be productive partnerships between 
governments and social economy organizations, the stated and unstated objectives of 
governments for supporting social economy initiatives must be considered.  It should also be 
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noted that not all parts of a government are necessarily united, and that governments are not 
necessarily coherent and strategic with respect to their objectives toward social economy 
organizations. 
 In summary, the literature suggests that governments‘ support for and recognition of 
the social economy varies according to political ideology, and that the views and goals of the 
government and those involved in the social economy can differ and conflict.  Governments 
tend to view social economy organizations as able to fill gaps in program and service 
delivery, while reducing related costs.  Founders of and practitioners in the social economy 
tend to view these organizations as vehicles to serve the needs of under- or ill-served groups 
and to develop innovative solutions to service and program gaps. 
 
 
2.2 The Roles of Co-operatives in Society 
Governments hold varying ideas with respect to the roles of co-operatives in society; 
governments can and have used co-operatives as policy instruments in a number of different 
ways according to their political vision.  Indeed, co-operatives have been used to achieve 
both benign and less benign objectives (Fairbairn 2000; Hoyt 1989; Craig 1993).  Fairbairn 
notes that: 
In the international context, co-operatives have been favoured because they 
improve national economies; assist primary producers (especially in 
agriculture), particularly to market exports; reduce unemployment by creating 
locally-based jobs; reduce dependency on the state; and provide services to 
rural areas that investor-oriented firms are less interested in serving, among 
other reasons (Fairbairn 2000: 49). 
 
On the other hand, governments have used the co-operative model to exert control 
over certain groups of people. Craig (1993) notes that the establishment of co-operatives 
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under some neocolonial administrations primarily served the interests of the state and its 
favoured subgroups, and did not promote equitable grassroots development: 
Co-operatives values and ideology are strongly egalitarian and opposed to 
racism.  Yet agricultural co-operatives were well developed by white farmers 
in South Africa during the apartheid era and most Afrikaner farmers are 
members and supporters.  The white-only leadership was silent on the issue of 
apartheid and exclusion of blacks occurred in the co-operatives as well as 
elsewhere in white society (Craig 1993: 190). 
 
As a further illustration, in some countries co-operatives must conform to state plans, 
ownership cannot be traced to individuals, and benefits are not distributed on the basis of 
patronage – all of which violate fundamental co-operative principles (Hoyt 1989).   The 
strong role of co-operatives in centrally planned economies has created controversy in the 
international co-operative community as to what constitutes a co-operative (Hoyt 1989: 82). 
There is also debate about the appropriate role of government in developing economies, 
where co-operatives are often used as a tool to augment development.  Development 
assistance flows from the developed countries‘ governments and their co-operative 
organizations to assist in developing co-operatives in the Third World (Develtere 1992). 
Develtere (1992) describes how the imposition of the co-operative model by colonial 
regimes was aimed at incorporating ―rural economies into the world capitalist system‖. Co-
operatives ensured that colonial merchant-traders could obtain sufficient goods to meet 
growing demands from their home countries, but primarily for their own benefit, not that of 
the co-operatives‘ members. While co-operatives are in theory voluntary and open 
organizations, in practice co-operative sectors in developing countries have to a large degree 
been externally driven, as have the institutional arrangements in which co-operatives are 
supposed to function (Develtere 1992). Outside agents, primarily governments‘ were 
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frequently responsible for implementing the co-operative model in colonized countries.  
However, co-operative movements in the home countries were also involved in promoting 
and establishing co-operatives in the colonies.  Doing so was viewed by these external agents 
as essential for maintaining social control, although this was not the stated purpose.  As 
Develtere (1992) notes: 
The promotion of co-operatives was directly linked to the unrest that was 
growing in many places in the Empire. The British authorities, in many cases, 
introduced co-operative schemes only after rural or working-class protest 
(Develtere 1992: 39). 
 
Governments‘ treatment of co-operatives in other countries is discussed further in Chapter 
Three. 
 The roles of co-operatives in more affluent and developed countries have been 
somewhat different from their roles in the colonial South. Torgerson et al. (1998) discuss the 
main approaches to agricultural co-operative development adopted in the United States — the 
California School and the Competitive Yardstick School — that are described as particularly 
and distinctly American. They claim that it is this distinctiveness that resulted in particular 
policy roles for co-operatives. 
 According to Torgerson et al. (1998), the California School, initiated by Aaron 
Sapiro, was developed in response to the need of agricultural producers to ensure they 
received fair treatment and obtained improved control and co-ordination of marketing 
procedures.  They did so by establishing co-operatives to market specific agricultural 
commodities. These co-operatives took the form of direct membership associations with 
long-term membership contracts and professional management.  The lack of professional 
management was deemed to have been a major cause of co-operative failure in early co-
operative marketing efforts.  Through improved management, growers were able to avoid the 
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―disastrous consequences‖ of having their crop dumped on the market at the same time, 
driving the price down. 
 Sapiro is credited by Torgerson et al. (1998) with creating awareness throughout 
North America of the potential for farmers to organize to improve the terms and conditions 
under which they did business.  The advocates of the California School are also credited with 
playing a major role in the passage of the Capper-Volstead Act of 1922 (Capper-Volstead Act 
of 1922.   Approved, February 18, 1922.  (42 Stat. 388) 7 U.S.C.A., 291-192) and the 
Cooperative Marketing Act of 1926 (Cooperative Marketing Act of 1926 (July 2, 1926, ch. 
725, subchapter 2, 44 Stat. 802)).  These same advocates influenced the creation of orderly 
marketing mechanisms under the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937 
(Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937.  7 U.S.C. subchapter 601). 
 E.G. Nourse (1927), a Chicago school economist, advocated a different model of co-
operative development to counter the broader scheme of Sapiro.  Rather than direct 
membership co-operatives that tended to be organized on a regional basis, Nourse‘s 
Competitive Yardstick School advocated smaller, locally controlled co-operatives focused on 
providing the services that farmers needed in their communities.  A main difference was that 
he believed that co-operatives ―could be organized to represent a limited share of marketing 
activity and still serve a yardstick role by which members could measure the performance of 
other firms dominating the marketing channel‖ (Torgerson et al. 1998: 3). By their presence, 
co-operatives could play a check and balance function in the market. They would increase 
competition to the ultimate benefit of farmer-members.  Nourse disagreed with Sapiro‘s idea 
of democratically-controlled and market-dominant commodity co-operatives and instead 
advocated that co-operatives could ―attain scale economies by affiliating through purchasing 
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or marketing federations that preserved a bottom-up structure rather than a more centralized, 
top-down one‖ (Torgerson et al. 1998: 3). 
 Torgerson et al. note that the Competitive Yardstick School and its focus on service, 
competition, and efficiency created a: 
…public policy rationale for supporting the organization of more cooperatives 
as a partial answer to farm price and income problem. The competition-
enhancing rationale also became an important element in treatment under tax 
and antitrust codes (Torgerson et al. 1998: 3). 
 
 Torgerson et al. place much emphasis on the independence of American farmers. This 
seems to fit with Craig‘s (1993) discussion of modified capitalism: ―The school of modified 
capitalism suggests that co-operatives provide a decentralizing influence that counteracts the 
centralizing tendencies of corporate capitalism‖ (Craig 1993: 63). This view is not surprising 
in that the suggestion of socialism or communism in any form was to be avoided, especially 
during the McCarthy era and the Cold War; taken to its extreme, the school of modified 
capitalism argues that co-operatives ―are not socialist in nature, or a separate sector. Rather 
they are the epitome of the capitalist ideal‖ (Craig 1993: 63).  Emphasis is placed on how 
individuals through collective action can improve their economic wellbeing and also increase 
their personal freedom and individualism to a degree greater than that which they could 
otherwise achieve.  In Craig‘s (1993) view, it is this school which is the dominant one in the 
United States. 
Co-operatives have also been used as a means of social control in developed 
countries, as well as developing ones.  Bantjes (2007) notes that in Canada, politicians and 
government officials were: 
…most keen on co-operatives where the threat from more radical forms of 
organization was greatest.  Departments of agriculture, fisheries, and even 
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special departments of co-operative development were using funds and 
fieldworkers in an effort to channel popular activism away from socialism and 
toward forms of economic reform more compatible with capitalism (Bantjes 
2007:  61). 
 
For instance, the establishment of agricultural co-operatives on the Prairies was at 
least in part driven by class differences between eastern capitalist interests and the 
immigrants who became farmers.  Politicians and officials feared that the settlers who came 
from Eastern Europe and England brought ideas about socialism, trade unionism and radical 
action with them.  Co-operatives were viewed as a means of shielding farmers from the 
effects of the market, making them less dependent on single commodities, and avoiding 
radical reactions to global capitalism (Bantjes 2007: 55).  Nonetheless, many farmers pursued 
the dream of a co-operative commonwealth to replace capitalism. 
Little attention is given by Torgerson et al. (1998) to the Co-operative 
Commonwealth School, perhaps because of its ideological basis in utopianism.  The idea of a 
Co-operative Commonwealth originated with the British co-operative movement in reaction 
to the unfettered growth of the capitalist economy during the Industrial Revolution (Bantjes 
2007: 44; Bonner 1961: 461; Craig 1993: 53; MacPherson 1979: 4).  The Rochdale Pioneers 
were influenced by utopian ideas of people such as Robert Owen when they established their 
co-operative in 1844:  ―…they would create a utopian community (self-supporting home 
colony) in which nonexploitive social and economic relationships would be achieved‖ 
(Fairbairn 1994).  The concept of a Co-operative Commonwealth was not unique to England 
and was supported in Canada, France, Sweden and the United States (Bonner 1961: 467).  
There was some debate about what a co-operative commonwealth would consist of and how 
it could be achieved, but in general the goal was to achieve a new order in society. 
This approach has never resulted in the achievement of a full-fledged new social 
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order, but the Co-operative Commonwealth School did have a considerable impact on 
Saskatchewan, notwithstanding claims by Torgerson et al. (1998) that co-operatives in North 
America sprang up independently of such utopian influences.  In fact, the school‘s influence 
was so strong that it contributed to the formation of a social democratic political party that 
has enjoyed considerable periods of power as the elected Government of Saskatchewan 
(Johnson 2004), and of several other provinces, notably British Columbia and Manitoba.  
This was, of course, the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation (C.C.F.), now known as the 
New Democratic Party. 
In summary, these different streams of co-operative thought illustrate that, depending 
on political ideology, governments perceive co-operatives as playing different public policy 
roles.  In many developed economies of the West, governments see co-operatives as acting as 
a competitive yardstick and as serving as a check and balance to the private sector, thus 
levelling the playing field.  The founders of co-operatives frequently take a different view of 
the role that co-operatives play; because of their grassroots orientation, co-operatives provide 
members/producers/ users and communities with control over the delivery of goods and 
services.  For many founders, co-operatives support the development of what they view as a 
better society. 
 
2.2.1 Proposition One 
The preceding examination of the literature on the social economy in Canada and on 
the roles that co-operatives can play in society shows that the views of the government and 
the social economy, and the views of co-operative founders and government are not 
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necessarily congruent.  It is therefore suggested that the following would be found with 
respect to co-operatives, as social economy organizations. 
Proposition One: 
The views of the government and those in the social economy can differ and conflict.  
While co-operative founders believe that the co-operative model of social economy 
organization allows their members to achieve control over the delivery of the goods and 
services they need, with the underlying ideology promoting a vision of a better society, 
government believes that co-operatives serve a public policy role by acting as a check 
and balance and serving as a competitive yardstick to the private sector. 
 
 
 
2.3 Co-operative – Government Relations 
 
The literature on government–co-operative sector relations in Canada is somewhat 
dated but continues to be relevant to this research.  The relationship between co-operatives 
and governments is complicated by the division in powers between the federal, provincial and 
territorial governments, different levels of support for and recognition of co-operatives, 
variations in government structures addressing co-operative policy and programs, and 
difficulties the co-operative sector has in having its issues and concerns addressed (See 
Appendix Five for a discussion of the division of powers between the federal, territorial and 
provincial governments with respect to co-operatives). 
This section begins with a historical overview of government–co-operative relations 
in Saskatchewan, and then delves into literature that provides potential answers to the 
question:  Why did co-operative – government relations develop the way they did? 
 
2.3.1 The Government and the Co-operative Sector in Saskatchewan 
Co-operatives have played, and continue to play, an important role in Saskatchewan‘s 
economic and social development (Fulton, Hammond Ketilson and Simbandumwe 1991; 
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Hammond Ketilson et al. 1998; Herman and Fulton 2001).  For its size and population, 
Saskatchewan has a large co-operative sector such that co-operatives have had a ―significant 
place‖ in government policy (Fairbairn 2000).  The scope, placement and size of the 
Saskatchewan government‘s capacity to address co-operative policy and co-operative 
development has varied considerably over the years, with changes in political party at the 
helm of the government as well as changes in political priorities.  Fairbairn (2000) suggests 
that a key question in examining government–co-operative relations in Saskatchewan is ―how 
best to place what is effectively an interdepartmental policy area within a strongly 
departmentalized civil service‖ (Fairbairn 2000: 29). 
Fairbairn (2000) describes three stages in the history of government–co-operative 
relations in Saskatchewan: the first from 1913 to 1944; the second from 1944 to 1982; and 
the third from 1982 to 1999.  During the first period, responsibility for co-operatives resided 
in the Department of Agriculture.  This made sense at the time because of the growth of the 
co-operative movement among farmers, who needed to pool and market their grain 
themselves and to obtain farm supplies at reasonable costs, instead of having dominant 
Eastern Canada interests control and profit from their efforts.   Although the government did 
not start the co-operative movement in the province (Fairbairn 2000: 30), it did provide 
support for co-operative development. 
Eventually, other kinds of co-operatives were formed, such as retail co-operatives and 
credit unions, and it no longer made sense to house responsibility for co-operatives in the 
Department of Agriculture (Fairbairn 2000: 31).  The co-operative movement outgrew the 
capacity of one branch in that department.  When the C.C.F. became the governing party of 
the province in 1944, it established a department wholly devoted to co-operatives – the 
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Department of Co-operation and Co-operative Development (Fairbairn 2000:31).  
MacPherson  (1984) notes that:  ―Even the name of the new political party, the Co-operative 
Commonwealth Federation, was partly an attempt to build on the widespread support gained 
by the Canadian co-operative movement since the turn of the century, particularly on the 
prairies‖ (MacPherson 1984: 161). 
The Department of Co-operation and Co-operative Development focused on 
promoting the development of new types of co-operatives in the 1944-1982 period but, for 
the most part, did not address the concerns and issues of the established co-operatives: 
In retrospect it is striking how little the established co-operatives and the 
C.C.F. government had to do with one another.  While there were numerous 
ideological and personal connections, there were few joint initiatives, 
partnerships, or government programmes or initiatives to assist established co-
operatives.  In some respects the apparently close alliance between the co-
operative movement and the C.C.F. was an illusion.  While the followers of 
the two movements shared overlapping reformist visions, there were few close 
connections between government programmes and co-operative organizations 
(Fairbairn 2000: 31-2). 
 
 Many of the new co-operatives developed in the second stage of government–co-
operative sector relations would not have been established without government intervention 
(Fairbairn 2000: 32).  Yet, development was not pursued in many situations where there were 
opportunities.  The Medicare crisis occurred during this time but the government did not 
pursue the development of co-operative Community Clinics: 
One of the most promising forms of co-operative developed in this period was 
the consumer-sponsored health-services co-operative (community clinic).  
However, the controversy associated with the emergence of these co-
operatives in the doctors‘ strike of 1962 led the C.C.F. and all subsequent 
governments to distance itself from them.  As a result, a promising model 
within an area of public responsibility was not actively promoted (Fairbairn 
2000: 32). 
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 Fairbairn (2000) calls the third period an ―era of experimentation that has not ended‖.  
The Progressive Conservative (P.C.) government under Premier Grant Devine eliminated the 
Department of Co-operation and Co-operative Development in 1987
1
.   Responsibility for co-
operative incorporation, legislation and regulation went to the Department of Justice; 
responsibility for co-operative development and government–co-operative sector liaison was 
housed in a Co-operatives Branch in the Department of Economic Development and Trade.  
The number of staff assigned to the branch was drastically reduced.  
The P.C. government was very much focused on large-scale economic development 
projects and entered into an arrangement with Federated Co-operatives Limited (FCL) to 
sponsor the building of a heavy oil upgrader at FCL‘s refinery in Regina (Fairbairn 2000: 34).  
The province provided much of the funding required for this venture.  Where there were new 
co-operatives developed, much of this activity was prompted by government programming 
that was not specific to co-operatives (Fairbairn 2000: 34).  For instance, the Small Business 
Loans Association program provided equity for small business development is still in 
operation today (Enterprise Saskatchewan website). 
 In 1991, the N.D.P. was re-elected.  In response to concerns voiced by the co-
operative movement, in 1992 the government established a Co-operatives Directorate with an 
Assistant Deputy Minister responsible for co-operatives in the Department of Economic 
Development
2
.  The directorate was intended to be the focal point for government-co-
operative sector relations and was involved in co-operative policy and program development.  
                                                 
1
 I worked at the Department of Economic Development and Trade at that time and have firsthand knowledge of 
this event, and of government-co-operative sector relations since then. 
2
 I was employed as a Senior Policy and Program Co-ordinator in the Co-operatives Directorate from May 1992 
to September 1997.  The discussion in the rest of this section is based on my own experience during that time. 
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When the Department of Rural Affairs was disbanded, the directorate also acquired 
responsibility for community economic development. 
The establishment of the directorate raised the profile of the co-operative sector for a 
time.  The directorate prepared a Cabinet-approved mandate setting out how the government 
would work with and support the co-operative sector, and the name of the department was 
changed to Economic and Co-operative Development. The Assistant Deputy Minister for Co-
operatives had been the Executive Director of the Regina Community Clinic for 12 years 
before coming to government.  While he was in the Co-operatives Directorate, he made 
several approaches to the Department of Health to include the co-operative model in the 
Wellness approach and in other plans for the restructuring of health care in the province.  His 
overtures were rebuffed by officials in the Department of Health (Marwick 2005). 
The decision was made to dissolve the directorate in 1998 and to disperse 
responsibility for co-operative development among other branches in the department.  Co-
operative development specialists were assigned to the Small Business unit.  The Assistant 
Deputy Minister position was abolished and the remaining staff was reassigned to other units.  
 The question of how best to situate responsibility for co-operative policy, 
programming and development support within government remains unanswered (Fairbairn 
2000).  Placing responsibility for co-operatives within an influential line department such as 
Economic Development could, in theory, be beneficial to the co-operative movement.  
However, this department was very focused on the dominant business structure and did not 
understand the associational aspects of co-operatives or that economic and social 
development go hand-in-hand (Marwick 2005).  On the other hand, placing responsibility for 
co-operatives in a central agency would isolate it from the departments dealing with co-
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operative matters.  Childcare co-operatives, for instance, are the responsibility of the 
Department of Education and grazing co-operatives come under the purview of the 
Department of Agriculture. 
 There was further restructuring of government departments.  In 2005, a Department of 
Rural Development was re-established and responsibility for co-operatives was assigned to it 
(Government of Saskatchewan.  News Release, March 11, 2005).  Co-operative development 
staff were incorporated into regional offices, which deal with business services.  In the budget 
of 2006, this department was renamed Regional Economic and Co-operative Development.  
However, there has been little capacity to undertake co-operative policy development since 
the Co-operatives Directorate was disbanded in 1998. 
For a time, it seemed that political interest in co-operatives was increasing yet again.  
In 2005, the Co-operative Advisory Council was established to: 
…provide a forum for senior representatives of Saskatchewan Co-operative 
Association (SCA), its member co-operatives, and other invited co-operative 
organizations to meet with the Minister of [Regional Economic and Co-
operative Development] and other government representatives to discuss high 
level issues relevant to both SCA and the government including but not 
limited to: 
 
1. Legislation, regulations, policies, programs, and services initiated by 
the Provincial Government that impact on the development, operation, 
and growth of co-operatives and credit unions in Saskatchewan; 
2. Co-operative and credit union sector strategies and initiatives of 
interest to government, or where supportive action by the government 
is required, and 
3. Issues of mutual concern and to establish joint strategies to enable the 
co-operative and credit union sector to work in partnership with the 
government to address them (Co-operative Advisory Council Terms of 
Reference, unpublished). 
 
 
More drastic changes came with the election of November 2007.  The Saskatchewan 
Party achieved a majority government and reorganized government departments and 
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agencies.  The former Department of Regional Economic and Co-operative Development was 
renamed the Ministry of Enterprise and Innovation.   This ministry was charged with 
establishing a new arm‘s length organization called Enterprise Saskatchewan to be the focal 
point for economic development planning in the province.  Enterprise Saskatchewan was 
formally established in July 2008 (Government of Saskatchewan.  News Release.  August 1, 
2008).  The implications for co-operative policy, programming and development are not yet 
known, although a Co-operatives Sector Team has been established to make 
recommendations to remove barriers to growth and build on competitive advantages. 
Fairbairn‘s (2000) analysis of government policy toward co-operatives concludes that 
it varies based on political interests and priorities.  Although there have been some 
differences in the ways that the political parties have related to co-operatives, ―it has arguably 
never been a basic political goal of any government to promote co-operatives simply for the 
sake of promoting co-operatives…government policy as a whole firmly supported co-
operatives only when there was a larger, practical goal in sight‖ (Fairbairn 2000: 36). 
In Canada, government support for co-operative development and government 
capacity structures to address the needs of co-operatives vary over time and according to 
government priorities.  Generally, governments do not adequately address co-operatives in 
their programming, policies, structures, budget allocations, and legislation. 
  
2.3.2 Co-operatives and Policy-Making 
Fulton and Laycock (1990) conclude that co-operatives will continue to receive less 
than their fair share of policy influence because they are non-capitalist entities in a capitalist 
political economy.  The formal logic of state decision-making limits their effectiveness.  
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Their democratic structures make it almost certain that in their policy activities co-operatives 
will adopt an advocacy role that their members see as engagement with politicians on issues 
that are important to them.  At the same time, the formal structures of their organizations will 
often result in co-operative managers and leaders wishing to engage more directly in policy-
making, with government officials responsible for policy decisions.  There is a difference 
between how the members and the managers of co-operatives approach advocacy; co-
operative members are part of a policy community which operates at some distance from the 
network of decision-makers; managers and leaders want to be involved in that network.  
Policy networks and communities continue to be the subject of ongoing research (Skogstad 
2005; Monpetit 2002) and remain relevant to an examination of how nongovernmental 
organizations participate in the policy process. 
Co-operatives have been somewhat suspicious of maintaining close relations with 
federal and provincial governments.  Fulton and Laycock (1990) note that this finds 
expression as ―a disinclination to become involved in broad-ranging public policy discussions 
and an opposition to expansion of state enterprise except where this directly promotes co-
operatives‘ institutional interests‖ (Fulton and Laycock 1990: 142-3).  They attribute this 
attitude to co-operatives‘ belief that an interventionist state might intrude on economic and 
social activities within which co-operatives have found their market niche.  It is also related 
to their frustration with governments that early on ―facilitated the domination of the average 
citizen by distant economic elites‖ (Fulton and Laycock 1990: 143).  The co-operative 
movement‘s practice of political neutrality is also a factor; increased participation in partisan 
policy development or political activity might contravene this practice.  The result is ―a 
profound yet unarticulated uneasiness about co-operative-state relations‖ (Fulton and 
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Laycock 1990: 143), which ultimately impacts co-operatives‘ ability to effectively influence 
government policy. 
Fulton and Laycock (1990) delineate two main types of influence that pressure groups 
can exercise; these are traditional lobbying or policy advocacy, and actual policy-making and 
implementation.  The groups engaging in such activities are often referred to as policy 
communities, in the first instance, and policy networks in the second (Skogstad 2005; 
Atkinson and Coleman 1996).   
In order to effectively influence government policy formation, pressure groups must 
be able to mobilize support among either their members or the public, or both.  This means 
that there must be considerable consensus among members.  Members must believe that the 
group does, in fact, represent their interests, and cohesion signals to the government that the 
group has legitimacy.  Fulton and Laycock (1990) suggest that lobby or advocacy efforts 
need to be narrowly focused to represent the views of members, and to make statements and 
decisions for them; this implies that regional or industry-specific groups may be more 
successful than large co-operatives with diverse memberships.  Members tend to be issue-
oriented and focused on achieving short-run objectives; they therefore may have minimal 
knowledge of government policy-making processes and players. 
To be involved in policy-making, groups need to be able to ―order and co-ordinate large 
amounts of detailed and technical information, and remain relatively autonomous from both their 
members and the government‖ (Fulton and Laycock 1990: 145). Maintaining autonomy is seen as 
particularly important because ―group negotiation and compromise with both state and other 
groups in the economy is fundamental to policy participation‖ (Fulton and Laycock 1990: 145).  
Organizations, for instance private corporations or private sector trade associations, have 
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advantages over membership-based groups such as co-operatives in proposing policy changes.  
The interests of organizations engaged in lobbying are not necessarily those of its members, so to 
the extent that organizations have political power, this does not depend on a legitimation process.  
The decision to influence public policy is a management decision and managers have a great deal 
of independence in decisions they make. 
Corporations and business associations often have greater financial resources than 
membership-based organizations, and have greater freedom to exert pressure on policy makers 
(Fulton and Laycock 1990: 145).  They tend to be more stable over the long run and are able to 
develop extensive knowledge of government process and players.  Within a co-operative, 
however, the decision to influence public policy is not the manager‘s to make.  The decision must 
be made by the board, taking into consideration the varying interests of the co-operative‘s 
members.  Because of heterogeneous interests among members, consensus may not be possible.  
The democratic process that must take place may hinder the co-operative from acting quickly 
(Cook 1994; Hammond Ketilson 1990; Fulton and Laycock 1990). 
As membership groups with a democratic structure and member commitment, co-
operatives should be well positioned for success in policy advocacy.  However, their dual nature 
means that they are also organizations with hierarchical and bureaucratic structures.  Because of 
this, ―directors and management often take independent action on both commercial and policy 
fronts‖ (Fulton and Laycock 1990: 148).  Co-operatives‘ dual nature can result in conflicts 
between policy advocacy and policy-making roles, reflecting the tension between what members 
want and what managers want.  
In summary, the literature on government – co-operative sector relations in Canada 
provides evidence that government officials lack knowledge and understanding of the co-
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operative model.  Moreover, structural and governance issues constrain co-operatives in their 
advocacy and lobbying efforts.  Consequently, co-operatives and their associations are 
relatively ineffective in their lobbying and advocacy efforts and in participating in the policy-
making process. 
  
2.3.3 Categorizing Government Treatment of Co-operatives 
 
Government‘s approach to co-operatives can take many forms.  Because there is so 
much variation in how governments treat co-operatives, a means of categorizing how 
governments treat co-operatives as social economy organizations is a useful heuristic device 
to compare treatment over time and according to which political party is in power within the 
same jurisdiction.  It also allows comparison among different countries.  
As Hoyt (1989) notes, the fundamental dilemma underlying government treatment of 
co-operatives is what the role of government should be with respect to co-operative 
development: 
Experience throughout the world has shown that government policies can 
impede or enhance independent co-operative development.  The debate centers 
on the need to preserve autonomy and democratic control of the cooperative by 
its members, while recognizing the cooperatives‘ need, in some countries, to 
receive management and financial support from the government and to operate 
in a favourable legislative environment (Hoyt 1989: 88). 
 
Hoyt (1989) identified a continuum of public policy toward co-operatives in her 
examination of how agricultural co-operatives have been treated by governments around the 
world.  These conditions vary from country to country and can change through time as new 
political regimes gain power.  Although the continuum speaks to the relationship between 
agricultural co-operatives and governments, it can be applied to other types of co-operatives.  
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This continuum is a useful guide for categorizing public policy on co-operatives.  Hoyt (1989) 
categorizes government policy in five levels from outright hostility to complete control: 
 
Figure 1 – Hoyt’s Continuum of Public Policy on Co-operatives 
Type of policy 
level: 
 
Destructive 
 
1 
 
 
Neutral 
 
2 
 
Supportive 
 
3 
 
Participating 
 
4 
 
Controlling 
 
5 
 
 
 
Description:  
 
 
 
 
Antagonism, 
hostility, 
violent 
destruction 
 
 
 
 
No public 
policy, 
positive or 
negative 
 
 
 
 
Creation of 
favorable 
legal/business 
environment  
 
 
 
 
Active 
provision of 
support 
services; may 
include 
management 
 
 
 
 
 
Total control 
over cooperative 
management and 
decision-making 
 
(Hoyt 1989) 
  
At level 1, governments are hostile toward co-operatives and suspicious of them.  
They attempt to restrict, suppress or outlaw co-operatives.  An example of this is the 
treatment that consumer co-operatives experienced in Nazi Germany: 
In principle, the cooperatives, with their democratic ways of self-
administration, did not fit into the political system and the socio-economic 
concept of National Socialism.  On the other hand, the cooperatives had been 
able to develop strong market positions, so it was not possible simply to 
liquidate them, either.  Liquidation was, however, inflicted upon the consumer 
cooperatives whose activity had a strongly socialist orientation which was to 
be repressed by smashing their organizational basis.  At first all of their 
organizations including their associations and central enterprises were 
subjected to the command and disposal of the ‗Deutsche Arbeits-front‖ 
(German workers‘ front) while their nationwide associations were dissolved 
right away (Aschhoff and Henningsen 1986: 31). 
 
 At level 2, ―the government does not actively attempt to destroy co-operatives, nor 
does it give them special treatment.  In effect, co-operative businesses operate in the same 
climate as all other businesses.  This limited involvement by government has been typical of 
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industrialized countries‖ (Hoyt 1989: 89).  Government involvement in co-operative 
development in some Western industrialized countries has been limited because social or 
popular movements established co-operatives to meet their goals; co-operative movements in 
some industrialized countries were also built on strong traditions of independence, 
voluntarism and self-help (Hoyt 1989), reducing the need for government intervention.  
Treatment at this level could be considered to be ―benign neglect‖. 
 Policy makers at level 3 demonstrate: 
…a positive attitude toward co-operatives as a tool that citizens can use to 
improve their economic well-being and participate in economic democracy.  
Artificial barriers to co-operative operations are removed.  For example, 
special legislation may be passed to make it easier to organize and operate 
them.  Education, research, and technical assistance programs are initiated to 
help co-operatives be successful.  The aim of government is to encourage the 
development of co-operatives; however, responsibility for initiating and 
carrying through this development rests with members…the government is not 
actively involved in the day-to-day affairs of the co-operative, does not 
participate in co-operative management, and does not have representatives on 
the board of directors (Hoyt 1989: 90).   
 
 Level 3 appears to demonstrate a balance between government‘s public policy goals 
and the need to maintain autonomy and democratic control by members.  The environment 
established by government is enabling, not too controlling (as at level 4) and not too 
neglectful (as at level 2). 
 Given the history of co-operatives in Saskatchewan, it would appear that their 
treatment by the provincial government could be categorized as falling into level 2 or level 3.  
The government‘s organizational structure for supporting co-operatives has ranged from very 
little profile, few staff and a nominal budget allocation within a department to an entire 
department dedicated to co-operation and co-operative development.  The former is 
indicative of level 2 and the latter level 3.  When the co-operative model has not been 
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regarded as useful in addressing government priorities, a neutral stance has been maintained; 
when the co-operative model has been instrumental, a supportive approach has been taken. 
 Co-operatives in Saskatchewan have not experienced the extreme treatment that levels 
1 and 5 represent.  An example of how co-operatives have been treated at level 5, at which 
governments have total control over co-operative decision-making and management, can be 
found in colonial policy.  Develtere (1992) states that British colonial policy was: ―…directed 
primarily to the maintenance of law and order so that trading companies might pursue and 
expand their business‖ (Develtere 1992: 40).  In India, co-operative operations and 
administration were closely monitored and actively directed by British colonial 
administrators.  The Belgian colonial development strategy included co-operatives as an 
interim measure for managing colonial economies until capitalism could be established 
(Develtere 1992). 
In summary, Hoyt found that governments treat co-operatives in different ways and 
that these practices vary from country to country, and over time within the same country as 
political regimes change.  Hoyt notes that in industrialized countries, the governments are 
typically fairly neutral toward co-operatives.  Co-operatives are not accorded any special 
treatment but they are not actively destroyed (Hoyt 1989).  
 
2.3.4 Definitional Issues and the Ideal Co-operative 
Hoyt‘s continuum attempts to encompass the full range of treatment that co-
operatives have experienced and continue to experience around the world.  This range is 
reflective of the many different ways that governments conceptualize co-operatives and their 
roles in public policy and in society.  As Hoyt notes, ―not all countries require businesses to 
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conform to the ICA principles in order to be considered co-operatives‖ (Hoyt 1989: 82).  The 
democratic governance of co-operatives is particularly at issue.  
Just as there is some confusion about how the social economy can be defined and 
understood, there is similar confusion about co-operatives. The International Co-operative 
Alliance (ICA), the penultimate association of co-operative associations, issued a statement 
on the co-operative identity following extensive consultation with co-operative organizations 
around the world (see Appendix One for the ICA‘s statement, co-operatives principles and 
values).  This document included the following definition: 
A co-operative is an autonomous association of persons united voluntarily to 
meet their common economic, social, and cultural needs and aspirations 
through a jointly-owned and democratically-controlled enterprise 
(MacPherson 1996). 
 
This definition probably comes the closest to being universally accepted, but there are 
many others.  For instance, the United States Department of Agriculture, which houses a rural 
co-operative development service, states that: ―In general, a cooperative is a business owned 
and democratically controlled by the people who use its services and whose benefits are 
derived and distributed equitably on the basis of use‖  (USDA1997).  Put another way, the 
USDA‘s definition boils down to user-ownership, user-benefits and user-control. 
Co-operatives are one form of organization under the umbrella of social economy 
organizations, but the many definitions of co-operatives contribute to the confusion around 
understanding some co-operatives, or indeed some social economy organizations.  
Democratic governance and member participation and control are key features of co-
operatives.  In contrast, social economy organizations may not be member-controlled but 
deliver the same kinds of services, for instance, health care, and are closely linked to 
government.  Although member-owned, there are co-operatives which deliver health care 
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services that are also closely linked to government.  The latter, among them the Community 
Clinics in Saskatchewan, may not be considered ―pure‖ or ideal-type co-operatives, but there 
are many degrees of ―co-operativeness‖.  
Their close linkage to and almost complete dependence on government is what led the 
co-operative movement in the province to withhold its support for the Clinics earlier in their 
history.  At one time, the co-operative movement did not consider the Clinics to be ―real‖ co-
operatives (Transcript 37).  The distance between the co-operative movement and the 
Community Clinics does not exist today, but the Clinics could still be viewed as being not 
quite ―real‖ or genuine co-operatives.  The way in which they observe member economic 
participation and autonomy and independence is different from what is considered the norm 
for co-operatives, as expressed in the co-operative principles: 
 3
rd
 Principle:  Member Economic Participation 
Members contribute equitably to, and democratically control, the capital of 
their co-operative.  At least part of that capital is usually the common property 
of the co-operative.  Members usually receive limited compensation, if any, on 
capital subscribed as a condition of membership.  Members allocate surpluses 
for any or all of the following purposes: developing their co-operative, 
possibly by setting up reserves, part of which at least would be indivisible; 
benefiting members in proportion to their transactions with the co-operative; 
and supporting other activities approved by the membership. 
 
4
th
 Principle:  Autonomy and Independence 
Co-operatives are autonomous, self-help organizations controlled by their 
members.  If they enter into agreements with other organizations, including 
governments [emphasis added], or raise capital from external sources, they do 
so on terms that ensure democratic control by their members and maintain 
their autonomy. 
 
 Member economic participation means that they contribute the capital on which co-
operatives, at least initially, are run.  Typically, this contribution of capital ensures that the 
members remain in control of their organizations.  Community Clinic members contribute a 
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nominal amount in the form of membership fees and additional funds are raised through 
Clinic foundations established for that purpose, but otherwise members do not participate in 
the economic affairs of their co-operatives in the same way that members of other kinds of 
co-operatives do. This is what distinguishes the Community Clinics from other co-operatives.  
Members do not provide the funds but still expect to have control over the Clinics. 
It is the observation of the 4
th
 Principle that is the most problematic for both the 
Clinics and the government, but for different reasons.  The Clinics fear the loss of their 
autonomy and independence, and government and health region officials bemoan their 
inability to control them (Transcripts 1, 11, 31).  The Clinics are public service providers but 
are not controlled as public sector organizations by the government.  This is at the heart of the 
tension in the relationship between the Clinics and the provincial government.   
The Clinics thus cannot be fully conceptualized as co-operatives.  Nor can they be 
fully conceptualized as public sector entities, even though they receive almost all of their 
funding from the government and deliver a public service.  They are also not private sector 
organizations, although they do appear to be conceptualized by the provincial government as 
another form of private practice.  The Clinics‘ very uniqueness among co-operatives suggests 
that it may be possible to consider them as something else, possibly as hybrids. There are 
growing streams of literature on the third sector and public governance (for instance, see 
Pestoff 2009; Brandsen and Pestoff 2008) and the emergence of hybrids in the social 
economy (for instance, Evers 2005; Graefe 2006).  Viewing the Community Clinics as 
hybrids has implications for how they have been, and still are, treated by government.  This is 
explored later in the study. 
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2.3.5 Co-operative Legislation in Canada 
 The existing literature on co-operative legislation in Canada has suggested that co-
operative legislation is based on business corporation law and that this causes systemic 
problems for co-operatives.  This is perhaps not surprising because the state appears to be 
oriented toward the private sector with the business corporation as the dominant form by 
which it is organized and acquires legitimacy. 
Axworthy (1990) discusses the constraints that co-operative legislation in Canada  
places on co-operative organizations with respect to their prescribed structure, powers of 
control and decision-making, and member participation.  Since co-operatives are both 
economic and social institutions, non-economic considerations come into play in selecting an 
organizational form.  Because co-operatives have other objectives than maximizing profit, 
what is rational for them will depend on the mix of social and economic aims to be pursued.  
These different aims give rise to different interpretations of efficiency (Axworthy 1990: 40). 
 Axworthy (1990) states that: ―Perhaps the main consequence of this legislated regime 
is the requirement that co-operatives adopt an organizational and managerial structure based 
on elite democratic theory even though they espouse participatory democratic ideals‖ 
(Axworthy 1990: 41).  According to Axworthy (1990), co-operatives are required to elect a 
board of directors and appoint specified officers, and they are required to develop formal 
hierarchies; the legal regime specifies that co-operatives must elect representatives to manage 
the organization rather than operating on the basis of participatory decision-making.  
Axworthy notes that the structure required by co-operative legislation in Canada is 
inconsistent with the democratic principles of co-operatives: ―The fact remains that 
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participatory democracy and the legal regime borrowed from corporation law and practice do 
not fit together‖ (Axworthy 1990: 41). 
Ish and Ring (1996) note that: 
…modern Canadian co-operative legislation displays amazing similarity with 
ordinary corporate legislation thus camouflaging the fact that co-operatives are 
distinct from ordinary business corporations which base control on investment 
and which possess hierarchical management structures (Ish and Ring 1996: 
104). 
  
Ish and Ring (1996) also note that because there has been little by way of court decisions 
dealing with co-operative legislation, and the ones that have been taken were largely 
influenced by previous interpretations of corporate legislation. 
The federal Canada Cooperatives Act that was proclaimed in June 1999 does not 
appear to have removed or mitigated the influence of corporate law on co-operative 
legislation.  The new legislation replaced the old Canada Cooperative Associations Act of 
1970, but was still modeled in large part on the Canada Business Corporations Act.  While 
modernizing the corporate statute law on co-operatives, the influence of the dominant 
corporate model can be seen in some of its provisions.  For instance, the Act: 
 
 Enables members of co-operatives to decide on whether to issue equity in 
the marketplace on a competitive basis, while retaining a co-operative 
structure.  
 Provides greater flexibility of methods for members to finance their co-
operative by giving access to new ways to raise capital if members decide 
that internal financing is not enough.  
 Makes directors subject to a statutory duty of care and fiduciary duty —
modernizes, clarifies, and limits these duties.  
 Allows for a good mix of qualified individuals to serve on the board of 
directors of a co-operative by permitting members to elect (limited) 
outside expertise. At least 2/3 of a co-operative's directors must either be 
members of the co-operative or representatives of members that are co-
operatives, business corporations, or other entities: 1/3 of the directors 
may be outside directors. If the co-operative issues investment shares to 
non-members, members may decide to authorize investment shareholders 
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to elect no more than 20% of the directors.  
 Gives co-operatives access to an array of modern corporate tools (e.g. 
amalgamations, arrangements, and reorganization) that competitors use everyday 
to carry on business efficiently and effectively.  
 Harmonizes aspects of the Canada Cooperatives Act with similar 
provisions in the Canada Business Corporations Act (CBCA) (Canadian 
Co-operative Association.  Co-op Legislation).  
 
 In summary, this brief exploration of the legal regime points to its importance as an 
instrument of public policy.  It seems that in Canada, government conceptualizes co-
operatives as business corporations, which results in many aspects of business corporation 
legislation being embedded in co-operative legislation.  This gives rise to systemic tensions 
for co-operatives.   
 
2.3.6 Proposition Two 
 The preceding examination of three streams of the literature on co-operative – 
government relations shows that the government in Saskatchewan has used the co-operative 
model to meet public policy goals and that these goals have changed over time and according 
to the ideology of the governing political party.  It has also shown that co-operatives 
experience structural challenges in participating in the policy-making process, both through 
legislation based in large part on business corporation legislation and through their own 
decision-making process.  Finally, governments approach co-operatives in many different 
ways.  All of these factors affect co-operatives‘ ability to participate effectively in public 
policy-making.  It is therefore proposed that: 
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Proposition Two: 
Co-operatives can be expected to have little influence on government policy, except 
where their ability to act as a check and balance or competitive yardstick may address 
government priorities. 
 
 
2.7 Conclusions 
 This chapter has reviewed streams of literature on government-co-operative sector, 
the roles of the social economy in Canada, and the roles that co-operatives play in society.  It 
has also reviewed literature on the legal structure of co-operatives, categories of government 
treatment of co-operatives, and co-operatives and the policy-making process.     
Different conceptualizations of co-operatives and the roles they play affect the 
relationship between co-operatives and governments and contribute to its complexity. Co-
operatives need governments because they control the policy environments in which co-
operatives operate, as well as providing funding, development, research and other supports.  
Governments need co-operatives to play a number of different public policy roles; however, 
they are often conceptualized as business corporations, if they are conceptualized at all.  
When governments do support the co-operatives model, it does so to meet specific public 
policy goals; thus government support for co-operatives waxes and wanes according to 
government priorities.  Co-operatives operate in complex political, economic and social 
environments, where public policy goals and priorities shift continually. Two propositions 
that arise from these streams of the literature have been identified: 
 
Proposition One: 
The views of the government and those in the social economy can differ and conflict.  
While co-operative founders believe that the co-operative model of social economy 
organization allows their members to achieve control over the delivery of the goods and 
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services they need, with the underlying ideology promoting a vision of a better society, 
government believes that co-operatives serve a public policy role by acting as a check 
and balance and serving as a competitive yardstick to the private sector. 
 
 
Proposition Two: 
Co-operatives can be expected to have little influence on government policy, except 
where their ability to act as a check and balance or competitive yardstick may address 
government priorities. 
 
 The next chapter focuses on concepts and theories from literatures dealing with public 
policy and policy-making processes, the role of ideas and ideologies in public policy, power 
relationships, and interest group-government relations.  These are all areas of scholarship that 
can contribute to understanding the relationship between the Community Clinics and the 
provincial government of Saskatchewan.
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CHAPTER THREE:  POLICY PROCESSES AND POLICY-MAKING 
3.0 Introduction  
In this chapter, concepts are drawn from the research on public policy and the policy-
making process, business–government relations, conceptions of power relationships, and the 
role of ideas and ideology in public policy-making to build an appreciation of how these 
areas of scholarship inform an understanding of co-operative – government relations.  
Definitions of ―public policy‖ and of ―policy analysis‖, along with a discussion of policy-
making processes and the constraints around them, are provided first.   The role of ideas and 
ideology in the public policy-making process and the conditions necessary for policy change 
are then explored.   Conceptions of power relationships between social economy 
organizations and governments are discussed, followed by an examination of business – 
government relations.  A framework for examining the primary data assembled for this study 
is then set out. 
 
3.1 Public Policy and the Policy-Making Process 
 There are many definitions of public policy (Howlett and Ramesh 2003; Pal 1987; 
Stanbury 1993), but generally a public policy is a statement about what a government will do 
to address a particular problem or to achieve a particular goal.  The development of public 
policy is related to government priority-setting and mandate (Doern and Phidd 1992), and 
involves decisions about resource allocation. 
This is a simple statement but public policy development is complex, with many 
different players and structures involved.   There are, in fact, many different public policy 
processes.  Further, policy takes many forms and they are not necessarily mutually exclusive; 
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the relevant forms include but are not limited to legislation, regulation, ministerial speeches, 
briefing notes, the annual expenditures budget, and cabinet decision items.  There are 
variations in how policy is developed; there can be what Stanbury refers to as ―hard‖ methods 
like cost-benefit analysis and ―soft‖ methods such as consultation (Stanbury 1993).  
Governments also have numerous instruments at their disposal to operationalize their policy 
decisions; these can include legislation and regulation, grants, and transfer payments, among 
others. 
Government inaction is also an option; by choosing not to take action to address a 
problem or opportunity, the government indicates its policy.  There can also be ―policies 
without resources‖ (Doern and Phidd 1992):  ―Many governments find it necessary to 
enunciate policy to express their concern about, and support for, a particular constituency or 
group, since this is usually preferable to expressing no public concern whatsoever‖ (Doern 
and Phidd 1992: 58).  In this case, a policy consists of rhetoric only and does not utilize any 
of the available policy instruments; it merely serves the purpose of ―waving the flag‖. 
 In addition to the different definitions of public policy, there are also different 
conceptualizations of the stages or steps involved in policy development and analysis. In 
general, there are several stages in addressing a policy problem: problem identification; 
definition; search for alternative instruments that would best address the problem; choice of 
alternative and resources allocated to it; implementation; and evaluation (Bardach 2009; 
Geva-May and Pal 1999; Howlett and Ramesh 2003; Smith 2005).  This process is an 
iterative one; there are feedback loops built into every stage.  The process generally applies to 
routine policy generation as well as responses to emergent situations or crises, although in 
crises some steps may be omitted because of time constraints. 
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3.1.1 The Actors in the Process 
 The analysis of policy options has many complicating factors associated with it, 
which have much to do with who has power and control.  As Doern and Phidd (1992) point 
out, government ministers (the most senior elected officials) rarely get to make one decision 
at a time; they are normally faced with making multiple decisions, complicated by multiple 
processes running simultaneously.  Ministers also have to balance ideologies and dominant 
ideas of efficiency, equity, individual liberty, redistribution, and, in the case of the federal 
government, national unity and regional sensitivities (Doern and Phidd 1992).  Ministers have 
to make policy decisions with finite available resources and limited information.  They are 
also influenced by the desire to be re-elected, and make decisions based on where they are in 
terms of the electoral cycle; priorities shift over time.  The desire for elected officials to be 
elected and re-elected underlies the framework for understanding the relationship between 
business and government described later in this chapter.  Finally, ministers seldom have one 
area of responsibility so they are dealing with multiple areas simultaneously.  This impacts on 
the amount of information they can digest with respect to any single policy decision. 
 The bureaucracy plays a key role in the public policy process.   Doern and Phidd 
(1992) describe the bureaucracy as having structure, as in multiple departments and agencies 
each with their own mandate, as ―a system of delegation that immediately creates an impetus 
for ‗bottom-up‘ policy initiatives emanating from departments that have their own agendas 
reinforced and challenged by their own policy communities‖ (Doern and Phidd 1992: 154), 
and as consisting also of senior officials who have both positive and negative influence over 
their ministers through their daily interactions.  The bureaucracy is the site of competing 
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interests, conflicting and overlapping mandates, and ―turf protection‖, making co-ordination 
of policy initiatives difficult.  The power of the departments and agencies and of the senior 
officials varies with government priorities; this is further complicated by frequent 
reorganizations and changes in structure and personnel.   
 Doern and Phidd (1992) describe the relationship of cabinet ministers with their 
senior officials as one of mutual dependence because ministers may prefer to devote their 
time and attention to policy and political party matters and leave the administration of their 
departments to the senior officials, who must also be policy advisors to their ministers and be 
aware of their political constraints and concerns.  The responsibility of senior officials for 
both policy and administrative matters leads to concern about their political neutrality, 
especially when a new government comes into power, but: 
…the core of the concern about the role of senior public servants and senior 
advisers in policy formulation centres on their role in initiating policy ideas 
and proposals, analyzing and ―massaging‖ policy proposals, and in blocking or 
frustrating the plans or ideas of elected politicians.  It is evident that 
bureaucrats have a considerable capacity to initiate policy.  In part the political 
system expects and encourages them to do so when it berates them on those 
occasions when they have failed to plan, to estimate costs and effects 
adequately, and when legislators leave wide discretionary powers in their 
hands or assign such powers to separate boards and agencies.  The reality of 
decision-making in a complex Cabinet-bureaucratic structure is that policies 
are not always clear, frequently conflict with each other, and must be 
constantly reinterpreted as they are applied to single cases or projects (Doern 
and Phidd 1992: 165). 
 
This would suggest that given the complexity of the relationship between a minister 
and his/her senior officials, there may be a divergence in their goals: ―… policy is always at 
least partly the outcome of day-to-day relations between senior officials and ministers as they 
each seek to play their prescribed administrative and political roles in the face of a changing 
agenda‖ (Doern and Phidd 1992: 170).  
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Interest groups also have a key role to play in public policy-making and are as varied 
as the government structures and processes they attempt to influence.  As well as attempting 
to influence government to take policy decisions that would be to their benefit -- and perhaps 
to the benefit of society as a whole -- they have other roles to play in a democratic society.  
According to Stanbury (1993), they can serve as signalling mechanisms to government with 
respect to the preferences of citizens between elections; they can aggregate interests which 
are easier for governments to deal with and provide a means by which individuals can 
participate in the policy process; they can provide information to government because they 
possess specialized technical knowledge about political support for proposed and existing 
policies; they can act as information conduits from their members to government, from 
government to their members, to other interest groups from government, and facilitate 
communication within government; and they can act as agents of government in the delivery 
of services (Stanbury 1993: 119-120). 
According to Stritch (2007), there has been little attention given to the role that 
business associations play in policy-making in Canada and ―very little is known about the 
scope and character of policy analysis by business groups.‖  His own research has found that 
there is ―considerable variation in the extent to which groups engaged in policy analysis‖, 
that policy analysis activity by business groups has become more extensive in recent years, 
and that there is a shift toward increased privatization of policy analysis in Canada because of 
budgetary constraints in the public sector.  Prevailing neoliberal tendencies no doubt have 
something to do with this tendency as well. 
There has also been little scholarly work done on provincial governments and their 
policy-making processes despite the fact that ―the largest proportion of policy development, 
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adaptation and change is concentrated in the provincial sector‖ (McArthur 2007).  The reason 
for this seems to be insufficient information on how provincial governments work: 
It also appears that provincial governments are not particularly introspective or 
self-conscious, adding to the paucity of reliable information.  Provincial 
governments produce relatively few reports on their findings, and those that 
are produced are not readily accessible.  Provincial government officials are 
arguably skeptical about theory and the study of how government works, and 
see the management of government as a very practical matter (McArthur 2007: 
238). 
 
In summary, there are many conceptualizations of what public policy is and how it is 
developed.  There are many different actors with different ideas, values and goals; many 
instruments through which public policy can be effected; many forms that public policy can 
take; and, numerous constraints to the process.  Relationships among the actors, the issues 
and the processes are frequently complex.  Interest groups outside of government often find 
that achieving their goals in this environment is highly challenging. 
 
3.2 The Role of Ideas and Ideology in Policy-Making and Policy Change 
Just as there are numerous definitions of public policy and understanding of the policy 
analysis process, there are different conceptualizations of the conditions necessary for policy 
change to occur.  There are some common concepts about the role of ideas in policy-making.  
One is that ideas play a very important role and that dominant ideas dominate public policy.  
As Doern and Phidd (1992) point out, ―ideas both influence and are embedded in the 
structures and processes of policy-making‖.  At the nexus of our system of government is the 
following understanding: 
The central tenet of democratic politics, especially in a cabinet-parliamentary 
system, is that political parties offer a program of policies to the electorate and 
that the victor at the polls, expressed in parliamentary seats, possesses a 
majoritarian mandate to carry out its policies.  The assumption is that 
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democratic life is purposeful, a peaceful contest over contending ideas, 
preferences, and objectives.  The assumption is that political power or the 
gaining of political office is a means to carry out policies, not that policies are 
a means to gain office (Doern and Phidd 1992: 35). 
 
 Hall (1993), Howlett and Ramesh (2003), and Doern and Phidd (1992) set out similar 
concepts with respect to the role of ideas in policy-making; all characterize ideas as having 
several different levels.   Doern and Phidd (1992) describe a typology of ideas that 
distinguishes between four levels of ―purposeful activity and thought.‖  These are:  
ideologies, dominant ideas, paradigms, and objectives. 
 Ideologies are the broadest level of ideas in this typology and are associated with 
liberalism, socialism and conservatism.  Liberalism is defined as ―a belief in the central role 
of the individual in a free society‖, which includes a free market capitalist economy and a 
belief in scientific and technical progress (Doern and Phidd 1992: 36).  The state‘s role in this 
case is as ―a benevolent reformist referee-like role, balancing the ideas and power of 
contending interests in an even-handed way‖. 
 Conservatism‘s goal is to ―preserve valued and proven traditions‖, with a belief in the 
market and in minimal government intervention, while also holding ―an organic paternal 
view of society, of the need for the state and the community to care for those who cannot care 
for themselves‖ (Doern and Phidd 1992:37). 
Socialism is based on a class analysis of society, and places less emphasis on the 
individual and more emphasis on a collective view of society.  It is characterized by much 
more government intervention to effect a redistribution of wealth and power to disadvantaged 
classes and groups: 
While seeing the need for a socialist state that will redistribute income, the 
socialist view is ambivalent about centralized power.  Power must be 
concentrated to achieve redistribution in a capitalist society, but at the same 
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time there is fear among social democrats about the possible bureaucratization 
of that power (Doern and Phidd 1992: 37). 
 
 Doern and Phidd (1992) note that a particular feature of Canadian politics has been 
the adoption of major components of one ideology by another.  A pertinent example is the 
adoption of Medicare by the federal Liberal government.  At the same time, these ideologies 
―help foreclose certain policy options or reduce levels of commitment to particular courses of 
action and to particular ideas‖ (Doern and Phidd 1992: 38). 
The next level of ideas in this typology is that of dominant ideas.  As mentioned 
above, these ideas equate to values and how Canadians define themselves.  It is important to 
understand these in order to understand public policy: 
These ideas influence political debate and the ―evaluation‖ of public policy 
regardless of the particular preferences stated in the legislation or the 
ministerial speech accompanying the particular policy or decision.  These 
ideas are each desirable.  They also often totally or partially contradict each 
other (efficiency versus regional sensitivity, or redistribution versus stability 
of income) (Doern and Phidd 1992: 41). 
 
Much of the work of public policy is to prioritize among these dominant ideas and to 
allocate resources to them.  Paradigms constitute the next level of policy ideas according to 
the typology.  This is a narrower concept that is linked to particular policy fields: 
A well-developed paradigm provides a series of principles or assumptions that 
guide action and suggest solutions within a given policy field.  Paradigms can 
become entrenched and thus change very slowly because they become tied to 
the education and socialization of professionals or experts and perhaps of the 
larger public as well (Doern and Phidd 1992: 41). 
 
An example of this is again found in health care policy that is dominated by doctors in 
a ―medical‖ model focused on curing or treating those who are already ill or injured.  The 
countering paradigm is that of a health promotion and prevention approach, which is less 
dominated by doctors (Doern and Phidd 1992: 41).  This level is important because policy 
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paradigms can also screen out policy options and ―alert us to the role of professional experts 
who have power partly because they are the successful purveyors of the dominant paradigm‖. 
The fourth level of policy ideas consists of specific objectives related to particular 
policy arenas:  ―It includes the more specific purposes that may be debated or be in dispute 
within a policy field‖.  It is the narrowest form of policy ideas in the typology and although 
important, Doern and Phidd suggest that ―the study of public policy must begin with an 
appreciation of the broader levels of democratic political life.  It does not begin with a search 
for ‗objectives‘ only‖ (Doern and Phidd 1992: 42-43). 
Howlett and Ramesh (2003) also discuss the connection between ideologies and 
policy paradigms, noting that established beliefs, values and attitudes shape understandings 
of public policy problems and flavour notions of the feasibility of proposed solutions: 
A policy paradigm thus informs and holds in place a set of ideas held by 
relevant policy subsystem members…that shapes the broad goals policy-
makers pursue, the way they perceive public problems, and the kinds of 
solutions they consider for adoption (Howlett and Ramesh 2003: 233). 
 
In order to achieve policy change, the existing policy paradigm must be dismantled 
before substantive change can occur.  Changes that are marginal and incremental and that 
occur frequently are viewed as ―normal‖; these occur in closed networks and are dominated 
by policy monopolies within government (Howlett and Ramesh 2003: 235).  Atypical policy 
change is much less frequent and much more substantial in nature.  These changes occur in 
response to anomalies that the existing policy paradigm can no longer deal with adequately 
(Howlett and Ramesh 2003: 237). 
Hall (1993) looks more closely at the role of the state in policy change, suggesting 
that there is increased interest in the role of ideas in policy because of a perceived failure of 
theorists of the state to adequately account for the state‘s motivation for its actions, as 
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expressed in its policies.  The concept of state policy-making as social learning has taken 
hold through researchers‘ attempts to develop an ―alternative conception of the policy process 
with which to complete their account of policy‖ (Hall 1993: 275).  This concept seems to 
imply that some actors within the state decide what to do without opposition or input from 
external actors; in other words, the state acts relatively autonomously in the policy-making 
process.  This is one type of recent theory of the state which he labels ―state-centric‖.  
Another type is what Hall calls ―state-structural‖, which gives ―interest groups, political 
parties, and other actors outside the state an important role in the policy process‖ (Hall 1993: 
276).  In the latter type of theory, how the state is structured, what it has done in the past, and 
deeper structures of power and dependency, all influence the kind and strength of the 
demands that these social actors place on the state.   
Hall suggests that there are three main factors affecting policy at any particular time.  
The first is what the policy was at a previous time.  The second is that ―the key agents pushing 
forward the learning process are the experts in a given field of policy, either working for the 
state or advising it from privileged positions at the interface between the bureaucracy and the 
intellectual enclaves of society‖ (Hall 1993: 277); politicians play a much smaller role than do 
the experts.  The third is the capacity of the state to act autonomously from exogenous factors.   
Policy-making is a process that involves three central variables: ―the overarching goals that 
guide policy in a particular field, the techniques or policy instruments used to attain those 
goals, and the precise settings of those instruments‖ (Hall 1993: 278). 
Hall further identifies three kinds of changes in policy.  In the first, the instrument 
settings or levels are changed to take into account the effects of the policy and any new 
knowledge which may come to light, while the overall goals and policy instruments remain 
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the same; this is referred to as a first order change in policy (Hall 1993: 278).  A second order 
change occurs when both the policy instruments and their settings are altered in response to 
past experience although the overall goals of policy remain the same (Hall 1993: 279).  When 
all three central variables change as a result of reflection on past experience, a third order 
change occurs; these are major changes in policy. 
Hall calls the interpretive framework within which those who make policy work a 
policy paradigm: 
Policy-makers usually work within a framework of ideas and standards that 
specifies not only the goals of policy and the kind of instruments that can be 
used to attain them, but also the very nature of the problems they are meant to 
be addressing.  This framework is embedded in the very terminology through 
which policy-makers communicate about their work.  It is influential because 
so much of it is taken for granted and not amenable to scrutiny as a whole 
(Hall 1993: 279).  
 
Using Hall‘s classification of policy changes, his first and second order changes can 
then be viewed as ―normal‖ policy-making.  Third order change is not normal because it is 
characterized by ―radical changes in the overarching terms of policy discourse associated with 
a ‗paradigm shift‖.  First order changes are viewed as routine incremental decision-making, 
while second order changes and the development of new policy instruments are more 
substantial and strategic.  Hall finds that third order changes are not yet adequately modelled 
but, nonetheless, develops some hypotheses about how third order changes in policy come 
about.  Changes in policy paradigms may, for example, be caused by policy failure: 
A policy paradigm can be threatened by the appearance of anomalies – 
developments that are not fully comprehensible within the terms of the 
paradigm.   As anomalies accumulate, ad hoc attempts are made to stretch the 
terms of the paradigm to cover them, but this gradually undermines the 
intellectual coherence and precision of the original paradigm.  Experiments 
may be undertaken to deal with the anomalies by adjusting the existing lines 
of policy, but if the paradigm is incapable of dealing with them, the 
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experiments will result in policy failures that undermine the authority of the 
existing paradigm and its advocates even further (Hall 1993: 280). 
 
Third order change is therefore likely to involve the accumulation of anomalies, 
experimentation with new forms of policy, and policy failures that cause a shift in the locus 
of authority over policy and initiate a contest between competing paradigms.  ―It will end 
only when the supporters of a new paradigm secure positions of authority over policy-making 
and are able to rearrange the organization and standard operating procedures of the policy 
process so as to institutionalize the new paradigm‖ (Hall 1993: 280).  Atkinson and Coleman 
(1996) appear to concur, citing Sabatier‘s hypothesis that ―…the core of a government‘s 
approach to policy is unlikely to be revised significantly without a change in government that 
leads to a redistribution of the balance of power among advocacy coalitions within a policy 
community‖ (Atkinson and Coleman 1996: 213). 
Hall concludes that first and second order changes correspond to the ―state-centric‖ 
view of social learning, but that third order change corresponds more closely to the ―state-
structuralist‖ view:  ―Only some kinds of social learning seem to take place inside the state 
itself.  The process of learning associated with important third order changes in policy can be 
a much broader affair subject to powerful influences from society and the political arena‖ 
(Hall 1993: 288). 
 Skogstad (2000) utilizes Hall‘s policy paradigm concept to analyze how ideas that have 
become embedded in institutions shape policy outcomes, noting that ―most policy analysts 
ascribe explanatory power to ideas as they interact with interests and institutions.  Thus, ideas 
become important to policymaking when strategically-placed individuals or groups manipulate 
them to realize their interests‖ (Skogstad 2000: 464).   Hall (1993) notes that policy paradigms 
last when their underlying principles are consistent with real world developments and wider 
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societal normative frameworks.  Skogstad (2000) points out that the feedback effect of policies 
and their related policy instruments also affect the durability of their underlying principles: 
Policies have cognitive effects on the strategies of societal actors and their 
incentives to mobilize and/or build coalitions.  An important feedback effect 
of a policy instrument is whether it promotes solidarity and communal 
behavior as opposed to organizational fragmentation and particularism among 
affected citizens.  Those policy instruments that create incentives for solidarity 
among societal groups and for cohesive societal networks to form around 
policy ideas and policies are more likely to fortify a policy paradigm 
(Skogstad 2000: 466).  
 
In summary, the literature on the role of ideas and ideology in policy-making would 
seem to suggest that achieving a major change in policy is difficult and that the dominant 
paradigm will exert a heavy influence on policy-making.   
 
3.3 Conceptions of Power Relationships 
 The role of the social economy in public policy is germane to this research because 
governments have become interested in how social economy organizations can help them to 
address challenges to their ability to provide goods and services to their constituents.  Co-
operatives are among the forms of social economy organization that are the subjects of 
significant research with respect to the role they play in public policy. 
Focusing on Quebec, Vaillancourt (2008) addresses the participation of social 
economy organizations in the policy-making process, differentiating between what they seek 
and what they achieve in terms of securing a place in the process.  He delineates two key 
concepts in the policy-making process, one being the co-production of public policy and the 
other its co-construction.  The former refers to the participation of stakeholders in civil 
society and the market in implementing public policy, meaning that the policy is developed 
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and designed by the state; the latter refers to the participation of stakeholders in the 
development and design. 
Vaillancourt (2008) argues that good public policy requires that stakeholders 
participate in both the co-production and co-construction processes, with the goal of the 
democratization of public policy.  The co-construction of public policy occurs in several 
ways:  monoconstruction, neoliberal, corporatist, and democratic, solidarity-based.  In the 
first instance, the state constructs public policy on its own and does not involve stakeholders 
from civil society or the market.  In neoliberal construction, ―the state is encouraged to 
construct public policy by co-operating with the private sector, that is, with the dominant 
socio-economic agents in the market economy‖ (Vaillancourt 2008: 11). In the corporatist 
scenario, there is some co-operation between the state and stakeholders but the stakeholders 
are not equally represented; some are more privileged than others, with the effect that special 
interests can dominate. 
The last instance, which Vaillancourt (2008) favours, is that of democratic, solidarity-
based co-construction.  This scenario is characterized by four key features.  First, the state co-
constructs policy in close co-operation with stakeholders from both civil society and the 
market, with the state remaining the final decision-maker (Vaillancourt 2008: 12).  The 
second key feature is that ―democratic co-construction builds on a reform of the state that 
enables it to become a partner of civil society without for all that ceasing to be a partner of 
stakeholders from the market economy‖ (Vaillancourt 2008: 12).  The state moves away 
somewhat from neoliberal co-construction but complements the market economy with the 
resources of civil society to meet collective interests. 
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A third feature of democratic, solidarity-based co-construction is that ―elected 
officials establish open, inclusive forms of governance in which dialogue is favoured between 
the elected officials and the leaders of the participatory democracy‖ (Vaillancourt 2008:13).  
The representative form of democracy retains the final decision-making authority, but makes 
room for stakeholders that have been under-represented in the policy-making process. 
A fourth feature represents an ideal of social economy participation in the co-
construction of public policy, in which it is enabled to: 
…express its voice among those of other stakeholders at the moment when 
public policy and programs are defined.  The issue is that of enabling the 
social economy to move beyond the status of a mere tool or instrument of the 
state in the application of public policy plans co-constructed without it.  It is 
that of permitting the establishment of a partner-type relationship, that is, a 
non-instrumental relationship, between the state and the social economy.  In a 
partnership interface, stakeholders from the social economy retain a degree of 
autonomy in relation to the state (Vaillancourt 2008: 13). 
 
Vaillancourt (2008) has thus conceptualized what is, for him, the desired role 
of social economy organizations in public policy. In this conceptualization, social 
economy actors want to be and are involved in co-construction, not just co-production 
of public policy.  Social economy organizations have a strong role to play in 
democratizing the state and enabling under-represented stakeholders to participate, as 
well as filling gaps left from ongoing adjustment to a post-welfare state. 
Vaillancourt‘s (2008) conceptualization of two main forms of involvement in the 
public policy process suggests that in the ideal state of co-construction, the government is 
assumed to be an open and willing partner to social economy organizations and includes both 
the market economy and civil society in the design and development of public policy.  
The conclusions arising from this conception of the state are that policy-making can 
be a collaborative process in which all stakeholders have access and participate on the same 
 63 
 
 
level; government continues to partner with stakeholders from the private sector but also 
partners with those from the social economy.  Further, government decision-makers have 
established open, inclusive dialogue between themselves and the leaders of social economy 
organizations, and these organizations are not just instruments of the state in implementing 
public policy. 
 
3.4 Interest Groups and Public Policy 
In contrast to the ideal world that Vaillancourt envisions for social economy 
organizations, Stanbury (1993) views policy-making as often adversarial.  Stanbury‘s (1993) 
framework (see Figure One) for understanding the relationship of business with government 
in Canada is potentially useful for a number of reasons.  Stanbury (1993) conceptualizes the 
relationship between business and government to be frequently adversarial (in the sense that 
there are winners and losers) with access to and influence over the policy-making process the 
main goal of business; government‘s goal is to acquire resources it needs to remain in power.  
The underlying concepts at play in the relationship are related to public choice theory 
(Stanbury 1993: 127), with a focus on outcomes – who gets what.   The relationship is about 
the exchange of resources between business and government.  While Stanbury talks primarily 
about business, what he says is relevant to any interest group in the economy or society that 
can benefit government in some way.  This would include social economy organizations and 
co-operatives. 
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Figure 2     A FRAMEWORK FOR UNDERSTANDING 
BUSINESS-GOVERNMENT RELATIONS IN CANADA 
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According to Stanbury, political parties in a democracy formulate policies as a 
means of getting votes.  Politicians are assumed to act in a rational, self-interested fashion 
and ―sell‖ policies for votes.  The political party that forms government always acts to 
maximize the votes it will receive, and therefore targets the interests of the marginal or 
uncommitted voter because it usually has sufficient information on its supporters.  
Problems arise for the party in power when it is difficult to ascertain what the interests of 
the marginal voter are.  Information about these interests is costly and difficult to obtain, 
and frequently political parties lack the resources to acquire it.  Because the private sector 
often possesses the information or the resources to acquire it, it offers these to the party in 
power in exchange for political favours.  Businesses may lobby to secure favourable or 
fight against unfavourable legislation and regulation; they may seek favourable 
interpretations of discretionary provisions of existing legislation; and they may provide 
support to politicians or officials seeking elected or appointed office in expectation of 
receiving pay, power and prestige in return for future favours (Stanbury 1993). 
In Stanbury‘s framework, the relationship between business firms/trade 
associations and government is placed in its social, economic and political context.  With 
respect to the political system, Stanbury finds that one important characteristic is the 
availability of information about the policy-making process and its outcomes.  He states 
that governments can influence these factors only over the long run and most are outside 
the influence of business and other interest groups, as are the characteristics of social 
values in Canada.  Doern and Phidd (1992) describe the social values as dominant ideas 
that can be ―part of the agenda of a particular policy field regardless of how they are 
defined by governments or even in the statutes that create them‖ (Doern and Phidd 1992: 
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38).  These dominant ideas/values are said to include efficiency, individual liberty, 
stability of income and of other desired conditions, redistribution and equality, equity, 
national identity, unity and integration, and regional diversity and sensitivity.  Stanbury 
(1993) notes that interest and lobby groups have to be sensitive to these values/dominant 
ideas in order to influence government.  Of particular interest for this study is the 
importance of traditions, symbols, institutions and collective memory in national identity.  
Over time, Medicare has become a symbol of the Canadian national identity 
(Commission on the Future of Health Care in Canada, November 2002); it is a way that 
Canadians distinguish themselves from Americans, for instance. 
The processes utilized by both parties to influence each other are of particular 
importance in determining the outcomes of the relationship.  Stanbury (1993) describes 
the relationship between business and government as dynamic and complex.  Over time, 
the balance of power can shift between the parties and both parties have to address a wide 
range of issues in different policy areas.  The process is serial in that ―the game has an 
infinite number of rounds (or innings)‖.  The outcomes of the rounds or innings are often 
inconclusive as far as what constitutes a win or a loss for either party.  Finally, ―…the 
parties are highly interdependent.  Society requires both business and government as 
institutions, and it is necessary that they relate quite closely to each other‖ (Stanbury 
1993: 18). 
The characteristics Stanbury (1993) identifies that are most relevant to this study 
are governments‘ control over information, access to the policy-making process, and 
resources that are needed by lobby or advocacy groups.  Although political parties need 
information from business to secure power, when they form government, they can and do 
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exercise control over information, which can result in information asymmetry for 
business.  Lack of access to the policy-making process can result in a group or 
association‘s failure to secure the resources necessary to fulfil their mandate.  With 
respect to groups and associations, lack of cohesion among members can also impede 
their efforts. 
 Stanbury (1993) suggests that outcomes can be evaluated in terms of their 
efficiency, dynamism, openness, maintenance of individual freedom and degree of 
healthy rivalry.   Dynamism refers to the ability of the relationship to change over time in 
response to exogenous factors affecting either or both parties to the relationship.  When 
Stanbury (1993) speaks of openness, what he means is that the relationship between 
business and the government should be ―well and widely understood‖, capable of 
accommodating new or emerging interests ―so that change can occur without severe 
discontinuities‖.  The evaluation criteria, maintenance of individual freedom, relates to 
how government intervention affects individuals‘ choices.  It speaks to the values 
underlying the political system and where the balance of power lies.  Stanbury (1993) 
notes that ―persistent dominance by any interest group, including government, [must] be 
avoided if we are to aspire to a genuinely pluralist, democratic society‖ (Stanbury 1993: 
41).    
 Healthy rivalry refers to the dynamic tension between the parties to a relationship 
that can result in the relationship‘s evolution and adaptability to changes in the 
exogenous and endogenous characteristics of the parties, as well as to the broader social, 
political and economic environment. 
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Finally, Stanbury (1993: 42) sets out four categories of outcomes in the 
relationship between business and government: 
 Business dominates government  
 Government dominates business 
 Social gridlock 
 Win some, lose some. 
 
When business dominates government, it generally gets what it wants; this 
includes a wide range of government responses to business demands as long as those 
responses benefit business.  When government dominates business, it places a higher 
priority on other groups in society to the detriment of business.  Stanbury (1993) 
describes social gridlock being like ―an institutional sclerosis‖ which occurs when all of 
the actors can effectively neutralize the others; in such cases, ―positive, creative forces 
cannot generate the growth and dynamism possible in more open societies (Stanbury 
1993: 423).   In the ―win some, lose some‖ category of outcomes, business does influence 
government some of the time, but other interest groups may influence government 
through their own lobbying and advocacy efforts. 
In summary, Stanbury‘s (1993) framework is based on public choice theory, 
where government seeks to gain and retain political power as the governing party and 
business seeks a favourable legislative and regulatory environment.  Each has something 
the other wants, resulting in the exchange of resources; the more valuable the resources 
that business can offer to government, the more power business will hold in the 
relationship.   Moreover, the relationship between business and government is primarily 
adversarial.  
Stanbury‘s framework is useful for the purposes of this thesis as a heuristic device 
to categorize the findings obtained through key informant interviews.  It provides a 
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means to organize the findings to identify key factors in the relationship between the 
Community Clinics and the government, as mediated by the medical establishment (see 
Chapter Five).  The framework also provides a means of thinking about the constraints 
that exist, the influence processes used by the parties to the relationship, the impacts of 
the instruments chosen by the government in its interaction with the Clinics, and 
differences within the parties to the relationship. 
Because Stanbury‘s framework focuses on business-government relations in 
Canada, it is necessary to make some adaptations more appropriate for the study of the 
relationship between the Community Clinics and the provincial government in the 
context of primary health care delivery.  The framework does not address the degree of 
internal cohesion within the government; in the primary health care context of 
Saskatchewan, the elected politicians, Department of Health officials and Health Region 
officials are all actors that often have differing views.  The medical profession is also an 
actor possessing considerable resources and influence in this context.  The framework 
requires that the medical profession‘s influence processes be taken into account.  
The exogenous variables and endogenous characteristics of business trade 
associations and lobby groups must also be adapted to better represent those of the 
Community Clinics.  Indeed, Stanbury‘s interpretation of these terms differs from what 
they are normally understood to mean.  For instance, he considers member characteristics 
of business associations to be an exogenous variable, not an endogenous characteristic. 
 
3.5 Summary 
 
 The preceding sections have proposed three different ways of conceptualizing the 
relationship between the state and particular interest groups with respect to policy-
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making and policy change:  Stanbury‘s conceptualization of business-government 
relations as adversarial with the exchange of resources the prize; Hall, Howlett and 
Ramesh, and Doern and Phidd‘s conceptualization of how policy change occurs and the 
conditions necessary to achieve it; and, Vaillancourt‘s conceptualization of an ideal 
situation in which social economy organizations are equal partners in the co-construction 
of public policy.   
The premise underlying Stanbury‘s (1993) framework is that there are winners 
and losers, not that the parties are hostile to one another; nonetheless, the outcomes are 
frequently win-lose, rather than win-win.  When interest groups do get what they want 
from government in the form of policy concessions – i.e. when they ―win‖ – it is usually 
because they possess power in the form of resources that the government wants.  There 
does not appear to be much room for collaboration in Stanbury‘s conceptualization of the 
relationship between interest groups and government.  
The other two models do provide room for collaboration between the parties 
involved.  Vaillancourt in particular regards both parties as equals in spite of the 
differences in the resources, and therefore power, that each might possess, thus 
presenting the possibility of a more collaborative relationship. 
In summary, there are many conceptualizations of what public policy is and how 
it is developed.  There are many different actors with different ideas, values and goals; 
many instruments through which public policy can be effected; many forms that public 
policy can take; and, numerous constraints to the process.  Relationships among the 
actors, the issues and the processes are frequently complex.  Interest groups outside of 
government often find that achieving their goals in this environment is highly 
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challenging.  The literature on the role of ideas and ideology in policy-making would 
seem to suggest that achieving a major change in policy is difficult and that the dominant 
paradigm will exert a heavy influence on policy-making.   
The literature on conceptualizing power relationships suggests that policy-making 
can be a collaborative process in which all stakeholders have access and participate on 
the same level; government continues to partner with stakeholders from the private sector 
but also partners with those from the social economy.  Further, government decision-
makers have established open, inclusive dialogue between themselves and the leaders of 
social economy organizations, and these organizations are not just instruments of the 
state in implementing public policy. 
The literature on business and public policy suggests that government seeks to 
gain and retain political power as the governing party and business seeks a favourable 
legislative and regulatory environment.  Each has something the other wants, resulting in 
the exchange of resources; the more valuable the resources that business can offer to 
government, the more power business will hold in the relationship.   Moreover, the 
relationship between business and government is primarily adversarial.  
Based on the concepts drawn from these streams of the literature, the following is 
anticipated: 
 
3.5.1 Proposition Three: 
Achieving major changes in government policy towards co-operatives will be 
difficult, unless co-operatives have some resources to offer to government.  The 
more valuable the resources that co-operatives can offer to government, the more 
power co-operatives will hold in the relationship. 
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3.5.2 Proposition Four: 
 
Co-operatives will expect equitable relationships with government and the co-
construction of public policy as it affects them, but will not be successful. The 
underlying ideas and ideologies of the government and other key actors in a policy 
field will often prevent this. 
 
 
 
 In the chapter that follows, the case of Saskatchewan‘s co-operative Community 
Clinics is presented, with findings from the transcripts of the key informant interviews 
conducted for this study.  In Chapter Five, the findings are assessed against the 
propositions identified here and in Chapter Two.  
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CHAPTER FOUR:  RESEARCH APPROACH AND FINDINGS 
4.0 Introduction 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to present a case study of three of Saskatchewan‘s 
co-operative Community Clinics.   Fairbairn (1997) cites co-operatives as being the 
―most precisely defined‖ entities among the social economy organizations in Canada and 
as playing a key role in the establishment of the country‘s public health care system:  
―The development of ‗community clinics‘ was an integral part of the development of the 
Medicare program‖ (Fairbairn 1997: 6).  Not only were the Community Clinics in 
Saskatchewan developed as co-operatives to provide medical services in the event of a 
doctors‘ strike, they were developed on principles that have become the core of Medicare 
(Rands 1994; Johnson 2004).  When Premier Tommy Douglas announced his intention to 
implement a medical insurance plan for residents of Saskatchewan, he said that it would 
be based on a pre-payment principle, universal coverage, high quality service, 
administration by the Department of Public Health or an agency responsible to 
government, and acceptability to both those providing and those receiving the services 
(Tollefson 1963: 45).  Over time, these principles have evolved to those in the current 
federal legislation on Medicare (see Appendix Seven.). 
All of this seems to suggest that the Community Clinics, in some ways, have been 
very successful and influential.  Yet, they still struggle to find a place and play a stronger 
role in the delivery of primary health care in Saskatchewan today.  The policy 
environment in which they do so is complicated, with a number of highly complex 
relationships at play. The Community Clinics thus represent a strategic test of the 
propositions set out in Chapters Two and Three.  They are not the only valid test because 
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the experience of other co-operatives could be tested, but they are important because of 
their role in the development of Medicare and their uniqueness as social economy 
organizations in primary health care delivery.   
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The key players in the health care policy domain in Saskatchewan are the 
government, comprised of elected officials, departmental officials and the health regions, 
the Community Clinics, together with their Federation and members, and the medical 
establishment (see Figure 3 on page 74). This depiction excludes other actors not directly 
involved in the relationship between the government and the Community Clinics.  The 
flows of funding, accountability, service provision, influence, advocacy organizations 
and ownership are portrayed. 
The figure shows the Clinics as having a direct relationship with the Health 
Regions.  The Clinics are expected to co-ordinate their programs and services with those 
of the Health Regions; also, any additional funds they require for new initiatives must be 
obtained from the Health Regions.  The elected and departmental officials of the 
government have a direct relationship with the Health Regions because the Health 
Regions are the government‘s chosen structure to deliver institutional services in the 
province (An Act respecting Regional Health Services, Chapter R-8.2 of The Statutes of 
Saskatchewan, 2002).  At the same time, there are relationships between the elected 
officials and the Community Clinics, and between departmental officials and the 
Community Clinics.  These relationships differ in important ways, which are identified in 
the findings in this study.   
The Saskatchewan Community Health Co-operative Federation represents the 
Clinics‘ interests to government; thus a direct relationship between the government and 
the Federation is shown.  The co-operative movement also lobbies government on behalf 
of co-operative interests in general in the province.  The Federation is a member of the 
Saskatchewan Co-operative Association (Saskatchewan Co-operative Association 2006-
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07 Annual Report); thus the Clinics have a relationship to the Federation.  In this 
diagram, the individual Community Clinics include the Clinics‘ boards and 
administrators.  Clinic members are the ultimate groups affected by the relationship 
between the Clinics and the government.  It is important to note that the Clinics‘ 
members are the only group with an ownership relationship with the organization 
providing them with primary health care services.  This is the key way in which the 
Clinics differentiate themselves from private medical practice and the Health Regions; 
members are not just clients, they are owners. 
It is also important to note that prior to health reform, there were hundreds of 
organizations across the province delivering different components of health care.   In 
place of the Health Regions in Figure 3 (page 75) would be the following: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
MULTIPLE SERVICE 
PROVIDERS in 
multiple locations 
across Saskatchewan: 
Hospitals 
Ambulance 
Home Care 
Nursing Homes 
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Public Health Nursing 
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Post health reform, the Health Regions represent another actor in the primary 
health care policy domain that the Clinics must deal with and work through; this 
diminishes the strength of the relationship they previously had with department officials 
and elected politicians, as discussed in Chapter Five. 
The medical establishment is a key player in the health care policy domain 
through the Saskatchewan Medical Association (SMA).  Although there is no direct 
relationship between the medical establishment and the Community Clinics, it 
nonetheless has considerable influence over the policy environment regarding the 
delivery of health care in the province.  The SMA speaks for and lobbies on behalf of 
physicians; it was opposed to the Community Clinics when they were created at the time 
of the doctors‘ strike (Tollefson 1963; Badgley and Wolfe 1967; Rands 1994) and they 
appear to remain opposed today, especially with regard to maintaining fee-for-service 
remuneration.  Because of its influence, the medical establishment is an important 
mediator in the relationship between the Community Clinics and the state. 
The health care policy domain is comprised of a large number of actors within a 
complex, multi-layered network of relationships.  This is the policy environment in which 
the Community Clinics seek to negotiate their place at the policy-making table.   Within 
this context, the case study of the Community Clinics follows.  
In this chapter, the rationale for case study research is discussed first; the data 
collection methodology used for this case study is then described, and the specific 
methodology utilized to analyze the key informant interview transcripts is explained.  
Next, information on each Community Clinic, information about how it is organized and 
run, its budget, programs and services offered, board composition, staff complement, and 
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vision, mission and values is provided.  The chapter then sets out the findings from the 
data about the relationships between the co-operative Community Clinics and elected 
officials of the government, departmental officials and the medical profession.  
 
4.1 Methodology:  Case Study Research  
The methodology chosen for this research is empirical in nature, with the need 
and intent to explore the relatively large number of concepts contained in Stanbury‘s 
framework.   The complexity of the three-way relationship between the Community 
Clinics and the government and departmental officials, as mediated by the medical 
establishment argues for a case study approach using qualitative methods, including 
documentary sources and in-depth interviews with key informants.  A comparative 
method is adopted to examine the differences and similarities of the three Community 
Clinics with respect to the propositions.   The Community Clinics are unique in the co-
operative sector in Saskatchewan in that they receive the majority of their funding from 
the government.  Yet there are sufficient differences among the three Clinics to justify 
studying all three instead of just one, as is normally done with a strategic or critical case.  
One has been the nexus of political action and lobbying, one has avoided a role as 
political advocate, and one occupies a middle ground in terms of political activism.  
Examining the three provides a broader field for developing and testing theory. 
A case study approach allows the researcher to obtain the perspectives of the 
participants involved in the organizations today and historically; some of the participants 
have had a direct role to play in shaping the relationship between the Community Clinics 
and the government.  Although the Medicare crisis occurred over forty years ago, there 
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are still people around today who remember it and speak of it as though it was only 
yesterday.  It is very much alive in the minds of these people.  In the years since, Clinic 
advocates and government officials, whether elected or appointed, have developed very 
different beliefs about the relationship.  Their experiences and perspectives could not be 
captured adequately through quantitative methods. 
According to Yin (2003), a case study approach is preferred when examining 
contemporary events and when the relevant behaviours cannot be manipulated by the 
researcher.  Its utilization is appropriate when complex phenomena need to be 
understood.  It ―allows an investigation to retain the holistic and meaningful 
characteristics of real-life events‖ and can accommodate a full variety of evidence, 
including documents, artifacts, interviews and observations beyond what may be 
available (or admissible) with a conventional historical study (Yin 2003: 8). 
The case study is one method utilized in qualitative research (Gall et al. 1996); 
other methods include ethnography, grounded theory (Glaser and Strauss 1967), and 
action or participatory research.   It could be called an ―interdisciplinary‖ method because 
of its use in a number of disciplines, including management studies and organizational 
theory, education, sociology, and political studies.  Graduate schools of business 
commonly utilize the case study as a basic tool of teaching.
3
   
Use of the case study approach has its proponents and its detractors.  As a 
proponent, Schell (1992) regards the case study as: 
…unparalleled for its ability to consider a single or complex research 
questions within an environment rich with contextual variables.  
Observation, experiments, surveys and secondary information (archival) 
                                                 
3
 See, for instance, Leenders, Leenders and Erskine 2001 on the use of cases at the Richard Ivey School of 
Business at the University of Western Ontario and the website of the Harvard School of Business:  
http://www.hbs.edu/case. 
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have the advantage of producing sets of independent and dependent 
variables suitable for quantitative analysis:  The case study is best suited to 
considering the how and why questions, or when the investigator has little 
control over events (Schell 1992:  n.p.). 
 
The case study approach can accommodate a broader range of evidence, building 
a chain of evidence which gives this kind of research greater validity. 
Detractors of case study approach point out both practical and more abstract 
concerns.  Practical concerns include the highly labour-intensive nature of data 
collection, of organizing and reviewing large volumes of field notes, and of analyzing the 
data and then writing it up so that it is ―systematically comparable‖ with data collected 
using other methods.   Related to this concern is the amount of time case study 
preparation can take, which can result in ―massive, unreadable documents or report only 
the researchers conclusions‖ (Schell 1992). 
The risk of researcher bias is also a concern; this methodology is frequently 
regarded as being more subject to researcher bias than use of other strategies.   Further, 
―…there are fewer conventions the researcher can rely upon to defend him/her self 
against self-delusion or the presentation of ‗unreliable‘ or ‗invalid‘ conclusions‖ (Miles 
1979 quoted in Schell 1992: n.p.).   Schell (1992) further notes that critics claim that 
case studies do not provide an adequate basis for scientific generalization, and that the 
case study methodology is not well formulated because of a ―lack of rigour in method 
and execution‖.   Quantitative methods such as experimentation are viewed as more 
rigorous and therefore more valid and reliable.  However, these problems with the case 
study approach ―are not innate, but instead represent opportunities for development 
within the research strategy, or even more importantly, recognition of methodological 
constructs which are already known‖ (Schell 1992: n.p.).  Quantitative methods alone 
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may not be sufficiently flexible in design and application to be sensitive to the 
complexities of social phenomena; qualitative methods are more sensitive because 
design and application can evolve during the research to accommodate the complexities 
of the phenomenon under study (Dube and Pare 2001). 
In this study, efforts to minimize researcher bias were made in several ways.  
Large sections of the transcripts were reproduced to demonstrate that the informants‘ 
views were being interpreted accurately.  Pains were taken to ensure that attention was 
given to minority voices and positions, and similarly, that outliers and the unexpected 
were identified and explained where they were found.   A multi-layered comparative 
approach was used to capture the differences among the three Clinics and the differing 
perspectives held by different types of informants. 
The knowledge and experience gained from being an insider in both the Clinic 
world and the policy-making world in the provincial government made me a strong 
candidate for doing this research and offered distinct advantages.  Having both 
perspectives minimized the possibility that one would dominate over the other.  In 
addition, the past involvement of three of the Student Advisory Committee members as 
board members of the same Community Clinic meant that they possessed intimate 
knowledge its operations, providing another check on the accuracy of the interpretations 
presented here.   Insider experience and knowledge also facilitated access to the different 
types of informants interviewed for this study. 
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4.1.1 Summary 
 
In doing the present research, surveys and other quantitative methods were not 
considered to be adequate to examine the relationship and other behaviours under study. 
There were too few informants and the concepts too numerous and complex to use 
quantitative methods.  Past research on the role of ideas in policy-making appears to have 
utilized historical analysis and case study approaches (Hall 1993; Skogstad 2005).  Case 
analysis allows deeper exploration of the motivations and actions of the actors in the 
case, and is useful in theory development because it allows investigation of the actors‘ 
responses to decisions made by other actors (Westgren and Zering 1998: 3).   It is of 
particular value in instances when the research question does not lend itself to statistical 
(quantitative) analysis (Gall et al 1996; Westgren and Zering 1998), as is the instance in 
this research.  
  
4.2 Data Collection Method 
 
The data that forms the basis for the case of the Community Clinics in this 
research is derived mainly from primary sources such as the Clinics‘ own documents 
(annual reports, newsletters, Clinic histories, submissions to government commissions, 
etc.), key informant interviews, as well as secondary accounts (a few monographs on the 
history of Medicare, journal and newspaper articles, monographs on the history of the 
Douglas and Blakeney governments, etc.)  As Yin (2003) notes, multiple sources of 
evidence are required to produce high quality case studies, with interviews being one of 
the most important sources. 
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The key informant interviews were important for providing historical 
interpretation of events and insight into the motivations of the relevant actors.  In order to 
facilitate the research, a letter was sent in advance of scheduling the interviews to gain 
the permission of senior officials to interview appropriate staff members in their 
organizations (See Appendix One).  None of the key informants approached for an 
interview refused to participate. 
The interviews were structured into two groupings, one for informants directly 
involved in the Community Clinics (past and present Clinic administrators, board chairs, 
and staff) and the other for informants who have or who have had a role in establishing 
the policy and institutional environment in which the Clinics operate (past and present 
politicians, Department of Health officials, and Health Region officials) (see Appendices 
Two and Three).  One health care consultant was also interviewed utilizing the interview 
questions prepared for the latter group.   
Table 1–Key Informant Interviews 
Key Informant 
Groups 
Clinic Politicians Govt. 
Officials 
Health 
Regions 
Others 
Number Inter-
viewed 
6 4 3 6 2 
 
The selection of key informants for this research was limited by the small number 
of Community Clinics in Saskatchewan.  Because there are only five existing community 
health care co-operatives in the province, the pool of potential informants for this 
research was quite small, offering a maximum of five Community Clinic administrators 
and five chairs of the boards of directors.  Ultimately, this pool was reduced because one 
Community Clinic had amalgamated with the Health Region and another operated on a 
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different funding basis.  The administrators and board chairs are the key informants from 
the Community Clinics with the most exposure to and contact with the policy-making 
process.  Interviews were also conducted with key elected and appointed Health Region 
officials, Department of Health officials, health care consultants, and a number of 
provincial politicians who were in office during the period of time being studied.  
The interview questions were informed by the conceptual tools reviewed and 
were designed to engage the participants in a fuller exploration of their own past 
experiences and practices.  Questions related to the role of co-operatives as social 
economy organizations, their participation in the public policy process, and government‘s 
understanding and treatment of the Community Clinics solicited key informants‘ views 
on the role that the Community Clinics play in health care in Saskatchewan, the 
advantages and disadvantages of the co-operative model of primary health care delivery, 
how well this model has addressed public policy objectives, how the relationship between 
the Community Clinics should be characterized, whether politicians viewed the 
Community Clinics differently from government officials, how successful the 
Community Clinics‘ lobbying efforts have been, and how well the government has met 
the needs of the Community Clinics.   Questions related to the conditions necessary for 
policy change solicited key informants‘ views on whether the relationship between the 
Community Clinics and the government has changed over time, whether the political 
cycle has affected the relationship, the challenges and opportunities the Community 
Clinics face, and the future directions they may take.  Responses addressed all of the 
components of the framework elaborated by Stanbury (1993). 
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The interviews were semi-structured; questions were open-ended in order to 
solicit informants‘ views as well as more basic ―factual‖ information.  Individual 
interviews were audio-taped to ensure that the responses were accurately captured.  Notes 
were also taken during the interviews as a secondary means to record the informants‘ 
thoughts.   
The audiotapes were transcribed into Word documents to form a transcript 
database in Microsoft Word.  The transcripts were not edited to correct grammar; 
meaning or sentence structure; the voice and words of the key informants were respected.  
The interviews were transcribed by a staff member of the Centre for the Study of Co-
operatives under the supervision of the researcher.  The staff member signed a 
confidentiality agreement with respect to the transcripts. 
The interviews were conducted over approximately seven months.   Individual 
interviews generally took between 60 and 90 minutes to conduct.  Twenty-one key 
informants were interviewed for this research, providing the major data source. Two key 
informants participated in the same interview, resulting in twenty transcripts.  Eighteen of 
the twenty interviews were conducted in person by the researcher.  Two were conducted 
by telephone.   
Following transcription, the relevant transcripts were forwarded to each informant 
for their review and editing.  The informants had the option of withdrawing from the 
research at any time during the interview and transcription process; none of the selected 
informants chose to withdraw.  Informants returned their revised transcripts along with a 
signed Interview Transcript Release Form.  Their revisions were incorporated into the 
digital version in the transcript database.  All of informants chose to remain anonymous; 
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none of their comments were attributed to them by name.  Ensuring anonymity allowed 
informants to share their views more freely than they might have otherwise.  All 
transcripts were assigned to a double numbering system to further ensure anonymity. 
An ethics approval process was undertaken in keeping with the University of 
Saskatchewan‘s Ethics Review policies and procedures.  An application for approval was 
submitted in September 2005 and approval was received on October 11, 2005.  The 
application included questions for semi-structured interviews with key informants from 
the Clinics, as well as questions for non-Clinic participants including former provincial 
government politicians, Department of Health officials, Health Region officials (elected 
and senior management), health sector consultants and other related informants (see 
Appendices Four and Five).  
 
4.3 Data Analysis Method 
The analysis of the field interview data was based in part on the application of a 
content analysis software package to the transcripts of the key informant interviews, and 
the systematic review of secondary sources including annual reports and newsletters 
published by the Clinics, as well as the other literature on the Clinics.  Qualitative data 
analysis (QDA) software is increasingly utilized by researchers undertaking studies 
which involve large amounts of text, for instance, transcripts from key informant 
interviews.  Its use moderates both the labour-intensiveness of data analysis and the risk 
of researcher bias.  The QDA software was used for both of these purposes in this study.  
It provided a useful starting point for the organization of the transcripts such that the 
aspects of the relationships under study could be identified and then analyzed.  The QDA 
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package used in this research is Weft QDA (Fenton 2006), which was chosen because of 
its ease of use by a researcher without previous QDA experience; it is also available free 
of charge.  Its use enabled the researcher to analyze hundreds of pages of transcripts from 
the key informant interviews.   
Respondents were grouped into several categories; these included clinic 
informants, politicians, government officials, health region informants, and other 
informants.  The data analysis process began with initial readings of the transcripts and 
the field notes, as well as listening to the audiotapes. Search terms were then developed 
for each component of Stanbury‘s framework and the transcripts database was queried 
systematically for occurrences of these terms.  The framework provides a means of 
thinking about the constraints that exist, the influence processes used by the parties to the 
relationship, the impacts of the instruments chosen by the government in its interaction 
with the Clinics, and differences within the parties to the relationship.  
The Weft software provided for a search of the entire database by each group of 
informants.  Search results were captured in two forms: tables showing coding statistics 
cross-tabulated by informant group; the second the relevant text by individual informant.  
The latter resulted in a new database where the responses of informants could be sorted 
and compared by each search term.  This facilitated identification of similarities and 
differences among informants and informant groups.  Relevant quotes specific to the 
search terms were also identified and incorporated into the discussion.  
The findings are organized and presented in a format corresponding to elements 
of the adapted version of Stanbury‘s framework, beginning with the endogenous 
characteristics of the Community Clinics.  The analysis then proceeds through the 
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exogenous variables affecting the Community Clinics, the endogenous characteristics of 
the government and the exogenous variables affecting it, the interaction between the 
Community Clinics and the government, and the influence processes at play in their 
relationship.   
Stanbury‘s framework does not distinguish between politicians, government 
officials and the Health Regions.  However, the adapted version does address the 
differences among these three groups, and the differences between the Community 
Clinics and these groups are identified in the discussion.  As noted previously, Stanbury‘s 
use of ―endogenous‖ and ―exogenous‖ differ from what is normally meant by these 
terms.  For instance, he views membership characteristics as an exogenous factor, not 
endogenous.  Although his framework is used to organize the transcript data, wherever 
possible, the language of the data itself is used to clarify his categories. 
The term ―Community Clinic‖ itself has different meanings.  It can refer to a 
distinctive organizational form with a name that by law can only be used by the 
Community Clinics; it can also refer to the Community Clinics being studied in this 
research, either as ―the Clinic‖ to refer to an individual clinic, or ―the Clinics‖ to refer to 
all three. Generally, if the findings or discussion are applicable to all three, the plural 
form (―the Clinics‖) will be used; if the findings or discussion are applicable to only one 
Clinic, the singular form (―the Clinic‖) will be used.  If the distinctive organizational 
form is discussed, it will be as the co-operative community clinic model. 
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CHAPTER FIVE:  CASE STUDY AND FINDINGS FROM THE DATA 
 
5.1 Co-operative Community Clinic A 
 
Clinic A is one of the first to be established in Saskatchewan.  It was incorporated 
under The Mutual Medical and Hospital Benefits Association Act, but has changed its 
incorporation to fall under The Co-operatives Act, 1996.  Because it was the last 
organization still incorporated under The Mutual Medical and Hospital Benefits 
Association Act, the Department of Health plans to repeal this act.   
 Clinic A is governed by a twelve-member Board of Directors, with an Executive 
Committee and a number of subcommittees to deal with specific aspects of the enterprise. 
These include:  Operations, Strategic Planning, Member Services, Political and Social 
Action, and Primary Health Care.  The Board‘s composition allows for representation 
from Clinic A‘s medical staff and members of the union of non-medical staff.  The head 
of the medical group reports directly to the Board of Directors.  Clinic A also has an 
Advocacy Network which provides members with ―organized information and support so 
they will be able to act in an informed way to defend and promote publicly-funded health 
care and to support other health-related actions‖.  An administrator who reports to the 
board oversees the operations of  
Clinic A. 
 Clinic A has approximately 11,000 members, but people do not need to be 
members to use the services of the Clinic.  It is estimated that an additional 14,000 people 
are served.  Clinic A employs 125 full and part time staff and representing 12 disciplines 
involved in providing interdisciplinary primary health care. They work out of three sites 
in their urban location and draw some members and patients from surrounding areas. 
 91 
 
Clinic A also provides physician services to a neighbouring small town. 
 Clinic A's annual operating budget is approximately $8.25 million, the majority of 
which comes from the Department of Health.  Additional funds are received from the 
federal government, fee-for-service, and member fees.  Grant funding from the federal 
government and other sources is also used to undertake special projects and pilot new 
services and programs.  Some of Clinic A‘s programs are funded through donations 
received by a charitable foundation established specifically for this purpose.  Individuals 
pay $15 and a family $30 for a lifetime membership.  Members are also asked to 
contribute on an annual basis.  Member benefits include reduced rates on dispensing fees 
for prescription drugs and free delivery of prescriptions, as well as coverage for non-
insured medicals.  Member benefits also include eligibility to run for the Board of 
Directors, and to serve on committees and volunteer.  Members receive Clinic A‘s 
newsletter and are invited to volunteer for various projects and roles.  
 The vision of Clinic A is: 
Healthy individuals in a healthy community.  Our vision is a world 
where communities, families and individuals experience optimal 
conditions for health through all stages of life, actively pursue and 
manage their own health, and are supported by a publicly administered 
health care system offering high quality primary health services 
provided by an integrated and innovative health care team (Clinic A 
website).   
 
 Its mission is to provide excellence in primary health care.  Clinic A also sets out a 
statement of values to which it adheres, as follows: 
We believe: 
 
 People who use our health services should help decide what our 
services will be and how our services will be offered to the 
community.  
 People‘s health needs are best met by an active partnership 
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between the people who use health services and people who offer 
them.  
 Co-operative community clinics, run by the people from the 
community, are an ideal way to provide health services.  
 Health care services people need should be: universal; accessible; 
comprehensive; portable; and publicly administered.  
 When health care providers work together as a team, our users 
benefit.  
 People have a responsibility and a right to support and control 
their own health. Our role is to support them to act on their 
responsibility and right.  
 Social and economic factors such as racism and poverty can 
profoundly compromise the health of the people we serve.  We 
will act socially and politically to eliminate the negative effects 
of these factors on people‘s health.  
 People should have equal opportunity to achieve health and well-
being. They should also have equal opportunity to receive health 
services according to their needs.  
 We must make responsible use of the public and member funds 
provided to support our services by ensuring they are used 
effectively, economically, and efficiently.  
 We need to dedicate ourselves to ensuring our services are 
accessible to all individuals and groups in need of them in our 
community (Clinic A website). 
  
 Clinic A‘s services and programs include: community mental health nursing; 
counselling; laboratory, electrocardiogram and x-ray facilities; family physicians; a 
health information centre; member relations; nursing; nutrition services; occupational and 
physical therapy; and a pharmacy. 
Clinic A has numerous partnerships to provide programs and services in its 
community, particularly marginalized populations who may have difficulty accessing 
care.  Examples include a medical student-run clinic at Clinic A‘s inner city clinic site, a 
home visiting program for high-risk families in inner city neighbourhoods, a community 
kitchen to help people learn how to prepare nutritious meals at reasonable cost, an 
Aboriginal seniors‘ program, and a diabetes program for at-risk Aboriginals.  Clinic A is 
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the only Community Clinic among the three being studied that has signed an agreement 
with its Health Region to co-operate and to co-ordinate delivery of primary health care 
services (see Appendix Nine).   
Clinic A can be characterized as the most politically active of the three, lobbying 
not only for itself, but also for all of the Community Clinics, the co-operative model of 
primary health care delivery and for Medicare.  Clinic A has attracted the attention of 
health care administrators, practitioners and researchers from around the world, and 
continues to host delegations that come to learn about the model.  Outside of the province 
and the country, Saskatchewan is recognized as having a positive and effective model for 
consumer-owned and operated primary health care. 
 
 
5.2 Co-operative Community Clinic B 
 Clinic B is incorporated under The Co-operatives Act, 1996 and is governed by a 
twelve-member board, with Finance, Membership and Publicity, and Education and New 
Programs committees.  Clinic B‘s physicians report to the board through a medical co-
ordinator who is a doctor.   Its mission statement is: 
We are a health co-operative which is proactive in providing 
comprehensive health, social and educational services to members, 
patients and clients from [our community] and district. Our mutual goal is 
the creation of a healthy community (Clinic B website)  
 
 Clinic B‘s vision statement is: 
Working co-operatively for a healthy community (Clinic B website).  
 Clinic B provides the following services: family physicians, nurse practitioner, 
expanded nursing, laboratory, exercise specialist, counselling services, nutrition, 
optometry, X-Ray/ECG, health information centre, menopause resource centre, blood 
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glucose monitoring, and 24 Hour emergency call service. 
 Clinic B offers a lifetime membership for the cost of $5 per person or $10 per 
family. This lifetime membership gives members the right to vote at members‘ meetings, 
i.e. Annual General Meeting, run for the Board of Directors, sit on any of Clinic B‘s 
committees and receive Clinic B‘s newsletter. 
 A reminder notice is sent on members‘ anniversary date letting them know that the 
special benefits portion of the membership is about to lapse, and giving them the 
opportunity to renew so as to continue receiving the special benefits.  In the first year of 
membership, members pay only the lifetime membership fee; the Annual Special 
Benefits portion is waived and members receive all benefits for $5 if single, or $10 for a 
family. 
 Like Clinic A, Clinic B has a fund to which tax-deductible donations can be given.  
Contributions to the fund enable Clinic B to improve education, prevention, and health 
promotion programs and purchase needed medical equipment.  Clinic B‘s informants 
noted that the efforts of volunteers to fundraise for Clinic B were very important in 
supplementing the funding it receives from the provincial government. Additional funds 
in the form of grants are also obtained from other federal and provincial sources.  These 
are critical to keeping the Clinic solvent.  
 Also like Clinic A, Clinic B has many partnerships in the community to provide 
services and programs, and also relies on volunteers to help deliver these.  Examples 
include support for people with Fetal Alcohol Spectrum Disorder, day care centre to help 
young mothers stay in school, and services for new immigrants and refugees, including 
medical exams and treatment for Post Traumatic Stress Disorder. 
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 Clinic B‘s budget for 2005-06 was approximately $3.1 million.  It has 51 people on 
staff, with 3,200 active members and 14,689 on its total membership list.  Like Clinic A, 
it is located in a large urban centre.  It undertakes some lobbying and advocacy activity, 
but not to the same extent as Clinic A.   
 
5.3 Co-operative Community Clinic C 
 
 Clinic C is also located in an inner-city neighbourhood in a large urban centre in 
Saskatchewan.  It has 16,000 clients and nearly 7,000 active members.  Clinic C employs 
52 full time staff and has an annual budget of over $4 million.  Most of its revenue is 
received from the Department of Health, as is the revenue of the other two Clinics, A and 
B. 
 Clinic C is incorporated under The Co-operatives Act, 1996.  Its mission is: 
The [community] Co-operative Health Centre is a primary health care 
provider. We enable our clients by providing preventative, health 
promotion, supportive and curative health services. 
 
 Its values are:  
 
We believe ...  
Health care for all should be universal, accessible, comprehensive, 
portable and publicly funded.  
Every individual is to be treated with compassion, respect and dignity.  
Interdisciplinary health care teams are an integral part of health 
services delivery.  
Primary health care provision includes cooperation and partnerships 
with the whole community.  
In demonstrating integrity, commitment and accountability to our 
clients.  
In striving for continuous quality improvement. 
 
 
 Anyone aged 16 years or older is eligible to join and lifetime memberships cost 
$5.00.  Assessed membership, as distinguished from lifetime, may be paid annually to 
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help cover programs and services not covered by Medicare.  Members who pay the 
additional assessed membership fee benefit by receiving discounts on chargeable services 
and equipment rental.  Most services are available with or without a membership. 
 Clinic C offers a comprehensive and impressive array of programs and services to 
its members and to the community at large.  Community programs include community 
health workers, nutrition and dietetic counselling, advocacy, and health education and 
health promotion.  Community Program staff also provide transportation to appointments 
at the health centre, hospital or referrals by wheelchair equipped van; liaison and support 
for aboriginal clients; counselling and support to abused women; dental treatment, 
education and prevention to school students; individual, family and group counselling; 
research and health promotion on family violence; workshops and classes; self-help 
support groups; health education materials and internet access; volunteer support; and, a 
drug addiction recovery program.  
 Physicians and support staff in family practice, internal medicine, general surgery, 
paediatrics and obstetrics and gynaecology provide a broad range of services and 
comprehensive care for patients.  Nursing staff provide health assessment, diagnostic 
screening, health teaching, disease management, nursing care, referrals to other services, 
complementary therapies, visiting nurses, and palliative care.  Laboratory staff provide 
laboratory tests, ECG heart testing, and ambulatory blood pressure monitoring.  
Diagnostic imaging staff provide X-ray and ultrasound procedures.   Physiotherapy staff 
provide therapy treatments and run seniors' exercise groups. 
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5.4 Case Study Summary 
 Although the Community Clinics being studied are located in fairly similar urban 
settings, it is interesting to note that they are each able to address the specific and 
different health care challenges of the populations in their respective centre.   All have a 
community development focus and make special efforts to work with marginalized 
populations.  The Community Clinics take a health promotion and prevention approach to 
the provision of primary health care services.  To a greater or lesser degree, they work to 
address not only immediate health care needs but also the determinants of health.  All 
offer a wide range of services that are available in one place.  The Community Clinics, 
also to a greater or lesser degree, have innovated with respect to developing new 
programs and services to meet the needs of their members and users.  Key characteristics 
of the Clinics are given in Table 2 (see page 98).  
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Table 2 – Key Characteristics of the Community Clinics 
 
 There are common elements among the three Community Clinics, such as the 
interdisciplinary and holistic approach taken to primary health care, yet there are 
significant differences.  These differences became more visible in the data that was 
derived from the key informant interview transcripts that follows. 
 
 
Key 
Characteristics 
 
Clinic A 
 
Clinic B 
 
Clinic C 
 
Advocacy and 
Lobbying 
Strongly 
emphasized 
Less strongly 
emphasized 
Not emphasized 
Health promotion 
and prevention 
√ √ √ 
Interdisciplinary  
teams 
√ √ √ 
Targeted groups √ √ √ 
Tailored services 
and programs 
 
√ 
 
√ 
 
√ 
 
Doctors on salary 
or contract 
 
√ √ √ 
Incorporation Mutual Medical 
and Hospital 
Benefits 
Associations Act 
The Co-operatives 
Act 
The Co-operatives 
Act 
Number of 
members 
11,000 3,200 7,000 
Number of users 14,000 more 14,689 on total 
membership list 
16,000 
Number of staff 125 full- and part-
time 
51 52 
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5.5 Findings from the Data 
5.5.1 Endogenous Characteristics of the Co-operative Community Clinics 
According to Stanbury (1993), the endogenous characteristics of interest group 
include organizational variables – structure, governance, and core activities (other than 
advocacy).  These variables are characteristics that organizations can control and change 
over time. With respect to the Community Clinics, their endogenous characteristics 
include their autonomy, democratic governance, boards of directors, community-based 
nature, inter- or multidisciplinary approach, primary health care model, and member 
ownership.  The Clinics‘ core activities have been described in the previous sections.   
As a group, Clinic informants raised issues with respect to the Clinics‘ 
endogenous characteristics more frequently than other informant groups did, particularly 
those related to their autonomy, the co-operative model of primary health care delivery, 
governance and ownership.  Clinic informants have had a longstanding concern about 
lack of recognition of the co-operative model of primary health care delivery.  The 
potential loss of Clinic autonomy has been a concern of the boards and administrators of 
all three Clinics for some time.  Officials in the Department of Health have tried at least 
twice to have the Clinics folded into their respective Health Regions to come under 
Health Region control (Transcript 1). 
When these attempts were made, the Community Clinics fought back.  Initially 
the Districts were not given responsibility for primary health care, but when the Regions 
were formed, this changed.  In the mid- to late 1990s, there were cutbacks in funding for 
health care in response to a period of economic crisis.   One Clinic‘s annual report from 
that period stated that: 
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The District Health Board and Saskatchewan Health have been so 
consumed by trying to cut cost in the institutional sector they have had 
little time for community based services like ours.  We hope…that they 
will begin to appreciate and support our potential to foster good health. 
 
The Province has told us they intend to eventually transfer funding 
responsibility to the District Health Boards.  We are very concerned about 
the consequences to Associations of such a transfer.  We are working to 
influence the Province and District Boards to protect that which we value 
and to work in partnership with us to support and expand our model 
(1993-94 Annual Report). 
 
All three Clinics feared that if the Health Districts were given responsibility for 
the Clinics, they would: 
…not necessarily support the maintenance of the clinics and there was the 
possibility that two things could have happened: one – that they could 
have cut back resources for our clinics and we wouldn‘t have been able to 
meet our clients‘ needs as well, or two – they could have taken us apart.  
They were centralizing all of their functions like physical therapy, lab 
services, occupational therapy (Transcript 42). 
 
 The politicians seemed supportive of the Clinics at that time and through the 
Saskatchewan Community Co-operative Health Federation, representatives of the Clinics 
were able to meet with Cabinet to plead their case.  The decision to keep the Clinics 
autonomous was made twice at the Cabinet table.   An informant notes that the 
government made a commitment to the Clinics that the Clinics would only become the 
responsibility of the Health Regions when the Regions had made arrangements for 
alternate payment methods with a majority of individual and group practices in the 
Regions (Transcript 21).  Since progress in negotiating alternate payment mechanisms 
with the doctors has been slow, there is no perceived threat of the Regions gaining 
control over the Clinics for quite some time (Transcript 42).   
 On the other hand, officials of the Department of Health are regarded as anxious 
to control the Clinics:  ―The bureaucracy wants a system they can control.  They can‘t 
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control the Clinics.  They view them as problems.  The Clinics don‘t fit into boxes‖ 
(Transcript 42). This informant‘s view is that the officials are very strong and have never 
supported the Clinics.  Because there is no legislative framework to enable new Clinics, 
they do not get set up, and the politicians are cautious in how they support the Clinics and 
in what they say (Transcript 2).   
Another Clinic informant notes that Department of Health officials view the co-
operative Clinic model as a disadvantage because they cannot exercise as much control 
over the organization as they would like: 
…well, as a co-operative of course we‘ve got a disadvantage that we‘re 
not autonomous because we operate at the whims of the government.  As 
you know, one of the co-operative principles is independence and 
autonomy and we‘re not able to do that…Well, we are but the government 
also has the right to withdraw our funding, in which case we‘d be 
screwed… 
 
We‘re independent in that we can choose to accept or to not accept 
government funding, but on the other hand it is so crucial to our survival 
that without it we‘d be nothing more than a small lobby group of people, 
perhaps.  Not able to provide any real services (Transcript 32). 
 
 When asked about the Clinics‘ role in the health care system in the province, 
Department of Health officials simply say that there are five in operation (Transcripts 15, 
27). The implication seems to be that the department will deal with them because they 
exist but the officials consistently cite the Health Regions legislation (The Regional 
Health Services Act, Chapter R-8.2* of The Statutes of Saskatchewan, 2002 as amended 
by the Statutes of Saskatchewan, 2002, c.C-11.1; 2003, c.25; 2004, c.49; 2004, c.51; 
2004, c.C-11.2; and 2005, c.M-36.1) as setting out the mandate they must implement.  
The Department of Health has itself been reorganized to reflect the structure of the health 
system; it is set up to deal with and support the Regions (Transcript 22).  The addition of 
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a Primary Health Care Branch is relatively recent. 
Department officials would rather not have to deal with the Clinics and there is no 
support for establishing new ones.  Department of Health officials say that they have not 
been approached to establish any new co-operative Clinics and the existing Clinics are 
now referred to as ―primary care sites‖ in the health care system, further reflecting the 
pull of integration (Transcripts 16, 28). 
Another informant reiterates the concerns about accountability and measurement 
and evaluation of the Clinics, saying that Department of Health officials want proof that 
the Clinics provide efficient and effective service delivery (Transcript 41).  Where fee-
for-service practices allot seven minutes or so to each patient, the Clinics‘ physicians 
spend more time with every person – something in the range of 21 minutes.  The Clinics 
are seen as providing better care because the patient is able to access multiple services in 
one place and that different members of the Clinics‘ interdisciplinary teams can access 
the patient‘s records and discuss with each other what the patient‘s care should be.  The 
officials, however, regard the Clinic model as an expensive delivery mechanism for the 
other services, for instance, physiotherapy and counseling, which would not normally be 
associated with fee-for-service practice.  There is considerable pressure on the Clinics by 
the Department of Health to quantify their efficiency and effectiveness (Transcript 41).  
Clinic autonomy seems to be associated with the past more than with the future.  
One informant was careful to describe the Region‘s current relationship with the Clinic in 
its area as resulting in large part from the Clinic‘s history with the provincial government: 
Yes, we have a relationship but to me we have to back up a little bit 
historically.  I think the Community Clinics have been in operation for 
some time prior to all of this reform and the establishment of the Health 
Regions.  As so it was basically, I‘m assuming, I might be wrong, but the 
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[Case B] Clinic established itself as a co-operative and they did that in 
direct negotiations with Saskatchewan Health around funding…Basically 
they developed and continue to have their primary working relationship 
with the province when it comes to funding…and that is a historical fact.  
And then along came the districts, along came these bigger Regions and 
what Health has said to the Regions is, ‗We are going to give you a basket 
of dollars.‘  And we have a working agreement with them and a legislative 
framework that we are responsible for delivering the comprehensive array 
of health care services.  It is our job to integrate, plan and provide that 
kind of leadership.  And so we‘ve been mandated to do that and that‘s how 
we try to work (Transcript 11). 
 
 The historical relationship between one Clinic and the government places the 
Region itself between the Department of Health and the Clinic, making it difficult for the 
Region and this Clinic to establish a positive working relationship (Transcript 30).  The 
Clinic essentially serves two masters – the Health Region and the Department of Health.  
Where before this Clinic could approach the Department of Health directly for funding, it 
is now told to deal with the Health Region to secure funds for programs and services 
apart from its core funding.  The Clinic has to negotiate with the Region and meet the 
Region‘s priorities and strategies. 
 The same Region also has to deal with conflicting demands from a number of 
groups and the Clinic is but one of these.  The Region places great emphasis on achieving 
a common strategy in keeping with its mandate: 
So the Community Clinics basically have been more independent and 
autonomous and have done their own assessment and planning and 
they‘ve come up with an agenda and they want us to buy it.  And our 
strategy has been more one of, we need to develop a common strategy and 
agenda based on a whole host of competing interests.  Partner with us and 
we‘ll come up with one that‘s common.  I think what we sometimes have 
is a polite, friendly but bit of an arm wrestle around whose autonomy is 
whose – are we in the lead?  [The Department of] Health has given us that 
mandate so therefore the Clinics should basically say, ‗How do we 
respond to the needs of [community] and area and the Health Region – 
what is your agenda and how can we support that and how can we 
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influence that?‘  We probably prefer that kind of rapport.  I think that we 
sometimes find that the Clinic says, ‗Well, we‘re a board, we‘re 
autonomous, we‘ve had this history‘ (Transcript 13). 
 
 Although there is perceived value in the multidisciplinary team approach and in 
having physicians on alternate payment methods, the autonomous governance of the 
Clinic is an issue for this Health Region (Transcript 13).  At the time of the interview, the 
government‘s priority was to move fee-for-service physicians to alternate methods of 
remuneration, including salary and contract (Transcript 30).  This policy position has 
influenced the Health Region‘s relationship with the Clinic in that the Region is spending 
less time working with the Clinic and more time in working with physicians on this 
matter.  The province‘s efforts to develop a model contract with the Saskatchewan 
Medical Association have not yet been successful because the SMA is very resistant to 
the idea of alternate remuneration for its members: 
It‘s a huge step but that‘s where the province wants us to invest, but SMA 
and the province are not on the same page with this.  So SMA has 
basically told their physician members, ‗Don‘t sign anything with the 
Region around the contract until we say it‘s okay.‘  Well, we‘ve got some 
physician groups saying, ‗Okay, no, we won‘t talk about it,‘ but others are 
still quite interested (Transcript 30). 
 
The emphasis the Clinics place on autonomy appears to be countered by the 
government‘s emphasis on integration.  The priorities of the government‘s health policy 
thus place the Health Regions and the Community Clinics into conflict with each other. 
The leadership of the Clinics has been accustomed to dealing directly with either the 
politicians or with Department of Health officials (Transcript 30).  Now that the Regions 
have responsibility for primary health care, access to this venue for Clinic lobbying is 
being cut off.   
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A word that did not appear in the transcripts is innovation.  Instead, it appeared in 
the form of a metaphor:   
Someone gave me a model between a speedboat and an ocean liner, and 
maybe our Health Region is like the ocean liner and we can be a bit more 
like the speedboat, which can do things for the community, sort of 
experimental or leading edge things that others haven‘t thought of…it‘s 
one of those sorts of things where it seems to take a large bureaucracy a 
long time to be able to do the right thing where we can perhaps be a bit 
more nimble (Transcript 32). 
 
It may be that the Clinics‘ endogenous characteristics have stimulated their record 
of innovation in primary health care.  For instance, Clinic A developed a drug formulary 
later adopted by the province as a provincial drug plan, and employed the first medical 
social worker in a clinic setting.  Another example is that one Clinic‘s nurses had to meet 
the needs of many clients that were previously met in the hospitals in response to the 
impact of the changes in the health care system.  Activity increased in the areas of 
counseling, advice, health teaching and triaging of patients over the phone.  Efforts were 
made to obtain funding for a nurse-run health phone line.  The project was developed in 
conjunction with the Saskatchewan Registered Nurses Association.  The Clinic 
approached the Health Region and the Department of Health to fund a service that would 
provide people with the option of calling an experienced registered nurse for advice and 
health education.  This is normally provided during the day by the Clinic‘s nurses, but the 
project was intended to operate in the evenings and part of the weekend.  The objective 
was to reduce the number of unnecessary visits to emergency rooms, reduce double 
doctoring, provide people with health education, and consequently empower people to 
take more responsibility for their own health.  The Clinic was not successful in securing 
funding for a pilot project but, ultimately, the Department of Health established its own 
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―Telehealth‖ service for the entire province.   
The analogy of speedboat versus ocean liner seems apt.  This Clinic, as well as 
the others, has a structural advantage in that its size and closeness to its members allows 
it to try new things that are targeted for their specific needs.  What will happen to this and 
the other Clinics‘ records of innovation if the Health Regions that are their ocean liners 
absorb the speedboats into these large bureaucracies?  It seems that the flexibility and 
nimbleness of the Clinic could very well be lost.  This loss of the ability to innovate has 
larger implications in that new things tried at the individual Clinic level can be, and have 
been, adopted at provincial and national levels in the past. 
The metaphor of ―speed boat versus ocean liner‖ presents an important point of 
comparison between the Community Clinics and the Health Regions.  It suggests that the 
Clinics are more able to innovate because they are smaller and more nimble, and have the 
flexibility that the Health Regions do not possess.  However, the Clinics do not have the 
resources that the Health Regions possess, and Rogers (1995) notes that this is one reason 
why larger organizations can and do innovate.  In his terms, the Clinics would be 
classified as entrepreneurial or ―venturesome innovators‖, while the Health Regions 
would be ―traditional laggards‖ (Rogers 1995: 262-266).  
There may be an additional reason for the Clinics‘ record of innovation.   Clinic 
staff do their work as members of interdisciplinary teams.   The social dynamics of 
working this way may lead to innovation – people talk, think, experiment together, 
bringing the knowledge and experience of different health care professions to bear on the 
needs of Clinic members and users. 
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The endogenous characteristics of the Clinics are key factors in both Clinic 
autonomy and innovation.  Clinic autonomy arises from the co-operative model itself and 
is a core feature of Clinic structure and governance.  The core activities, in other words 
the services and programs they provide for their members and users, seem to have led to 
Clinic innovation. 
 
5.5.2 Exogenous Variables Affecting the Community Clinics 
The exogenous variables affecting the Community Clinics include variables over 
which they have no or limited control.  Following Stanbury‘s framework, these variables 
would include the relationship among the members, the degree of government 
intervention in the field, the degree of dependency on government actions, the 
characteristics of the members, and public perceptions of the organization.  This section 
focuses on the characteristics of and relationships among the members of the Community 
Clinics, the degree of government intervention in the field, and the public‘s perception of 
the community Clinics. The degree of dependency by the Community Clinics on 
government action is also discussed in other sections. 
As may be expected, issues related to the Community Clinics‘ exogenous 
characteristics were raised most often by Clinic informants, followed closely by the 
political informants.  The issue of the Community Clinics‘ close ties with the NDP arises, 
as does the differences among Community Clinic members with respect to age and 
understanding of the co-operative nature of the clinic model.  The degree of government 
intervention and issues of power and control also emerge. 
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One informant thinks that health care co-operatives can play a central role in 
primary health care in the province, but has found that the past still influences how the 
Clinic is perceived today (Transcript 35).  This informant thinks that the general public in 
that particular Clinic‘s surrounding community is not aware of what the Clinic does and 
that people are hesitant to come to the Clinic because of its historical association with the 
NDP.  With respect to the impact of the past on the present, one informant indicated that: 
…there are people that remember 1962 like it was yesterday and they 
haven‘t moved on.  And you know while the formation of co-operative 
health centres in 1962 was very futuristic in many respects, I find from 
some aspects they haven‘t moved on from there…they maintain the status 
quo… (Transcript 8). 
 
 
 
5.5.2.1 Public Perceptions and Beliefs 
 Some informants think that the Community Clinics were ahead of their time and 
that time has caught up to them.  Are they frozen in time in some respects?    One 
informant thinks there were more advantages to the co-operative Clinic model in the past 
than there are now (Transcript 35).  Today, the public has access to more options in 
health care, for example, walk-in clinics that are open around the clock; it is hard for this 
informant‘s Clinic to compete with that. 
One Clinic‘s identity is in part bound up with the perception that it was closely 
associated with the NDP (Transcripts 5, 37).   This perception has been problematic for 
the Clinic.  A Clinic representative who was a self-described ―high profile person‖ in the 
CCF party and helped to establish this Clinic notes that: 
Some of the physicians and one of the directors of the physicians was very 
concerned about the high involvement of the CCF because they wanted it 
to work as a medical clinic and if you come in later in the picture…where 
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you‘re saying that the government was a bit standoffish, you had to feel it 
was a rather mutual agreement for the clinic to take an arm‘s length 
position in order for them to be credible with all the opposition which was 
in the medical hierarchy (Transcript 38). 
 
 
 One Clinic representative did, however, see the need for this same Clinic to be a 
political organization in order to keep it running.  This appears to mean political in terms 
of lobbying and advocacy.  An example of this occurred when the Liberal government 
brought in deterrent fees: 
In 1967 when the Liberal government was in office and we took a stand 
against the deterrent fees that were laid against people, we got something 
like 35,000 signatures from the clinic membership in order to defeat the 
Liberal government at that time.  So you see we were never anti-NDP or 
anti-CCF.  What we were was careful to try to encourage the medical staff 
on board.  And that has been a struggle and I think is still a struggle from 
what I‘m hearing about programs that are going on (Transcript 37). 
 
The strength of the perceptions around this Clinic‘s association with the NDP also 
seems to have affected the possible establishment of new Community Clinics.  When a 
suggestion to establish a Clinic in a rural location was made to a Department of Health 
official during the Liberals‘ tenure as government, the official‘s response was that as a 
bureaucrat, that would be a ―kiss of death‖ (Transcript 6). 
 One Clinic informant, who was also a Clinic employee at one time, said that when 
Grant Devine was the Premier of the province, as leader of the Progressive Conservative 
(PC) Party, the PCs ―were afraid to do anything with the Clinics, even though they would 
have liked to, because they thought the Clinics could mount some kind of mass protest if 
they did anything with them‖.  The PCs were under the impression that the Community 
Clinics had a much larger membership base.  This informant worked at the Clinic at that 
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time and ―it was nice from that point of view that we had thrown fear in the government 
about touching us‖ (Transcript 37). 
Informants from the same Clinic have also expressed the opinion that the co-
operative movement itself did not regard the Community Clinics as ―real‖ co-operatives.  
The Clinics had approached the Canadian Co-operative Association – Saskatchewan 
Region for support in advancing the Co-operative Clinic model in the province.  What set 
them apart from ―real‖ co-operatives seemed to be that the Clinics received almost all 
their funding from the government.  Clinic representatives expressed disappointment that 
the co-operative movement did not give the Clinics the support they were asking for.  
There was also a question raised by the Canadian Co-operative Association – 
Saskatchewan Region around how the Clinics could operate as co-operatives under The 
Mutual Medical and Hospital Benefits Association legislation.  It is not known if the co-
operative movement in the province was concerned that the Community Clinics did not 
observe the co-operative principle of political neutrality.  This may have been another 
reason that the co-operative movement in the province did not support them at that time 
(Transcript 37). 
 
5.5.2.2 Member Characteristics 
 The influence of a generational difference is apparent in all of the Community 
Clinics; members probably had a stronger voice in the past: 
Researcher:  Do you think that is in part because of the aging of the 
membership overall? 
 
Informant:  Absolutely, absolutely.  Founding members have history with 
this place.  Many of them are active volunteers probably in their 70‘s or 
80‘s…So they are passionate.  So the founding members have a different 
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passion for this place than what new members do and our AGM‘s – we 
still hold them and it‘s harder and harder to get a quorum for us 
(Transcript 35). 
 
In one Clinic, an informant indicated that the presence of older members who 
participated in establishing the Clinic is a limiting factor in that the members‘ connection 
to the past constrains them from making strategic decisions that would help the Clinic to 
respond to the current environment.   The Medicare crisis remained very much in the 
present for these members.  The differences in how Clinic founders and older members 
view the government‘s relationship with the Clinic and the current leaders‘ views 
demonstrate how the ideas of certain players affect the outcomes of Clinic decision-
making and strategy.  The founders of all three Clinics being studied view the 
establishment of the Clinics as a radical transformation of health care delivery in 
Saskatchewan.  Current leaders view the health care system as having caught up to the 
Clinics; the Clinics are no longer radical as the basis of their operations become more 
mainstream – utilization of multidisciplinary teams, increased focus on promotion and 
prevention, and alternate physician remuneration schemes. 
All three Clinics indicated that there were problems caused by the aging of their 
membership and the difficulty in attracting new members.  The Clinics still have 
members who helped start the Clinics during the doctors‘ strike in 1962 and who 
continue to understand and value the importance of the co-operative model for the 
delivery of health care services.  As the number of these members and supporters 
diminishes over time, there are not enough new members with the same understanding 
and appreciation of the co-operative model.  
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All three Clinics are also experiencing difficulty in attracting new members and 
new board members.   The number of board members of one Clinic has been reduced 
from 12 to nine, as well as the number of people required for a quorum at annual general 
meetings.  If an insufficient number of people attend the annual general meeting, it 
cannot proceed and another attempt must be made later, with no guarantee that a quorum 
would be achieved then.   Planning for and holding these meetings consumes a lot of 
administrative time that could be used for other matters.   In this instance, the democratic 
process can sometimes be a limitation (Transcript 8). 
There is a need to find new members but people need to understand what the 
Clinics are.  A former political representative commented on the generation gap in 
support for the Clinic model, saying that member and public support for the Clinics has 
waned over time (Transcript 42). This concern is not specific to the Clinics; it applies 
more generally to the co-operative movement in the province and elsewhere.   
 
5.5.3  Interaction 
The government seems to have established an environment in which the 
Community Clinics experience increasing constraints to their ability to make decisions.  
These constraints are being placed on the Clinics by the Health Regions.  As the 
government‘s chosen policy instrument to achieve its goals in health care reform, the 
Health Regions have what the Clinics do not – a legislated mandate and the resources to 
carry out that mandate. 
According to Stanbury (1993), the interaction component includes government‘s 
choice of governing instruments, controlling access to decisions, control over 
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information, and assisting countervailing forces.  One of the government‘s instruments of 
choice is the legislation that established the Health Regions.  This has impacted its 
interaction with the Clinics in different ways.  The Health Region in which one Clinic is 
located favours integration.   Much emphasis is placed on achieving a system that is 
―seamless‖ so that patients can flow more easily through it and there is better co-
ordination and communication between the system‘s components (Transcript 3).  
This same Health Region thinks that the Clinic within its boundaries has 
―enormous potential‖ for primary health care delivery but also that it needs to be part of 
an integrated system.  The structure of the Health Regions is intended to ―promote, 
enable, create integrated health systems‖.  The need for accountability is also 
emphasized.  The Clinic‘s status as a co-operative is seen as posing particular challenges 
because of its democratic nature and autonomy; because of this, ―there‘s less control‖ of 
the Clinic (Transcript 40).  
In spite of the challenges caused by the attitude of the Health Region toward this 
Clinic, the Clinic has worked with the Region in a number of ways.  The Clinic has had a 
representative on the population health co-ordinating committee, the children and youth 
needs assessment group, the district‘s adult and seniors‘ needs assessment group.  The 
Clinic asked the Health Region for citizen involvement in decision-making, support for 
those with difficulty accessing service, and greater emphasis on programs that address 
factors that affect health, such as employment, income and housing.  The Clinic also had 
an agreement with the Health Region to provide physician services to a rural clinic in one 
small community and for a certain number of hours each week in another place.  This 
Clinic believes that another agreement with the Health Region to jointly plan and deliver 
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primary health care represents recognition by the Health Region of the Clinic‘s strengths 
in the delivery of focused programs and services to meet its clients‘ particular needs 
(Transcript 42).  However, given the goal of integration and the desire for control, it is 
unclear how this will play out in the future.   
In contrast to the other Clinics, one Clinic and its Health Region seem to have 
gone beyond a somewhat distant but cordial relationship to a working relationship that 
encompasses a degree of co-ordination and planning.  This seems to be largely due to the 
individuals involved.   The parties involved appear to be focused on providing 
complementary programs and services, although there is still much work to be done to 
sort these out.  
This does not mean that there are not any issues to deal with.  The Health Region 
has concerns about overlap and duplication but recognizes that the Clinic is more 
efficient and effective in the delivery of some services, for instance, minor surgery 
(Transcript 34).   There could be difficulties because of the different governance model if 
there were not a good relationship between the Clinic and the Health Region: 
Well, if you didn‘t have a good relationship between the two – yes, it 
would be a huge disadvantage because they‘re two different funding 
sources, they‘re two different corporate structures.  They‘re dealing with a 
board, similarly as are we; however, their board is an elected board by 
their membership using the co-operative way, whereas our board is 
government appointees which is a lot different and I mean you have the 
potential for a lot of vested interests, really (Transcript 9). 
 
 Competition for staff is an issue; the Clinic and the Region have different unions, 
different salary scales, different benefits, and so on.  Clinic staff receive the same salary 
increases as the provincial health care unions do, but apparently do not receive the same 
benefits.  As well, the management staff of the Clinic who are out-of-scope do not 
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receive these increases (Transcript 9).  There is also some confusion about who is in 
charge of whom.  But these problems seem to arise because of the government: 
Informant:  [Individual A] and me and our primary care consultant are 
sitting and essentially battling over, they fund [Individual A] say, and I‘ll 
use this for example, for clerical staff in our of our agencies where they‘ve 
also provided us the physicians.  So they are our employees but 
[Individual A] pays for that portion because of course part of the funding 
for physicians is the clerical support that goes there.  So essentially the 
money is going from government to the co-operative health centre back to 
us who hire the employees.  Whereas you know it‘s messy and… 
 
Researcher:  Administratively messy? 
 
Informant:  Yes.  And you get in these battles over whose employees are 
whose and now as we move into primary care we just received word this 
week that we are probably going to get two nurse practitioners for that site 
so we‘re very happy about that.  However, now we have the issue of who 
employs whom.  The [clinic]‘s wages are way lower.  They‘re a different 
union, they‘re CUPE, so now whose bargaining work is it?  They‘re going 
to be our people – they‘re going to be employed by the Region, yet they‘re 
going to be working in the co-operative health centre bargaining unit 
(Transcript 9). 
 
 
The Department of Health thus seems to be complicating matters for both this 
Clinic and the Health Region.  With respect to the possibility that the Clinic may be 
folded into the Region, the Health Region has told the Clinic that the Region does not 
want to take it, adding that the Clinic ―runs 10 times more efficiently‖ than the Region 
ever could (Transcript 34).   The Health Region also recognizes that the Clinic is better 
equipped to try to address the determinants of health.  The Region does not do much 
community development work and this has not been regarded as belonging in the realm 
of health care.  
However, the Clinic is not considered by some to have a ―true‖ interdisciplinary 
team (Transcripts 9, 35).   It is regarded as ―very medically run still‖ and has not gone as 
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far as it needs to with prevention and promotion.  The fact that this Clinic was founded by 
a physician seems to account somewhat for the dominance of the medical model.   The 
Clinic‘s organizational structure is such that the doctors report directly to the board and 
the remaining staff report through the Clinic‘s executive director.  This is understood to 
be a medical model of health care instead of a ―real‖ primary health care team (Transcript 
8).  This contrasts with other views that the Clinic‘s founder initiated the concept of 
interdisciplinary teams and a holistic approach to patient care that included an emphasis 
on prevention (Transcript 19). 
The degree of government intervention in the field is certainly related to the size 
of its expenditures on health care.  There is no doubt that the restructuring of the 
institutional infrastructure made sense to the government.  There was significant overlap 
and administrative duplication when each health care service operated on its own.  
Integration of ambulance, acute care, long-term care, home care and other services has 
helped to streamline and co-ordinate health care administration, planning and delivery 
(Lomas 2001; Lewis 1997). 
 Today‘s structure was not achieved without great controversy in the province.  
The closing of 52 rural hospitals was traumatic for the communities in which the 
hospitals were located and their surrounding areas.  The loss of the hospitals represented 
not only the loss of health care services, it also represented the loss of the communities‘ 
identity, as well as the loss of the economic spinoffs generated by the hospitals in terms 
of employment for local residents and income for local suppliers of goods and services 
(McDermott et al. 1994; Liu et al. 2001).  Having a hospital was a symbol of a 
community‘s identity and its ability to survive in rural Saskatchewan: 
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Residents of communities gain a measure of security, identity, and 
economic vitality from their local hospital.  In Saskatchewan, small rural 
hospitals were viewed as part of community-based care, although serving 
limited medical needs, they served psychological needs.  It is clear from 
the reactions of many of the residents that the community hospital 
contributed more than services but also to local identities (James 1999). 
 
 The restructuring also meant loss of control and ownership over the facilities, 
which were to be transformed into health centres supplying more every day services 
instead of acute care.  This has had an impact on the Clinics, which, as co-operatives, are 
still community-based and member-owned.  A Clinic representative noted that the 
provincial government has given the Health Regions more and more responsibility for 
service delivery and ownership of health care: 
They want to deliver it directly, covering their views they can do that most 
efficiently, effectively and economically.  You can see now that the 
Regions own acute cares and control them.  They own almost all the long-
term care facilities and control them and they own community health 
services and they own home care services and they don‘t have much 
motivation to turn those services over to private or semi-public 
organizations like not-for-profit co-operatives (Transcript 42). 
 
Although there is potential for the establishment of semi-public entities to deliver 
primary care services, the Regions do not appear to be interested in doing this.  Since the 
Regions have control over the allocation of resources, one informant does not see any 
potential for the development of new health care co-operatives:  
At the end of the day though it is the Health Regions that make the 
decision about whether the funds can be allocated to that kind of entity 
and in almost all cases, if a health centre is to be started up they will just 
start it up themselves (Transcript 1). 
  
The trend toward centralization of control has been noted by another informant, 
who said that there should have been a bigger role for the Clinics in health reform 
(Transcript 22).  Health reform efforts in the 1990s were based on ideas about community 
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involvement and the Health Districts were set up for this.  However, the Clinics were 
regarded as having a narrower focus than what was required for the Districts.  The Clinics 
were focused on primary health care, while the Districts were to integrate and co-ordinate 
acute care, long-term care, home care, ambulance services and others.  There was an 
opportunity then for the Districts to be set up as co-operatives but it happened so quickly 
that there was no time for a co-operative movement to develop to be able to handle 
district responsibilities.   There was recognition that the development of co-operatives 
takes time but there was some urgency around establishing the Districts and making them 
operational (Transcript 21). 
 At the time the politicians were very aware of the co-operative model and the 
philosophy behind it; there was a big emphasis on community development and the need 
for community participation (Transcript 22).  However, officials in the Department of 
Health wanted to make the districts larger and have less community control, so there was 
a tug-of-war between the politicians and the officials.  When the Fyke Commission also 
recommended larger centres, the decision was made to maintain control at the centre of 
government (Transcript 21).   
 In addition, the government needed to manage the negative publicity around the 
closure of hospital beds so this was another reason to maintain control at the centre of 
government.  This difference of opinion is why co-operatives did not get off the ground 
in health reform, although they did have a special place in the health districts initially.  
They could have developed 30 sites that were co-operative-driven.  The government 
wanted more districts, not less, but the officials won in this regard (Transcript 22).  
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There is a commonly held belief among clinic supporters that the NDP 
government made a deal with the Saskatchewan Medical Association when the Saskatoon 
Agreement was signed such that no more co-operative Community Clinics would be 
established.  This does not appear in the Saskatoon Agreement itself (quoted in Tollefson 
1963) and thus far nothing in writing has been found that would confirm that such an 
agreement existed, yet Clinic representatives are adamant the deal was made (Transcripts 
42, 5, 37). 
 Clinic informants also believe that the Saskatoon Agreement limited the Clinics to 
the role of landlords for the physicians who worked in the Clinics.  The relevant clause in 
the agreement is cited in Rands (1994): 
14. There may be places where few or no doctors have enrolled for direct 
payment by the Medical Care Insurance Commission, so that patients 
are denied the choice of such doctors.  It is not for the Commission to 
appoint doctors in such places.  The remedy is in the hands of the 
citizens themselves.  They can establish premises and invite doctors 
who wish to enroll for direct payment to rent such premises and set up 
practice in them…The interest of such enrolled doctors must be 
safeguarded from improper citizen pressure.  The role of the citizen 
group in the provision of insured services must be limited to that of 
landlord (Rands 1994: 116). 
 
While the Saskatoon Agreement had the effect of formally authorizing 
Community Clinics (Rands 1994: 65), Clinic founders believed that it also severely 
limited their role with respect to directing how the Clinics would be run.  The medical 
profession‘s concern was that laypersons would be able to ―interfere‖ with the actual 
practice of medicine.  This was not the Clinics‘ intent; rather, they wanted to establish a 
member-controlled organizational structure in which medical services would be provided 
according to the needs of the membership. 
The Clinics are thought to have misinterpreted the intent of clause 14: 
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I think it‘s a wrong interpretation if it means that the Clinics could not go 
out and proselytize among the populous to join the Clinic.  I think it was 
not intended, and I don‘t think did mean that.  They did mean that they 
were not to direct the doctors on how to practice medicine and that the 
doctors were not employees in any professional sense of the Clinic, it was 
intended to mean that (Transcript 24). 
 
 The view that the government did not make an agreement with the medical 
profession regarding the further establishment of clinics is also held by another 
informant, who said that there was never any evidence of that during Premier Romanow‘s 
tenure in government (Transcript 25).  In any case, whatever may have happened is over 
forty years in the past; should it really be a factor today (Transcript 18)?  Nonetheless, the 
Clinics‘ supporters have long held this belief, a belief exacerbated by the fact that the 
Saskatoon Agreement did not include any other means of physician remuneration than 
fee-for-service.  This clause seems to have had the effect that the Clinics‘ first doctors 
subsidized the Clinics‘ operations through their billings to the government on a fee-for-
service basis (Reid 1988).  It was not until 1994 that the department agreed to fund the 
Clinics directly on a global basis, which was still primarily based on fee-for-service 
remuneration. 
When asked about the effect that the Saskatoon Agreement had on the Clinics, 
one government informant said: 
There is no doubt that the Saskatoon Agreement was a compromise.  It‘s 
very easy now to say that.  It‘s always easy to say after a compromise is 
made which people deemed to be necessary to bring about a resolution of 
a dispute that the concession should not have been made with no 
corresponding elucidation of how the resolution to the problem could have 
been brought about without the particular concessions.  The Saskatoon 
Agreement was almost a complete victory for the government, in the sense 
that we established the fact that there would be a single payer system 
(Transcript 19). 
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 The Clinics have been credited with helping to bring the doctors‘ strike to a halt 
but Clinic representatives believe that the government of the day did not treat them fairly 
with respect to the Saskatoon Agreement.  However, one informant noted that there is a 
mistaken notion that the government was completely in charge of the events that 
unfolded; it did have to make some concessions, one of which was a change in the 
legislation to remove the right of the government to make any regulations that might be 
perceived by the medical profession to interfere with their practice of clinical medicine.  
The government also needed to show that the Clinics would similarly not be able to 
interfere (Transcript 19). 
Despite a belief, which has reached near mythic proportions in clinic lore, that 
they were limited by the Saskatoon Agreement to being landlords, some clinic supporters 
also believe that the elected members of the NDP government remain supporters and 
friends of the Clinic (Transcripts 42, 2, 11).  When the NDP returned to power in 1991, 
the Clinics supported the government‘s health reform initiatives, while at the same time 
lobbying the government to gain a more secure place for the Clinics in the health care 
system in the province. 
Another part of clinic lore is that when the NDP returned to power in 1991, 
officials at the Ministry of Health were told to ―leave the Clinics alone‖.  This comment 
was taken by Clinic supporters to mean that the Clinics were not to be negatively affected 
by the changes occurring in the institutional infrastructure and that they would continue 
to be supported and perhaps had an opportunity to have this support increased (Transcript 
7).  Ministry of Health officials may have interpreted this differently, however.   The 
Clinics were left alone in the sense that the officials have never done a formal analysis of 
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which the Clinics‘ place in the health care system should be (Transcript 23).  In not doing 
so, they have missed an opportunity to learn from the Clinics‘ long experience with 
alternate forms of physician remuneration and interdisciplinary service delivery.  As 
another informant puts it: 
Now back in 1991, 1992 there is no big mystery.  We didn‘t sit around the 
Cabinet table and try to figure out how to exclude or how not to bring in 
the Community Clinics.  There was no big mystery to that question.  If 
you put yourselves, by imagination, in our shoes we had a real battle going 
on for the entire system and a fiscal situation as well which is about to 
bring the whole house down.  So that was where our attention was 
focused.  So one could argue at worst, well, this is benign neglect or 
willful neglect and we didn‘t get our proper place but I view it as a 
different answer.  We had to deal with the hospitals and we had to 
restructure those if we had any hope in controlling costs and bringing 
transparency to life.  There is not that much deliberate policy of care in 
government, as you in government would know, as a lot of people think 
there is (Transcript 28). 
 
At the time, officials of the Ministry of Health and elected members of the 
government concentrated on restructuring the institutional infrastructure and did not 
address how to reform the delivery of primary health care.  The challenges faced by 
department officials are acknowledged: 
I think that the challenge again for them is there are lots of interest groups 
out there demanding, placing demands on them, including the SMA and 
the CMA
4
.  The bureaucracy has been through many, many battles with 
these folks and they know [the] political consequences of that (Transcript 
28). 
 
  This would at least in part account for the officials‘ inattention to the potential 
contributions of the Clinic model.  Related to that challenge was the one caused by the 
necessity to make funding cutbacks in a period of economic recession.  Competition by 
interest groups was fierce and the Clinics had to be seen to suffer constraints along with 
                                                 
4
 SMA is the Saskatchewan Medical Association; CMA is the Canadian Medical Association. 
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all the other groups.  With respect to the Clinics‘ funding needs post-Medicare crisis, an 
informant says that: 
The Clinics had a slightly better case in the sense that this was a new 
endeavour and it was something more, it was something more than simply 
delivering medical services.  It was to be, in essence, a new way of 
delivering medical services and to put it more broadly a new way to 
deliver health services and one that involved a melding of preventive 
health, social supports with the simple delivery of clinical medicine.  It 
was more than that and the add-ons were not being sufficiently funded by 
the government.  I think there‘s a bit of a case to that because I think the 
government was trying to maintain some sort of relations with the medical 
profession which were exceedingly rocky after the strike (Transcript 24). 
 
 
 
5.54 Endogenous Characteristics of Government 
Following Stanbury‘s (1993) framework, the endogenous characteristics of this 
component are matters that are in the hands of government, including the choice of 
governing instrument, control over information, control over access to participation in the 
policy-making process and its internal functioning, the scale or intensity of use of the 
governing instrument, the timing of government actions, and the design of legislation.   
Although Stanbury (1993) addresses the internal cohesion of the other party to the 
relationship – the interest group or organization – he does not do so with the government.  
It was necessary to add this because there are significant differences among the 
politicians and department officials.  The Health Regions are the creations of the 
government, including both politicians and department officials, and have a legislated 
mandate. 
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  5.5.4.1 Internal Cohesion 
 The Clinics have received mixed messages from the politicians and Department of 
Health officials.  The relationship of one Clinic with its designated consultant in the 
Primary Health Care Branch of the department is described in positive terms, while at the 
same time Clinic informants say that the Clinics are viewed as an anomaly, as different, 
as not fitting the model, as a nuisance, and as a ―pain in the butt‖ by the same department 
(Transcripts 31, 11).  Access to the Minister of Health has at times been limited, while 
[community] MLAs have attended Clinic events and voiced their support. 
 The ambiguity around the relationship of the Clinics with the politicians versus 
some government officials gives rise to the question: Why does the government continue 
to fund the Clinics?  Two informants were not sure, but speculated that: 
…maybe they keep funding us only because the political fallout from not 
funding us would be worse (Transcript 32). 
 
…we can‘t be cut loose because we‘re part of the history of Medicare 
(Transcript 12). 
  
A different informant said that the government may maintain the Clinics as a symbol to 
the medical profession that an alternative to fee-for-service practice exists: 
Informant:  The public health care model in Saskatchewan is perhaps as 
good as anywhere and so the gap between, what it is and what it should be 
isn‘t that huge.  And under those circumstances, the co-operatives don‘t 
thrive. 
 
Researcher:  True, if you look at them developing out of a need where the 
private sector or the public sector hasn‘t been willing or able to provide 
goods and services that are needed. 
 
Informant:  Yes.  So perhaps our role is more to monitor what is and try 
and tweak rather than fill a big gap (Transcript 32). 
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 This informant unknowingly echoed Torgerson et al. (1998) in identifying a public 
policy role for the Community Clinics similar to that played by agricultural co-operatives 
in the United States, that being a sort of competitive yardstick to the medical profession 
in the province. Another informant also pointed to the policy role that the Saskatchewan 
Wheat Pool played when it was still a co-operative, but noted that the retail co-operative 
system could perform a similar role for consumers but does not.  The informant sees a 
parallel with the retail co-operative stores, especially in the rural areas:  ―…the co-op 
store was there because without it there would have been a huge gap between what this 
kind of situation would have been and what was required‖ (Transcript 1). 
In urban centres there is not the same kind of gap in services so that if the co-
operative retail stores did not exist, it would not make that much difference.  As to the 
advantages of belonging to a Community Clinic, ―Well, they‘re not as obvious as they 
were in the past because I think the public model has kind of caught up to us now…‖ 
(Transcript 32).  The gap in services seems to have also closed in terms of the 
Community Clinics, so perhaps they no longer make that much difference.  This is 
perhaps one reason why potential new and younger members no longer see the advantage 
of belonging to a co-operative Community Clinic.   
Another informant notes that the relationship between the politicians and 
department officials is ―symbiotic‖ (Transcript 2).  The politicians give direction to 
department officials about what their priorities are, and the officials give their advice to 
the politicians about best options to take action.   The officials say that the government 
chose the District (now Region) model.  It seems that even though the politicians 
appeared to support the Community Clinics, the officials were not directed to give them 
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more priority and attention throughout health reform efforts.  Some politicians 
interviewed for this research appear to blame the officials while also indicating that there 
was a lack of political will to expand the Clinic model.   
 
5.5.5 Exogenous Variables Affecting Government 
 According to Stanbury (1993), the exogenous variables affecting government 
include the existing means of government intervention, the size of the government‘s 
majority in the legislature, the regional distribution of seats, and the constitutional 
allocation of powers.   
 The provincial government has at its disposal a full array of instruments by which 
to intervene in a policy domain, including that of health care policy.  As discussed in 
Chapter Three, this can include legislation, regulation, administrative practices, budget 
allocations, policy and program statements and procedures, speeches, briefing notes, and 
cabinet submissions.  It can also include doing nothing. 
 The size of the government‘s majority in the legislature can influence the choice 
of governing instruments, timing of government action, and strategies to retain a 
majority.  The regional distribution of seats, e.g. urban versus rural, or north versus south, 
can also influence policy decision-making.  In the case of the Community Clinics, neither 
the size of the majority nor the regional distribution of seats appears to have had an 
effect.  Timing in terms of where the governing party is in their term may have 
influenced the NDP‘s decision to tackle reform of the institutional landscape of health 
care in the province early in their first term after resuming power in 1991. 
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 The constitutional allocation of powers, i.e. the division of powers between the 
federal government and the provincial governments, does not appear to have had any 
bearing on public policy toward the Clinics.  Health care is primarily a provincial matter, 
although the federal government plays a strong role in funding and in ensuring that the 
provinces follow the principles of Medicare
5
. 
 
5.5.6 Influence Processes Used by the Community Clinics 
Influence processes include lobbying and advocacy, use of the media to influence 
public opinion, participation in the political process and stimulating the grass roots.  One 
Clinic is arguably more politically active than the rest of the Clinics in Saskatchewan.  
Clinic A has a standing Political and Social Action Committee, the purpose of which is to 
monitor political and social trends and issues that may affect the Clinic.  The committee 
makes recommendations to the Board of Directors with respect to actions that could be 
taken to address political and social trends and issues.   
The Political and Social Action Committee has undertaken numerous lobbying 
and advocacy activities over the years.  When members of the District Health Boards 
were elected, the committee attempted to influence the elections in keeping with the 
values of Clinic A.  In 1994/95, Clinic A worked with the Saskatchewan Health Coalition 
and held a news conference in which four founding activists in Saskatchewan, the first 
province to establish Medicare in Canada, challenged then Prime Minister Jean 
Chretien‘s policies and statements with respect to Canadian Medicare (Annual Report 
                                                 
5
 The federal government provides funding through cash and tax transfers to the provinces and a territory to 
help pay for health care services, but the actual delivery of services is a provincial/territorial responsibility. 
If provinces or territories do not adhere to the principles of Medicare, the federal government can withhold 
funds. 
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1994-95).  The panel included former Premier Allan Blakeney, Dr. Frank Coburn, Dr. 
Margaret Mahood, and ―Smokey‖ Robson. 
Political action also included unveiling a memorial to the introduction of 
Medicare in Saskatchewan, and leading efforts by the provincial Federation and the 
National Alliance of Community Health Centres to ensure that health programs would be 
protected in the North American Free Trade Agreement (Annual Report 1997-98).  In 
1997-98, the Clinic co-sponsored a national conference on protecting and strengthening 
the national Medicare system.  The conference, entitled ―Thirty Years of National 
Medicare:  Forward or Backward Since 1967?‖ attracted 300 participants.  
In 1998-99, Clinic A worked to try to ensure that legislation on physician 
incorporation would not compromise the principles of Medicare; lobbied against the 
Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI)
6
; advocated for restricted tobacco 
marketing and preventing the use of tobacco; and, advocated for a national pharmacare 
program and against the high cost of drugs (Annual Report 1998-99). 
In 2000-01, the Saskatchewan Community Co-operative Health Federation made 
a presentation to the Romanow Commission advocating for further development of the 
community health centre approach to primary health care (Annual Report 2000-01). 
Clinic A also provided a workshop to the Saskatchewan Association of Health 
Organizations at the association‘s annual conference to inform health district 
representatives about the benefits of the co-operative Clinic model.  Representatives of 
                                                 
6
 ―The Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) was negotiated between members of the Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) between 1995 and 1998.  Its purpose was to develop 
multilateral rules that would ensure international investment was governed in a more systematic and 
uniform way between states.  When it was leaked to the public it met with intense skepticism, as the rules 
in the agreement looked to undermine the sovereign power of the Nations that were in negotiation― 
(Wikipedia).  The agreement was not finalized.  Clinic members were concerned that the MAI would 
threaten Canada‘s public health care by setting the stage for a two-tiered system. 
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Clinic A worked with the Saskatchewan Community Health Co-operative Federation, the 
Saskatchewan Health Coalition, the Canadian Association of Community Health Centre 
Associations and the Canadian Co-operative Association to present briefs and lobby the 
provincial government, the Romanow Commission, the Senate Committee examining 
health care, and the general public for continued support and enhancement of a publicly-
funded health care system, and for further development of Community Clinics.  The 
Clinic also sponsored a public celebration of Medicare at the location where the original 
Medicare agreement was signed forty years ago. 
Clinic A celebrated its 40
th
 anniversary in 2002-03.  It focused on responding to 
the report of the Romanow Commission, with some board and staff members 
participating in media events on the report.  Clinic A supported the activities of the 
Saskatchewan Health Coalition and the board was represented in a national lobby of 
Members of Parliament in Ottawa organized by the Canadian Health Coalition in support 
of the Romanow recommendations.   Because of Clinic A, the Federation hosted a 
national conference of the Canadian Alliance of Community Health Centre Associations 
in Saskatoon (Annual Report 2002-03). 
Clinic A has provided a voice for its own members and clients specifically, for the 
co-operative model of delivery of primary health care services, and has participated in 
advocacy and lobbying efforts in defense of publicly-funded health care generally 
(Transcript 1).  As Church et al. (2006) note, community health centres are well-equipped 
– perhaps uniquely equipped – to: 
…provide a wide range of opportunities for citizen participation not found 
in most parts of the health care system.  Opportunities range from 
consultation to direct decision making.  Citizens are able to participate as 
service recipients, volunteers, and policy makers.  CHCs are particularly 
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adept at facilitating participation because of their unique mix of 
organizational culture, leadership, structures, and processes.  In essence, 
CHCs foster environments in which community members and staff feel 
empowered to participate in decision making.  Opportunities for citizen 
participation range from mobilization activities such as letter writing, 
petitions, and public meeting attendance to more formal roles such as 
providing volunteer program support, planning and delivering programs, 
and participating in the governance of the CHC through the board of 
governance and its various sub-committees (Church et al. 2006). 
 
It is important to note, however, that there are significant differences in how the 
three Clinics viewed their role in lobbying and political advocacy.  Clinic A discussed 
above is very active in advocacy and lobbying, not only for its own resource needs but 
also for Medicare in general and in addressing the determinants of health.  Clinic B is 
somewhat less active but does view its role in advocacy and lobbying as legitimate.  
Clinic C does not view political lobbying and advocacy as legitimate; the view of one 
informant is that the board is just interested in providing services to Clinic C members: 
―They‘re interested in this health centre and making it operate as a health centre, focusing 
on primary health care and moving forward in care‖ (Transcript 8).   Clinic C‘s board has 
talked about what the advantage of being a co-operative is.  They consider that being a 
member confers some monetary advantage with respect to non-insured services, as well 
as the opportunity to be a board member and have some decision-making ability, 
although the board ―speaks with one voice‖.  In spite of this, it is clear that the agenda for 
Clinic C is largely set by Saskatchewan Health, through Clinic C‘s service agreement 
with the department, and by the Health Region.  While Clinic C and its Health Region try 
to work together in a complementary fashion, it is recognized that there is a loss of 
autonomy (Transcript 35). 
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5.5.7 Influence Processes Used by the Medical Profession 
Text in the transcripts showed that the medical establishment‘s influence 
continues to be very strong.  The SMA is a key player in the health care policy domain in 
Saskatchewan, as illustrated by Figure   (see page 81).  Its influence and power are really 
exogenous forces affecting the provincial government and the Community Clinics.  
Stanbury‘s (1993) framework does not appear to recognize the power that third parties 
may have in the relationship between an interest group and the government.  The 
influence processes use the by medical profession are added here to address this gap. 
The push toward privatization of medical care is a force to be reckoned with by 
both politicians and Department of Health officials, at provincial and national levels.  
One informant sees a strong push to go back to fee-for-service remuneration at both the 
Canadian Medical Association and the Saskatchewan Medical Association levels, and 
points to the role that medical education plays in perpetuating the medical model of 
health care delivery in which the physician is essentially a business person (Transcript 
18).
7
  Little attention is given to community-based models.  Even though some newly 
graduated doctors may see some value in salaried practice, the dominant paradigm still 
seems to prevail (Transcript 25).  The SMA is very resistant to alternative methods of 
remuneration and the Department of Health is finding progress in achieving agreement on 
a model contract to be very slow (Transcripts 1, 14). 
                                                 
7
 In June 2005, the Supreme Court of Canada decided that Quebec‘s prohibition on using private insurance 
to pay for medical procedures that are publicly available violated the right of patients to obtain private care 
when there was a long waiting list for the procedures they required.  This decision is known as the Chaoulli 
decision after the Quebec doctor who challenged this ban.  In August 2005, the Supreme Court decided to 
suspend its judgment for a year.  Both the Quebec and federal governments asked for a delay in its 
implementation.  The delay was granted but expired on June 8, 2006. 
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Although there is evidence that some doctors support publicly-funded health care 
in Canada, the medical profession is still in favour of at least keeping private insurance as 
an alternative to Medicare.  At the 2006 annual conference of the Canadian Medical 
Association in Charlottetown, doctors voted in favour of ―patients having the option of 
purchasing private health insurance as a possible solution to the problem of not getting 
timely medically necessary treatment in the public system‖ (Greenaway, August 24, 
2006).   The president of the association believes ―there is a place for the private sector 
and for public and private partnerships‖ (Greenaway, August 23, 2006).   The Canadian 
Doctors for Medicare media release for August 23, 2006 reported that: 
Delegates at the Association meeting appeared to be taking views that 
contradicted each other in the extreme over the last several days.  They 
repeatedly spoke of a commitment to the public system and passed 
motions they said were intended to strengthen and protect it but they also 
passed motions that would undermine and erode it.  This includes a 
motion for physicians to be able to practice in both the publicly and 
privately funded systems, yet the current prohibition on this practice in 
Canada and many OECD countries forms the foundation of Canada‘s 
publicly funded healthcare system (Canadian Doctors for Medicare.  News 
Release). 
 
 The debate about private insurance versus a publicly-funded system is ongoing 
within the medical profession itself.   On August 10, 2006, the government reached a 
three-year tentative agreement with SMA on a new fee-for-service contract (Government 
of Saskatchewan News Release, August 10 2006); the previous agreement expired on 
March 31, 2006.   SMA members had asked the SMA Board to ―re-activate the Political 
Action Committee to support the bargaining process‖ (Saskatchewan Medical 
Association, SMA News, July 2006).  It is not known if this committee played any part in 
reaching an agreement.  However, a new fee-for-service agreement would seem to 
indicate that the SMA is not yet willing to participate in alternate methods of payment.   
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A 2.8% increase in the fee schedule is being provided to physicians for each year of the 
three-year contract.  Other incentives are provided in the form of additional funding for 
recruitment, retention and improved patient care.  
While the Clinics were hopeful of recognition and an increased role in the 
reformed health care system, one Clinic informant feels that the Clinics actually stopped 
lobbying government on the assumption that they would be involved and that the 
government was their friend: 
What happened is that the Clinics stopped a) fighting, but b) even 
messaging their story to the government and so when I look now at that 
transition from ‘99 to ‘01 to today, the Clinics were really flatlining in 
terms of their relationship with government.  They weren‘t doing 
anything.  And government was becoming much more distant.  The 
messages of bureaucrats get every day up to the minister, you know, and I 
think that the Clinics were losing – they weren‘t messaging appropriately, 
they weren‘t messaging to the minister.  He‘s a good friend of ours.  Why 
would we have to tell him what the story is? (Transcript 41). 
 
 The Clinics came into very difficult times, and staff and programs at one Clinic 
had to be cut in during this period.  The politicians wondered why they had not heard 
about the Clinics‘ funding problems before this came to pass (Transcript 2).   The 
messages the Clinics were receiving from the elected members of government were 
contradictory: 
The government claims it wants to see development and delivery of 
improved health care services like ours, yet they continue to give us lower 
increases in funding than those they give to district health boards.  
Moreover, their increases in funding to us are much less than our 
inflationary cost increases.  We will continue our struggle to get the 
funding we need…. 
 
 
 The Clinics seem to have used all of the methods at their disposal, with the 
exception of legal action, to influence the government. On the whole, their 
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success in doing so seems to have been limited.  They continue to receive global 
funding from the government, but have not gained the recognition or additional 
resources they would like to have. 
 
5.9 Summary 
 This chapter has presented information about the Community Clinics and findings 
from the key informant interviews   The descriptions show that the Community Clinics as 
social economy organizations are able to serve under- and un-served groups within the 
populations in their respective locations, and that they are able to tailor their programs 
and services according to the needs of marginalized populations.  They are also able to 
develop innovative solutions to the challenges of serving these groups. 
In summary, analysis of the data from the interview transcripts revealed that the 
Community Clinics fear that they will lose their autonomy and be subsumed by their 
respective Health Regions.  Generational differences among their members are 
influencing their operations.  The Community Clinics were perceived to be closely linked 
to the New Democratic Party.  One Community Clinic has made considerable efforts to 
influence government policy-making.  The data from the transcripts has also shown that 
influence of the medical profession in Saskatchewan is very strong.  Misunderstandings 
about the intent and effect of the Saskatoon Agreement still influence the relationship 
between the Community Clinics and the government.  There are differences between 
politicians and government officials with respect to how they view the Community 
Clinics. 
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It is clear from the findings that the relationship between the Community Clinics 
and the government, as mediated by the medical establishment, is complex and difficult 
to unravel.    In the health care policy domain in Saskatchewan, the Community Clinics 
are challenged significantly by both internal and external factors.  With the findings from 
the data, the following chapter examines the propositions arising from the literature on 
government-co-operative relations and the policy-making process and compares them to 
the experiences of the Community Clinics. 
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CHAPTER SIX:  ASSESSING THE RESEARCH PROPOSITIONS 
6.0 Introduction 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide an analysis of the data obtained from the 
key informant interviews.  The findings from the data are juxtaposed with the 
propositions set out in Chapters Two and Three to compare the experience of the 
Community Clinics with what was anticipated from the literature.  The discussion that 
follows is organized around the propositions that were identified in Chapters Two and 
Three: 
Proposition One: 
The views of the government and those in the social economy can differ and conflict.  
While co-operative founders believe that the co-operative model of social economy 
organization allows their members to achieve control over the delivery of the goods 
and services they need, with the underlying ideology promoting a vision of a better 
society, government believes that co-operatives serve a public policy role by acting 
as a check and balance and serving as a competitive yardstick to the private sector. 
 
Proposition Two: 
Co-operatives can be expected to have little influence on government policy, except 
where their ability to act as a check and balance or competitive yardstick may 
address government priorities. 
 
Proposition Three: 
Achieving major changes in government policy towards co-operatives will be 
difficult, unless co-operatives have some resources to offer to government.  The 
more valuable the resources that co-operatives can offer to government, the more 
power co-operatives will hold in the relationship. 
 
Proposition Four: 
 
Co-operatives will expect equitable relationships with government and the co-
construction of public policy as it affects them, but will not be successful. The 
underlying ideas and ideologies of the government and other key actors in a policy 
field will often prevent this. 
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6.1 The Role of the Community Clinics in Public Policy in Saskatchewan 
6.1.1 Proposition One 
The views of the government and those in the social economy can differ and conflict.  
While co-operative founders believe that the co-operative model of social economy 
organization allows their members to achieve control over the delivery of the goods 
and services they need, with the underlying ideology promoting a vision of a better 
society, government believes that co-operatives serve a public policy role by acting 
as a check and balance and serving as a competitive yardstick to the private sector. 
 
The data generally support the first proposition in that the views of the 
Community Clinics‘ founders do differ from and conflict with those of the government.  
These competing visions have led to disappointing differences between the expectations 
of the Clinics and the treatment they have received.  There are also important differences 
in perspective among current Clinic informants and Clinic founders, and there is no clear 
indication that the government believes that the Community Clinics play a significant 
public policy role at this time, or what that role might be.  Government appears to have 
been concerned about the vision of Clinic founders.  As discussed later in this chapter, at 
several points in the Clinics‘ history, governments backed away from changes that they 
perceived would result in significant political opposition; they were apprehensive about 
the potential for transformative change that the co-operative Community Clinic model 
represented. 
An important indicator of the differing views held by Clinic founders and the 
government concerns the Saskatoon Agreement. The Clinic informants interviewed for 
this study believe that the provincial government made a deal with the medical profession 
not to support the establishment of any more co-operative Community Clinics and that 
the Clinics were limited to being landlords for their doctors in the Clinics‘ early days 
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(Transcript 1).  Although one of the political informants interviewed for this research said 
that that was not the intended effect of the agreement and another maintained that there 
has never been any evidence that such an agreement existed (Transcripts 18, 24), some 
Clinic leaders and members interviewed for this study believe that their difficulties in 
securing government support and in expanding the co-operative model are proof.  Clinic 
advocates‘ views on the Saskatoon Agreement appears to have sustained political action 
by the Clinics and their Federation for over forty years. 
The Saskatoon Agreement was the policy instrument utilized by the government 
to resolve the doctors‘ strike.  In Hall‘s (1993) terms, it can be regarded as a third order 
policy change – one that achieved the overall goal of establishing publicly-funded and 
administered medical care, a major shift in public policy.  But it also entrenched the 
paradigm of fee-for-service remuneration for doctors and marginalized the Community 
Clinics, however much the latter may not have been the intended outcome.  Fee-for-
service has remained the dominant paradigm since. 
As discussed in Chapter Two, the relationship between the government and the 
established co-operatives was not close during the second phase of co-operative-
government relations from 1944 to 1982 (Fairbairn 2000).  Nor has it been since then, as 
subsequent relations have shown.  Although the co-operative movement has believed that 
its goals were congruent with those of the government, this has not translated into 
substantive government support. What results is not quite what Doern and Phidd (1992) 
call ―policy without resources‖ but, in the case of the Community Clinics, the resources 
provided are the minimum required to maintain them.   As stated by a political informant, 
there is no political will to do anything more for the Community Clinics (Transcript 22). 
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Evidence from the key informant interviews with Clinic informants and former 
politicians demonstrates that the Saskatoon Agreement has had a strong and lingering 
effect on the relationship between the Community Clinics and the government 
(Transcripts 1, 24, 32). These interviews took place well over forty years after the 
Saskatoon Agreement was signed, yet the individuals, some of whom were directly 
involved in the Clinics or the government at the time, had very clear memories of the 
events that unfolded together with very definite opinions about the impact of the 
Saskatoon Agreement on the Clinics.   
 Differences in viewpoint among Clinic informants who were not founders add to 
the complexity of the relationship between the Clinics and the government.  Two Clinic 
informants who were not Clinic founders appeared to believe quite strongly in the co-
operative model for delivering primary health care services; one of these two goes so far 
as to say that the model is ―near perfect‖ and could and should be utilized to organize 
primary health care delivery across Canada: 
Clinic Informant: … I would like to see the model spread across the 
whole blasted city, region, province and country because we Canadians 
deserve better health care then we're getting. I think the professionals in 
the system are excellent but it really does come down to how can a 
physician diagnose somebody with spending seven minutes with them, 
that is typically what it is set to, seven minutes, a file that they haven't 
read or won't read because they're too busy to read it and with someone 
they don't or may not know well (Transcript 41). 
 
In contrast, a current informant at a different Clinic does not appear to share the 
same vision and was hard pressed to identify any advantages of being a member of a co-
operative Community Clinic: 
Clinic Informant:  Our board has talked about this as well and [another 
Clinic informant] will probably talk about this. I mean the board has 
talked about what really is the advantage. There's a decrease in some of 
 140 
 
the non-insured services, so there's some monetary advantage. I mean the 
ability to be a board member and have some decision-making ability, I 
guess, though the board speaks with one voice… And I think that in the 
past the members probably had a stronger voice than what they do now 
(Transcript 35).  
 
The differences among current Clinic informants and Clinic founders include the 
generational gap, conflicting views on how successful the Clinics are in achieving a 
holistic, interdisciplinary health promotion and prevention approach, and conflicting 
views about the appropriateness of advocacy and lobbying activity. These differences 
within and among the Clinics seem to show that in spite of some important 
commonalities, they should not be conceptualized as an uncomplicated, homogenous 
group of organizations.   
Generational differences among clinic members and related ideological 
perspectives regarding the role of the Clinics in influencing health policy and health care 
delivery have emerged.  These differences could result in loss of control and autonomy if 
the number of members continues to decrease.  Older members who helped found the 
Clinics are steeped in the history of the Community Clinics and the co-operative 
principles by which they operate: 
Clinic Informant: …there are people that remember 1962 like it was 
yesterday and they haven‘t moved on.  And you know while the formation 
of co-operative health centers in 1962 was very futuristic in many 
respects, I find from some aspects they haven‘t moved on from 
there…they maintain the status quo…(Transcript 8). 
 
Clinic Informant:  And then the last thing is the boards themselves were 
getting older. I mean I came onto the clinic board and I look at some of 
the other boards -- these folks were -- they knew Tommy Douglas. God! 
They must have babysat his kids! And so you get this group of people 
who are tired. They had forgotten how to fight the good fight or maybe 
they fought the good fight and now they're cruising to retirement and they 
like their board positions (Transcript 41). 
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 Many younger members and users of the Community Clinics appear to have less 
understanding and appreciation of the Medicare crisis and co-operative philosophy.  This 
is forcing the Clinics to change their bylaws, for instance, to reduce the number of board 
members or the number of members required for a quorum, because they are unable to 
interest the younger clients and users in running for board positions:  ―So the founding 
members have a different passion for this place than what new members do and our 
AGM‘s – we still hold them and it‘s harder and harder to get a quorum for us‖ 
(Transcript 35).  A former political representative also noted that the generation gap is a 
factor decreasing public and member support for the Clinic model (Transcript 42).   The 
underlying ideology of the Community Clinics is not as strong as it once was: 
Political Informant:  There was high motivation to establish the 
community clinics and with that a huge amount of spirit and vigor and 
innovation and an appeal to idealism. Once that diminishes, as it 
invariably does in any enterprise and a clinic is like any other institution, 
it just seems to become settled in its practices, then the degree of public 
membership commitment also tends to level off and not have the same 
kind of innovative approach or determined approach for innovation which 
is really required. A determination that just doesn't seem to exist the same 
extent that it did in the early days (Transcript 25). 
 
The first proposition encompasses the notion that the co-operative model has 
provided Clinic founders with a vision of a better health care system, resulting from 
direct political action.  While this may have been evident at the beginning of the 
Community Clinics, findings from the case study show that this is not universally true in 
more recent times.  As noted previously, one Clinic is very active in its lobbying and 
advocacy efforts, one does undertake some activity but not to the same degree as the first, 
and one does little in the way of political action.  Although they face some common 
threats, each has adopted a strategy for political action in response to the threats they 
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perceive in their own individual environments.   For instance, Clinic A has lobbied for 
improved pedestrian crossings because of the large number of members who are elderly; 
Clinic B has lobbied for increased support for individuals suffering from Fetal Alcohol 
Spectrum Disorder.  Clinic C, on the other hand, does not appear to actively lobby the 
provincial government; its strategy seems to focus on maintaining a positive working 
relationship with its local Health Region.  The Federation lobbies on behalf of all of the 
Community Clinics but it is, in fact, most closely linked to the most politically active 
Community Clinic, which still strives to achieve a better health care system for all 
Canadian, not just its members.   
The Clinic model has also provided members with a means of measuring the 
performance of private medical practices.  One Clinic informant provided this example: 
Clinic Informant:  That grandma, who has become my example, sees her 
physician and her physician says "Grandma, you need to go down and get 
x-rays done, you need to get this blood test done". It's done 
instantaneously, there's no delay. Not necessarily grandma, but what about 
John the worker? There's no sort of real quantifiable loss in time, or 
productivity. He doesn't sit in the waiting room at the Wall Street X-ray 
clinic, ultrasound clinic and then he doesn't go to the blood clinic on 8th 
Street. Each of these is a substantial cost to the system due to the loss of 
productivity and redundancies in staff. So that is why the clinic model is 
even better because not only does it take that 20 minutes with the patient 
but then it puts the patient into a integrated service delivery model where 
grandma or John goes downstairs and they get their x-ray done and they 
get their blood test done, more importantly their blood test because we 
have an on-site lab, and in the course of that they have a conversation and 
John explains why he's there and the practitioner's got the sheet. Then he 
basically takes a look at the results on an instantaneous basis depending 
on how the physician has characterized the needs, and says you need to go 
back upstairs immediately. Let me phone the physician and get you back 
in now. I can't think of a better circle of care than that (Transcript 41). 
 
This would seem to support the proposition that the Clinics serve a check-and-
balance or competitive yardstick role, yet it is not clear that the government 
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conceptualises them in this way.  The co-operative model presents an alternative model 
of efficiency and integration, but such gains are not measured in health care restructuring.  
Instead of articulating a policy on the Community Clinics that would offer some insight 
into what the provincial government views as the Clinics‘ role, officials of the 
Department of Health simply say that they exist (Transcript 15, 27). The implication 
seems to be that the department will deal with them because they exist but the officials 
consistently cite the Health Regions legislation (The Regional Health Services Act, 
Chapter R-8.2* of The Statutes of Saskatchewan, 2002 as amended by the Statutes of 
Saskatchewan, 2002, c.C-11.1; 2003, c.25; 2004, c.49; 2004, c.51; 2004, c.C-11.2; and 
2005, c.M-36.1) as setting out the mandate they must implement.   
Through their multidisciplinary approach to care, the Clinics provide access to a 
wide range of health care services and programs not normally offered by private 
practitioners; they also provide access to many programs and services in one physical 
location.  The Clinics go further to advocate and lobby on their members‘ behalf and to 
address the social determinants of health, not only the immediate and acute care needs.  
Their focus on health promotion and prevention, rather than the medical model of care, 
enables them to address multiple problems at the same time.  Still, there are differences 
of opinion among Clinic informants about how successful the Clinics are in achieving a 
multidisciplinary approach:   
Informant:  Just because you put all of these health professionals in one 
building doesn't necessarily mean that the service delivery model is one 
where they're all co-operating with each other and each is working to their 
full capacity. Although I have seen many instances within the community 
clinics where they have, I have also seen many instances where they 
haven't. So you've got doctors, you've got a nutritionist, an occupational 
therapist, physiotherapist, pharmacist and whether they are all interacting 
the way they should to the best interest of the patient (Transcript 36). 
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One informant expressed the view that because the Clinic‘s founder was a doctor, 
the Clinic was still dominated by the medical model of health care, a model in which 
people are treated after they become ill or injured.  Moreover, this informant did not view 
the Clinic as having a ―true‖ multidisciplinary team (Transcripts 9, 35).   The 
multidisciplinary approach is frequently claimed as a key distinguishing feature of the 
Community Clinics; it differentiates them from private medical practice and from some 
public health facilities.  
This is problematic because government officials do not appear to distinguish 
between the co-operative Community Clinic model and private medical practice.  Instead, 
government officials hold the Clinics to the same standards as private practice and do not 
appear to understand the multidisciplinary approach the Clinics try to implement. 
Officials in the Department of Health regard the Clinics as anomalies and Health Region 
informants point to the difficulty of controlling autonomous entities with their own 
boards of directors: 
Clinic Informant:  The bureaucracy wants a system they can control.  
They can‘t control the Clinics.  They view them as problems.  The Clinics 
don‘t fit into boxes (Transcript 42). 
 
Health Region Informant: … you know co-operatives by their very 
nature impose another set of challenges because it is a co-operative and 
democratic; there's less control (Transcript 40). 
 
Health Region Informant:  So the community clinics basically have been 
more independent and autonomous and have done their own assessment 
and planning and they've come up with an agenda and they want us to buy 
it. And our strategy has been more one of, we need to develop a common 
strategy and agenda based on a whole host of competing interests. Partner 
with us and we'll come up with one that's in common. I think what we 
sometimes have is a polite, friendly but bit of an arm wrestle around 
whose autonomy is whose—Are we in the lead? (Transcript11). 
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The global funding that the Clinics receive from the government is still based on fee-for-
service remuneration.  Moreover, instead of being allowed to allocate funds to reserves 
for future expenditures on necessary equipment, staff and other expenses, the Clinics are 
also required to return any ―surpluses‖ they may achieve through operational efficiencies 
(Transcript 1).   
Although the literature suggests that governments sometimes view co-operatives 
as playing a check and balance or competitive yardstick role, the idea that the Clinics do 
so actually was put forward by a Clinic informant (Transcript 32) but not from any of the 
politicians, government officials or health region officials interviewed.  One Clinic 
informant alluded to this role when discussing the reasons for the government to keep 
supporting the Clinics.  Noting that the health care system seems to have caught up to 
where the Community Clinics have been for over forty years, the informant speculated 
that the government maintained the Clinics to ―tweak‖ the system and that the Clinics 
play a ―check and balance‖ role (Transcript 11). 
It may be that the check and balance role was stronger in the past.  The politicians 
have said repeatedly that the Community Clinics were instrumental in bringing the 
doctors‘ strike to an end in 1963 and they were key in getting Medicare off the ground 
(Transcripts 24, 32).  The establishment of the Community Clinics demonstrated to the 
medical establishment that the residents of the province could organize themselves into 
co-operatives to obtain physician services under salary or contract in a publicly-funded 
scheme.  This effectively showed that there was a viable alternative to private insurance 
and fee-for-service private practice.  It is generally believed that the Clinics helped the 
government achieve its public policy goal of establishing Medicare (Transcript 24; Rands 
 146 
 
1984).  Although only a few Community Clinics remain, their continued existence could 
well serve as a reminder to the medical establishment that the government has options for 
the organization of primary health care services. If this were the case, the government‘s 
use of the Community Clinics in this fashion would make them a policy instrument of the 
government.   
However, the evidence to support the proposition that the Community Clinics 
play a check and balance or competitive yardstick role is somewhat slim.  Further, the 
data do not indicate what public policy role, if any, the government believes the 
Community Clinics now play.  It is only inferred by political informants that the Clinics 
played this role in 1962 (Transcripts 24, 32). 
 
6.1.2 Proposition Two 
Co-operatives can be expected to have little influence on government policy, except 
where their ability to act as a check and balance or competitive yardstick may 
address government priorities. 
 
With respect to Proposition Two, there is evidence in the data to show that 
government officials lack knowledge and understanding of the co-operative model and 
that when they do receive attention from officials, co-operatives are treated much like any 
other enterprise. The evidence confirms what was suggested in the literature (Hammond 
Ketilson and MacPherson 2001; Hammond Ketilson et al. 1992; Fairbairn et al.1993). 
The co-operative form of organization has often been overlooked in the design and 
delivery of government programs and services (Fairbairn 2001).  Similarly, there is 
evidence that government officials lack knowledge and understanding of the Community 
Clinic model (Transcripts 15, 27).  This may explain, in part, why the Clinics have not 
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been effective in their lobbying and advocacy efforts.  Coupled with a lack of unity, it 
may also help to explain why they have not been able to play a stronger role in health 
reform, and why they have never been able to persuade government to pass separate 
enabling legislation specifically for the Clinic model.   Interviewees testified that the 
legislation that allowed them to form originally (The Mutual Medical and Hospital 
Benefit Associations Act) will be discontinued.  What will remain is The Co-operatives 
Act, 1996, which has little content on Community Clinics, and, as discussed in Chapter 
Two, is largely based on corporate legislation.  
There is evidence to suggest that government‘s policy toward the Community 
Clinics could be categorized as level 2 on Hoyt‘s continuum (see page 38), as discussed 
in Chapter 2.  At this level, the government ―does not actively attempt to destroy co-
operatives but neither does it give them special treatment.‖  Hoyt (1989) labels level 2 as 
―neutral‖, with government having no public policy toward co-operatives, either negative 
or positive.  The government‘s inaction is its policy.  It does not actively oppose or 
suppress the Community Clinics, as are governments at level 1 on the continuum.  Nor 
does it actively support the Community Clinics as at level 3, where governments do pass 
special legislation to make it easier to organize and operate co-operatives, and provide 
other supports for co-operative development.  Generally, the provincial government in 
Saskatchewan seems to be conflicted about supporting the active development of co-
operatives (Fairbairn 2001), let alone Community Clinics. 
Hoyt‘s level 2 accommodates the minimum action needed to maintain the co-
operative Community Clinics.  Some Clinic informants might view level 1, which Hoyt 
labels ―destructive‖, as more indicative of the government‘s policy toward the 
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Community Clinics, especially with respect to their dealings with Department of Health 
officials and their lingering beliefs about the Saskatoon Agreement (Transcripts 42, 5, 
37).  There is considerable evidence to show that the Community Clinic informants 
believe that they have not received adequate and consistent support from the government 
over time, and further that government policy, programs, legislation, budget allocations 
and organizational structure have not been what the Community Clinics needed 
(Transcripts 1, 2, 42, 41, 16, 28). 
Evidence from the case study and other data sources shows that, although some 
politicians have been viewed as supportive, access to Cabinet Ministers and senior 
officials has been limited.  Much of the support that has been offered, other than the 
annual global funding, has been largely ceremonial. The Clinics have been unable to 
infiltrate the policy-making process with respect to health care policy in Saskatchewan. 
Even though its policy is one of not providing additional or preferential resources, 
the government may continue to support the Clinics because it sees some value in 
maintaining at least the perception that it still has goals in common with those of the co-
operative movement.  Although Fairbairn (2000) has argued that government support of 
the co-operative movement varies with its policy goals and priorities, the movement still 
has a strong economic and social presence in the province, as demonstrated by Hammond 
Ketilson et al. (1998) and Herman and Fulton (2001).  In total, Saskatchewan residents 
hold over 1,000,000 memberships in co-operatives and credit unions in the province; and 
many residents have memberships in more than one co-operative or credit union.  And, as 
Doern and Phidd (1992) and Stanbury (1993) point out, governments want to be elected 
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and re-elected.  ―Showing the flag‖8 may serve partisan political interests if it is 
perceived to influence votes.  Maintaining the Community Clinics may also show support 
by the government for Medicare itself.   Indeed, a Clinic supporter said that the 
government would keep the Clinics around because of their connection to Medicare 
(Transcript 12); more than one felt that the Clinics should be afforded special treatment 
because of this, even though that special treatment has not manifested itself.   
 
6.2 Prospects for Policy Change 
Propositions Three and Four were developed from the literatures reviewed in 
Chapter Three on the social economy in Canada, the role of ideas and ideology in policy-
making, interest group-government relations, and conceptualisations of power in the 
relationship between the social economy and the state, as reviewed in Chapter Three. 
As noted in Chapter Four, the policy environment in which the Community 
Clinics exist is complex, with a number of relationships at play that, in turn, affect the 
relationship between the Clinics and the provincial government.  The actors in the 
process include provincial Cabinet Ministers and MLAs, Department of Health officials, 
Health Region officials, the medical establishment, the co-operative movement, the 
Federation, the individual Clinics and the Clinics‘ members.  Differences in views and 
goals among all of these actors add to the complexity facing the Clinics. 
 
 
 
                                                 
8
 The Government of Saskatchewan recognizes the co-operative sector annually in October during Co-
operatives Week.  The week begins with a ceremonial flag-raising of the co-operatives flag at the 
Legislative Building (http://www.gov.sk.ca/news?newsId=ed0e0d49-f1a0-4d48-9e66-7a8a11b0d389). 
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6.2.1 Proposition Three 
Achieving major changes in government policy towards co-operatives will be 
difficult, unless co-operatives have some resources to offer to government.  The 
more valuable the resources that co-operatives can offer to government, the more 
power co-operatives will hold in the relationship. 
 
With respect to Proposition Three, the literature on public policy and policy-
making suggests that the actors who control significant resources will be more successful 
in meeting their own goals (Doern and Phidd 1992).  The actors in the government have 
resources that interest groups want; in order to get those resources, interest groups must 
have resources that the government wants to harness or access (Stanbury 1993).  
Evidence from the data suggests that the Community Clinics hold little power or control 
in their relationship with the provincial government, and that the resources they do have 
are no longer viewed as essential or crucial. 
Although the Community Clinics continued to receive core funding from the 
Department of Health, the restructuring of the institutional structure of health care has 
resulted in a redistribution of power and control to the Health Regions.  The Community 
Clinics have been afraid of losing their autonomy ever since the Health Regions were 
established.  They have been told that they will be folded into their respective Health 
Regions when the regions were able to assume responsibility for primary health care, 
including alternate payment arrangements for a majority of individual and group 
practices in the Regions (Transcripts 1, 21; 1993-94 Annual Report).  The Community 
Clinics‘ relationship with the provincial government was changed so that the Clinics had 
to obtain funding for additional programs and services from the Health Regions, instead 
of directly from the Department of Health.  As discussed in the previous section, the 
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Health Regions and Department of Health officials want to control the Clinics; the co-
operative model under which they operate is viewed as a liability (Transcripts 11, 40, 42).  
The Community Clinics represent a valuable resource in their ability to innovate.  
As noted previously, the Clinics innovated to serve the needs of their members and many 
of their innovations were adopted at provincial and national levels (e.g. the prescription 
drug plan that was adopted by the provincial government).  The literature on the role of 
the social economy suggests that social economy organizations such as co-operatives 
have been and still are sites where innovative social programs and services can be 
created, refined, incubated and then diffused more broadly (Goldenberg et al. 2009; 
Bouchard 2009).  Evidence from the field interviews suggests that the Clinics can be such 
a ―speedboat‖ in innovation (Transcript 32).  However, there is no evidence in the data 
collected and reviewed for this study to show that the government recognizes the Clinics‘ 
record of innovation. 
 
6.2.2 Proposition Four 
Co-operatives will expect equitable relationships with government and the co-
construction of public policy as it affects them, but will not be successful.   The 
underlying ideas and ideologies of the government and other key actors in a policy 
field will often prevent this. 
 
The relationships that are desired are determined by the underlying ideas and 
ideologies of the actors involved in the complex web that is the health care policy domain 
(Stanbury 1993; Hall 1993; Doern and Phidd 1992).  Evidence drawn from the field data 
illustrates the dominant ideas or paradigms that influence the behaviour of the actors in 
the health care policy domain in Saskatchewan.  For the Health Regions, the dominant 
ideas are encapsulated in the legislation by which they were established: 
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Health Region Informant: …we are responsible for delivering the 
comprehensive array of health care services.   It is our job to integrate, 
plan and provide that kind of leadership.  And do we‘ve been mandated to 
do that and that‘s how we try to work (Transcript 11).     
 
Health Region Informant:  I think the concern that I would have is that it 
does need to be part of an integrated system. The regional structures are 
intended to promote, enable, create integrated health systems (Transcript 
40). 
 
Ideas related to regionalization, centralization, and integration, as mandated by the 
provincial government, have become significant driving forces for the Health Regions.  
Their strategies are to achieve greater centralization and integration.  
Aside from the Saskatoon Agreement, the government‘s policy appears in other 
forms. It appears in the government‘s annual expenditure budget; the service agreements 
between the Department of Health and the Community Clinics; the quarterly reports 
required by the Department of Health; the requirement that the Community Clinics obtain 
additional funds from the Health Regions for new programs and services; the requirement 
that the Community Clinics co-ordinate their plans with those of the Health Regions; the 
government‘s intention to repeal The Mutual Benefit and Hospital Associations Act; the 
government‘s continued inaction with respect to the Clinics‘ request for specific 
legislation; and the government‘s lack of support for the development of new Community 
Clinics (Transcript 1). 
The government‘s policy also appears in the legislation establishing the Health 
Regions (An Act respecting Regional Health Services).  Regionalization is the 
government‘s chosen policy instrument in the reform of the health care system in 
Saskatchewan.  The institutional structure of the health care system having been 
reformed, the government has more recently turned its attention to addressing primary 
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health care (The Saskatchewan Action Plan for Primary Health Care 2002), for which the 
Regions have responsibility.  Department of Health and Health Region officials 
repeatedly referred to the Health Region legislation as the mandate for health care 
delivery in Saskatchewan (Transcripts 13, 11, 40).  It is almost a mantra — adherence to 
this mandate is the prime directive.  In aggregate, these elements add up to the 
government‘s policy on the Community Clinics; in short, tolerate the existing ones while 
also avoiding open or overt actions to bring about their demise. 
The creation of the Primary Care Branch in the Department of Health made the 
Clinics more visible to the government, but also brought to the fore ideas about 
accountability, and administrative and planning processes.  More rules regarding 
accountability and problems in administrative and planning processes resulted 
(Transcripts 9, 35).  For instance, it is difficult for the Clinics to plan because Department 
of Health officials do not let them know what their funding will be until after a new fiscal 
year has started.  
 In contrast to the dominant ideas of regionalization, centralization and integration 
that are embraced by Health Regions and the government, the Community Clinics, in 
general, focus on ideas of autonomy, independence, democratic governance and 
community-based control, all of which are rooted in co-operative philosophy (Transcripts 
1, 11, 12).  The different ideas of the Health Regions and the Community Clinics thus 
bring these two actors in the health policy domain into conflict.  Differing ideas within 
and among the Clinics with regard to advocacy and lobbying exacerbate the challenges 
they have in presenting a coherent argument to the provincial government to increase 
their role in the delivery of primary health care services. 
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Differing ideas within government (i.e., those held by politicians, department 
officials, Health Region officials) also contribute to the complexity of the relationships 
among the actors in the health care policy domain.  Evidence from the interviews 
revealed that some political informants blame officials for not giving the Community 
Clinics an increased role in the health reform process (Transcript 22); Clinic informants 
believe that the politicians told department officials to ―leave the clinics alone‖ but the 
officials took this to mean that they should let the Clinics exist and continue to fund them 
but otherwise ignore them (Transcript 1).  As noted previously, the politicians show 
ceremonial support but Department of Health officials continue to regard the Community 
Clinics as anomalies.  
The government‘s private sector orientation, as seen in co-operative legislation 
based on corporation law and its failure to distinguish co-operatives from private sector 
business (Axworthy 1990; Canadian Co-operative Association 2009), has perhaps 
contributed to the dominance of the medical establishment and its influence with respect 
to the continuation of fee-for-service remuneration.  The medical establishment has 
considerable resources to devote to lobbying and advocacy, as well as longstanding close 
relationship with Department of Health officials (Transcripts 15, 27). 
Examination of the case study materials and the analysis of the provincial 
government‘s relationship with the Community Clinics reveal the important roles of 
some ideas that are in circulation.  These include regionalization, centralization and 
integration, all of which can conflict with core ideas of the Community Clinics These 
include with respect to autonomy, democratic governance, and member-ownership and 
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control.  The government‘s chosen policy instrument of regionalization has been the 
force behind the push to centralization and integration. 
The dominance of these ideas suggests that a third order policy shift (Hall 1993) 
would have been, and would still be, necessary in order for the Community Clinics to 
achieve what they have regarded as their proper place in health reform and the delivery of 
primary care.  The historical conditions which would have promoted or allowed a third-
order policy shift in the Clinics‘ favour – changes in the dominant paradigm, in its 
instruments and in their settings – did not appear to exist during the period of time under 
examination in this research.   Instead, a third order policy shift addressed the need for 
institutional restructuring and rationalization of the hundreds of health care organizations 
operating in the province, each with their own boards There is also evidence from the 
field data that a change in government from the Progressive Conservatives to the New 
Democratic Party in 1991 did not result in the paradigm shift that the Community Clinics 
had hoped for (Transcript 1). 
Ironically, the government has been attempting to effect a change from fee-for-
service remuneration of physicians to other methods such as capitation or salary; the 
Community Clinics have close to fifty years of experience in remunerating their 
physicians by salary or contract.  However, there is evidence from the interviews and 
from other sources that the medical profession still favours fee-for-service payment 
(Transcripts 1, 14), although some doctors, especially younger ones, may consider 
alternate forms of payment (Transcript 28).  Nonetheless, fee-for-service remuneration 
remains the dominant idea and paradigm for a medical profession that has been slow to 
embrace any changes in their payment arrangements. 
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The government‘s other important policy instrument – the Saskatoon Agreement 
– represents a historical third-order policy shift, changing as it did the means through 
which citizens of the province were insured for health care.  The introduction of publicly-
funded health insurance was a defining moment in the province‘s history and set the 
precedent for national programming that has come to symbolize what it means to be 
Canadian.   As mentioned above, ambiguity about the intention and effect of the 
Saskatoon Agreement persist. 
 The treatment that the Community Clinics have received suggests that they hold 
little power in the relationship and that they do not have resources that the government 
wants.  The Community Clinics have sought to participate in the development of primary 
health care policy in Saskatchewan over a long period of time but there is little likelihood 
that a paradigm shift will occur.  Private practice and fee-for-service remain the dominant 
paradigms in health care delivery in the province.  Evidence from the field interview data 
reveal that there is no political will to pursue a major policy shift with respect to the 
Community Clinics (Transcript 21). 
 
6.3       Summary 
Assessment of the propositions in light of the case study data reveal only partial 
support for Proposition One and little support for Proposition Two.  With respect to 
Proposition One, Clinic founders and the government have differing views on the role of 
the Community Clinics, but so too, it seems, do Clinic founders and some other Clinic 
actors.  The Community Clinics are unique as a group but also cannot be addressed as an 
entirely homogenous group, given the internal differences that emerged.  Differing views 
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of the Community Clinics, whether expressed by politicians, Department of Health 
officials, Health Region officials, Clinic founders, current Clinic informants, and others, 
pose additional significant challenges to adequately conceptualizing them.  Lack of 
homogeneity can limit co-operatives‘ effectiveness in policy-making and advocacy 
efforts (Fulton and Laycock1990); lack of homogeneity among the three Community 
Clinics may reduce their effectiveness with respect to influencing the provincial 
government. 
Considering Proposition Two, there is nothing in the field data to indicate that the 
government values the resources that the Clinics possess, and no indication that the 
government believes that the Clinics play a check and balance or competitive yardstick 
role in the delivery of primary health care in the province.  Government‘s policy on the 
Community Clinics can be placed at Level 2 on Hoyt‘s continuum; Hoyt (1989) labels 
level 2 as ―neutral‖, with government having no specific public policy targeting co-
operatives, either negative or positive.  
In assessing evidence in relation to Propositions Three and Four, it becomes 
apparent that achieving a major or third-order paradigm shift would be very difficult.  
The Community Clinics, while expecting to play a role in the delivery of health care in 
the province, have been denied access and participation, and have not been able to co-
construct public policy.  The dominant paradigms of private medical practice with fee-
for-service remuneration, and integration, regionalization and centralization, seem firmly 
entrenched. 
What does this mean for how the relationship between the Community Clinics 
and the provincial government can be conceptualized and understood?  The following 
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chapter explores more implications flowing from this assessment of the propositions, 
offers some possible answers to the research questions, and suggests directions for future 
research.   
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CHAPTER SEVEN:  CONCLUSIONS:  TOWARD A NEW UNDERSTANDING 
7.0 Introduction 
The relationship between Saskatchewan‘s co-operative Community Clinics, as 
hybrid social economy organizations, and the provincial Government of Saskatchewan 
has been the focus of this study.  In spite of a seeming congruence between the goals of 
the Community Clinics and successive provincial governments, the Clinics have not 
played a significant role in reforming the delivery of primary health care services in the 
province, even though they played a key role in bringing the doctors‘ strike of 1962 to a 
conclusion.  The Clinics‘ role enabled the provincial government to proceed with the 
establishment of the publicly-administered health care insurance scheme that was 
subsequently adopted nationally and became known as Medicare — a defining feature of 
what it means to be Canadian. 
When the NDP government made sweeping changes to the institutional 
infrastructure of health care in Saskatchewan beginning in 1991, the Community Clinics 
were not invited to participate, even though they desired an increased role in the new 
system.  This seemed to be a reasonable expectation because the Community Clinics had 
decades of experience in providing primary health care services through interdisciplinary 
teams, alternate forms of remuneration for doctors, a focus on health promotion and 
prevention, and the provision of multiple health care programs and services in one 
location.  Their approach was patient-focused and members had the opportunity to 
participate more actively in their own health care.  Many of the key features of the 
Community Clinics were congruent with the expressed goals of the government, but the 
Clinics have not been successful in securing a place at the health care policy table. 
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This study sought to examine this paradox with specific focus on the following 
research questions: 
 What role do ideas and ideology play in the policy-making process related to 
the co-operative Community Clinics? 
 Under what conditions can the dominant paradigm in health policy, 
specifically regarding the co-operative Community Clinics, be changed?  
 What accounts for the ambiguity in the relationship between the Clinics and 
the government? 
The literatures on the roles of social economy organizations and co-operatives in 
society, co-operative-government relations, interest group-government relations, public 
policy and policy-making processes, and the role of ideas and ideology in public policy 
informed the development of propositions about important dynamics in the relationship 
between the Community Clinics and the provincial government.  The four propositions 
that arose from the literature are: 
Proposition One: 
The views of the government and those in the social economy can differ and conflict.  
While co-operative founders believe that the co-operative model of social economy 
organization allows their members to achieve control over the delivery of the goods 
and services they need, with the underlying ideology promoting a vision of a better 
society, government believes that co-operatives serve a public policy role by acting 
as a check and balance and serving as a competitive yardstick to the private sector. 
 
Proposition Two: 
Co-operatives can be expected to have little influence on government policy, except 
where their ability to act as a check and balance or competitive yardstick may 
address government priorities. 
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Proposition Three: 
Achieving major changes in government policy towards co-operatives will be 
difficult, unless co-operatives have some resources to offer to government.  The 
more valuable the resources that co-operatives can offer to government, the more 
power co-operatives will hold in the relationship. 
 
Proposition Four: 
 
Co-operatives will expect equitable relationships with government and the co-
construction of public policy as it affects them, but will not be successful. The 
underlying ideas and ideologies of the government and other key actors in a policy 
field will often prevent this. 
 
 
This chapter offers some possible explanations for the paradoxical relationship 
between the Community Clinics and the government. The implications of the 
propositions are discussed first, with the propositions grouped according to the streams of 
literature examined.  Propositions One and Two arose from the literature on the social 
economy in Canada, the role of co-operatives in society, and co-operative-government 
relations; Propositions Three and Four arose from the literature on policy processes and 
public policy-making, including the roles of ideas and ideology and interest groups.  
Adaptations to Stanbury‘s (1993) framework for understanding business-government 
relations are suggested to address the context of primary health care service delivery and 
the relationship between the Community Clinics and the provincial government of 
Saskatchewan.  Possible answers to the research questions are then discussed, and the 
basis for a new understanding of the relationship between the Community Clinics and the 
provincial government is elaborated.   The chapter closes with possible directions for 
future research. 
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7.1  Implications of Propositions One and Two 
Proposition One: 
The views of the government and those in the social economy can differ and conflict.  
While co-operative founders believe that the co-operative model of social economy 
organization allows their members to achieve control over the delivery of the goods 
and services they need, with the underlying ideology promoting a vision of a better 
society, government believes that co-operatives serve a public policy role by acting 
as a check and balance and serving as a competitive yardstick to the private sector. 
 
Proposition Two: 
Co-operatives can be expected to have little influence on government policy, except 
where their ability to act as a check and balance or competitive yardstick may 
address government priorities. 
The field data together with other documentary evidence support Proposition One 
and appear to indicate that the Community Clinics do not have resources of value to the 
provincial government such that they would be able to achieve access to and influence 
policy-making. There are significant differences between the views of the government 
and the founders and some current Community Clinic informants.  The analysis has also 
shown that there are significant differences among the three Clinics Community Clinics 
and they cannot be conceptualized as a homogenous group.  Notwithstanding their 
differences, their commonalities make them unique organizations among co-operatives. 
 That very uniqueness suggests that the Community Clinics may not be 
sufficiently conceptualized as social economy organizations, as co-operatives or as public 
service providers.  The Clinics can be viewed as hybrids of all three types of 
organizations – social economy, co-operative and public sector. The confusion around 
definitions and understandings of co-operatives and the social economy also constrain 
how they are conceptualized.  Lack of a clear definition and understanding could help to 
explain why the government does not appear to think that the Clinics currently have a 
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defined public policy role, and fails to distinguish them in some respects either from 
private doctor-run clinics or from public health clinics and hospital facilities.  
 As co-operatives, the Community Clinics have been established under the 
relevant co-operative legislation, generally adhere to co-operative principles, and observe 
democratic governance practices.  What separates them from other co-operatives is their 
almost complete dependence on the provincial government for their funding.  The Clinics 
thus cannot be fully conceptualized as co-operatives.  Nor can they be fully 
conceptualized as public sector entities, even though they receive almost all of their 
funding from the government and deliver a public service.  They are also not private 
sector organizations, although they do appear to be conceptualised by the provincial 
government as another form of private practice.  It appears that the North Amcerican 
literature on co-operative sector-government relations does not and cannot adequately 
address the attributes of the co-operative Community Clinics.  The public policy role(s) 
that the Clinics play cannot be adequately defined because they are rather special kinds of 
hybrid organizations. 
 The literature on the social economy in Canada better enables the Community 
Clinics to be conceptualised or re-conceptualised as hybrid organizations.  Fairbairn 
(1997) states that the co-operative Community Clinics played a key role in the 
establishment of the country‘s public health care system:  ―The development of 
‗community clinics‘ was an integral part of the development of the Medicare program‖ 
(Fairbairn 1997: 6).  The definition proffered by Bouchard, Ferraton and Michaud (2008) 
applies to the Community Clinics as social economy organizations in all respects: they 
focus on providing services to their members and the community and are not profit-
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oriented, they are in many respects autonomous organizations, they follow a democratic 
decision-making process, revenues and surpluses are utilized to maintain and improve 
service provision, and they generally encourage the participation and empowerment of 
their members and community.  This research shows that it is because the Clinics do all 
of these things that the government finds them challenging to deal with. 
 
 
7.2  Implications of Propositions Three and Four 
Proposition Three: 
Achieving major changes in government policy towards co-operatives will be 
difficult, unless co-operatives have some resources to offer to government.  The 
more valuable the resources that co-operatives can offer to government, the more 
power co-operatives will hold in the relationship. 
 
 
Proposition Four: 
 
Co-operatives will expect equitable relationships with government and the co-
construction of public policy as it affects them, but will not be successful. The 
underlying ideas and ideologies of the government and other key actors in a policy 
field will often prevent this. 
 
Propositions Three and Four arose from the literatures on public policy and 
policy-making processes, and the role of ideas and ideology and of interest groups in 
public policy.  Stanbury‘s (199) framework is based on public choice theory, where 
government seeks to gain and retain political power as the governing party, and interest 
groups seek a favourable legislative and regulatory environment.  Each has something the 
other wants, resulting in a bargaining context where there can be an exchange of 
resources.  There is evidence that in some respects the provincial government considers 
 165 
 
the Community Clinics to be like any other private sector medical business.  Power lies in 
the hands of the government for the Clinics‘ global budget allocations, and with the 
Health Regions that control resources for additional programs and services that the 
Clinics may wish to offer.  
Stanbury (1993) adopts a positivist approach to understanding the relationship 
between interest groups and government.  His work is based on observations of this 
relationship.  Vaillancourt (2008), on the other hand, has adopted a normative approach 
in describing how the relationship between social economy organizations and 
government should unfold.  There is some commonality between Stanbury and 
Vaillancourt with respect to the importance of openness in the relationship between 
interest groups and government, and the role that interest groups play in democracy.  
When Stanbury (1993) speaks of openness, what he means is that the relationship 
between interest groups and government should be ―well and widely understood‖, and 
capable of accommodating new or emerging interests ―so that change can occur without 
severe discontinuities‖.  In this instance, the relationship between the Clinics and the 
government does not appear to be well and widely understood.  Maintenance of 
individual freedom and democracy are important to both Stanbury and Vaillancourt.  
Stanbury (1993) refers to it as an evaluation criteria relating to how government 
intervention affects individuals‘ choices, speaking to the pluralistic, liberal values that he 
sees as underlying the political system and where the balance of power lies.  Stanbury 
notes that ―persistent dominance by any interest group, including government, [must] be 
avoided if we are to aspire to a genuinely pluralistic, democratic society‖ (Stanbury 1993: 
41). 
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Vaillancourt‘s (2008) conceptualization of power in the relationship between 
social economy organizations and government differs significantly from Stanbury‘s with 
respect to interest groups and government.  While Stanbury (1993) depicts a relationship 
with winners and losers, conclusions arising from Vaillancourt‘s (2008) conception of the 
state are that policy-making is, at least potentially, a collaborative process in which all 
stakeholders have equal access and participate on the same level.  In Quebec, at least, the 
provincial government partners with stakeholders from the private sector but has also 
begun to partner with those from the social economy.  Government decision-makers have 
established open, inclusive dialogue between themselves and the leaders of social 
economy organizations, and these organizations are not just instruments of the state in 
implementing public policy.  In Stanbury‘s terms, the relationship as conceived by 
Vaillancourt would be win-win for both parties. 
Evidence from the field data shows that policy-making by provincial governments 
in Saskatchewan has not been a collaborative process in which the Community Clinics 
have had access and participated at anything near the same level as the medical 
profession.  Government decision-makers do not seem to have established open, inclusive 
dialogue between themselves and the leaders of the Community Clinics or their 
Federation.  There is evidence to show that the Community Clinics are co-producers of 
primary health care services, but are not co-constructors of primary health care policy.  
Vaillancourt‘s (2008) somewhat idealized conceptualization of social economy-
government relations does not reflect the reality of the relationship between the 
Community Clinics and the government of Saskatchewan.  
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Because Stanbury‘s framework focuses on business-government relations in 
Canada, it is necessary to make some adaptations more appropriate for the study of the 
relationship between the Community Clinics and the provincial government in the 
context of primary health care delivery.  The framework does not address the degree of 
internal cohesion within the government; in the primary health care context of 
Saskatchewan, the elected politicians, Department of Health officials and Health Region 
officials are all actors that often have differing views.  The medical profession is also an 
actor possessing considerable resources and influence in this context.  The framework 
requires that the medical profession‘s influence processes be taken into account.   The 
exogenous variables and endogenous characteristics of business trade associations and 
lobby groups must also be adapted to better represent those of the Community Clinics.  
Indeed, Stanbury‘s interpretation of these terms differs from what they are normally 
understood to mean, as discussed in Chapter Five.  A modified framework to address 
these concerns is provided by Figure 5 (page 163)
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Figure 4 A   FRAMEWORK FOR UNDERSTANDING COMMUNITY CLINIC-GOVERNMENT RELATIONS IN SASKATCHEWAN 
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7.3 The Role of Ideas and Ideology 
The study has shown that there are a large number of clashing and conflicting 
ideas and ideologies at play in the relationships among all of the relevant actors that 
serve to complicate the already complex.  The actors and some salient ideas are 
depicted in an expanded diagram of the health policy domain prepared by the author 
(see Figure 4). 
In this diagram, the dominant ideas and ideologies associated with each actor 
in the Health Care Policy Domain in Saskatchewan are depicted.  These ideas and 
ideologies were identified through analysis of the case studies of the Clinics, the 
transcripts of the key informant interviews, and other primary and secondary sources 
from and about the Community Clinics.  The Government of Saskatchewan sits at the 
top of the diagram because of its overall responsibility for provincial health care 
policy; as demonstrated in this study, the politicians appear to subscribe to notions 
that the private sector should be the dominant form of enterprise with which it deals.  
In the health care policy domain, this translates into maintenance of the fee-for-
service method of remunerating doctors while providing ceremonial support to the 
Community Clinics.  
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Figure 5 – Dominant Ideas and Ideologies (prepared by author) 
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The medical establishment‘s influence still dominates the health policy 
domain in Saskatchewan with respect to maintaining the hegemony of private medical 
practice with fee-for-service remuneration.  It appears to a large degree to be still 
operating in the medical model of treating patients when they become ill or injured, 
and that many doctors still wish to operate essentially as private businesses. 
Department of Health officials have had a stronger relationship with the medical 
profession than they have had with the Community Clinics, and the medical 
establishment has lobbied hard and effectively to support the dominant paradigm.  In 
spite of efforts to negotiate and implement new ways of remunerating doctors (e.g. 
salary, capitation, contract), department officials have not yet been able to persuade 
the medical establishment to accept any such alternatives. 
Department of Health officials are also pushing forward the governments‘ 
agenda with respect to the Health Regions; hence the attachment of ideas around 
regionalization, integration and centralization to actors in the Health Regions.  This 
has placed the Health Regions into conflict with the Community Clinics.  Ideas 
around autonomy, democratic governance and member control are important to the 
Community Clinics, although two of the Clinics appear to more closely adhere to 
these ideas.  These are the two that favour taking political action to influence the 
government.  Differences among Clinic founders and members emerged from the 
analysis, with many younger members lacking knowledge and understanding of the 
co-operative model.  The Federation advocates for and promotes a health promotion 
and prevention model, co-operatives principles and the Community Clinic model of 
primary health care delivery, while also lobbying for the continuation of Medicare 
itself.  The co-operative movement in Saskatchewan, as represented by the 
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Saskatchewan Co-operative Association, advocates for the co-operative model in all 
aspects of the province‘s economy and society.  
Finally, the policy level that sits between the political level of the government 
and the department officials is shown in the diagram as Level 2 – neutral.   The 
history of the provincial government‘s treatment of co-operatives generally, and the 
Community Clinics more specifically, has shown that this complex and conflicting 
web of actors, ideas and ideologies, has shifted and changed over time but not to the 
benefit of the Clinics. 
There are tensions between ideology and ideas that appear to get in the way of 
advancing the ideas that are shared.  The government and some doctors have shown 
interest in advancing health reform to the next stage – that of reforming the delivery 
of primary health care.  This stage would see a shift to a health promotion and 
prevention model, different means of remunerating doctors, and more patient 
involvement in her own health care.  These are ideas that the Community Clinics have 
acted on for well over forty years.  Yet, the old ideas around the medical model 
combined with an ideology that favours the private sector appear to stand in the way 
of achieving progress on this front.   
The government has shown ceremonial support for co-operatives and the 
Community Clinics but the Clinics have few resources with which to bargain 
effectively with governments; thus, they have not been able to play a public policy 
role, even in the period in which the NDP was last the majority party in government.  
Their lack of resources combined with the inability or unwillingness of the elected 
members of government and department officials to reconceptualize the Clinics as 
important sources of primary health care innovation leaves Community Clinics with 
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little power or control over their relationship with the government, department 
officials and Health Regions. 
 
7.4 Conditions for Policy Change 
As discussed in Chapter Three, Hall (1993) states that the conditions under 
which a major policy change could occur include a major paradigm shift, as well as 
changes and adjustments to the policy instruments and the ways they are implemented 
(Hall 1993; Scogstad 2000).  The conditions under which support for the Clinics 
could change did not exist when the NDP was the governing party from 1991 to 2007.  
When it returned to power in 1991, its priority in health care was to reorganize the 
institutional infrastructure.  This in itself represented a major paradigm shift but was 
not one that included a role for the Community Clinics.  Other changes and 
adjustments to the policy instruments led to the establishment of Health Districts, 
which later became Health Regions.  Reforming the delivery of primary health care 
services became a priority only much later in the NDP‘s tenure as the governing 
party.  Whether a change in governing party would alter the dominant paradigm in the 
health care policy domain is not known. 
Political parties in Saskatchewan have changed considerably since the 
Community Clinics were established.  The Liberal Party does not have any elected 
Members of the Legislative Assembly (Legislative Assembly of Saskatchewan 
website).  The former Progressive Conservative Party, together with some former 
Liberals and Reform Party supporters, became the Saskatchewan Party in 1997 which 
subsequently won the provincial election held on November 7, 2007.  Although the 
Saskatchewan Party‘s 2005 Policy Guide (Saskatchewan Party website) said the party 
supports a publicly-funded and administered health care system for the province, it 
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also says that the Health Regions ―have not led to the delivery of better front line 
services.  In fact, they‘ve created impediments to the effective province-wide use of 
the province‘s health facilities and human resources‖.  The Saskatchewan Party‘s 
2005 Policy Guide proposed establishment of a ―single health care agency for the 
entire province that would fully utilize the province‘s health facilities and human 
resources‖. 
At the time of writing, the Saskatchewan Party‘s website refers to a document 
with ―new ideas for Saskatchewan‖ (Saskatchewan Party website); this document 
does not mention a single health care agency as proposed in the 2005 Policy Guide.  It 
is not evident that the change in governing party will significantly affect the 
Community Clinics.  If centralization is the Saskatchewan Party‘s chosen public 
policy instrument, the Community Clinics could find themselves in a precarious 
position.  The Clinics are still perceived to be the creatures of the NDP.  This legacy 
together with the neoliberal political ideology may have a great deal to do with the 
future of the Clinics 
 
7.5 Sources of Ambiguity in the Relationship 
The sources of ambiguity in the relationship between the Community Clinics 
and the provincial government are many.  They include the different 
conceptualizations of the Clinics, including those of the politicians, department 
officials and Health Region officials.  Lack of political will combined with 
ceremonial acknowledgement of the Clinics by the politicians is another source.  
There are also lingering misgivings and misconceptions about the Saskatoon 
Agreement.  Despite the different views held by informants within and among the 
Community Clinics, it is the views of those on the outside that have had the biggest 
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impact.  The study has revealed that department officials regard them as anomalies 
that they would rather not have to deal with; that Health Region officials want to gain 
more control over them; and that the politicians ―wave‖ the flag‖ but provide only 
what is required to maintain the Clinics. 
There is the uncertainty caused by the NDP government‘s previously-stated 
intentions to roll the Clinics into the Health Regions, providing the latter make 
progress in implementing alternate remuneration schemes for doctors.  The most 
recent agreement for fee-for-service with SMA covers the period of 2006-09.  If 
progress is made toward moving other doctors in the province into group practices  
with alternate means of remuneration, would the government continue to (barely) 
maintain them?  If the government thought that the Community Clinics were serving 
as a ―check and balance‖ instrument, this role would no longer be required in the 
event that doctors agreed to work under contract or salary arrangements.  Progress has 
been slow with respect to negotiating a new agreement between the Saskatchewan 
Medical Association and the government and it seems unlikely that the government 
will make progress toward achieving its stated primary health care goals in the short 
term.  This rationale for keeping the Clinics going could eventually disappear.  The 
governing party has changed since the Clinics were made aware of this possibility 
and, as discussed, the views and priorities of the Saskatchewan Party with respect to 
the Community Clinics have not yet been fully revealed.  This in itself causes 
uncertainty for the Clinics. 
Additional ambiguity is caused by the government‘s shifting criteria and 
standards by which the performance of the Clinics is judged.  At times, it has 
appeared that the government has ―cherry-picked‖ these criteria, creating 
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inconsistencies over time in how they have been held to account for the funding they 
receive. 
The conflicting ideas and ideologies of the actors in the health policy domain 
serve to magnify the ambiguity in the relationship.  Perhaps the most interesting 
source of ambiguity is that some leaders of the Community Clinics do not fully 
recognize that they have become increasingly marginalized.  Some Clinic informants 
appear to cling to the hope that they can remain as they were originally conceived 
over 45 years ago.   
 
7.6 Toward a New Understanding:  The Community Clinics as Hybrid 
Organizations 
 
This research contributes a richer and deeper understanding of the relationship 
between the Community Clinics and the provincial government that has previously 
been little studied.  The key informant interviews in particular add depth as well as 
insights into the views of Clinic founders and supporters, the politicians, department 
officials, Health Region officials, and others involved in or affected by the 
relationship.  Together with an examination of additional primary and secondary 
sources, analysis of the key informant interviews provides new explanations in answer 
to the research questions.  
The Community Clinics appear to be unique types of hybrid organizations in 
many respects.  They are not fully co-operatives, not fully public sector organizations, 
and not fully private sector entities.  They are hybrids – anomalies that public policy 
has not yet been able to accommodate.  When all of the different conceptualizations 
of the Clinics are considered, there is no doubt that the relationship between the 
Clinics and the government is ambiguous and problematic.  Attribution of ―blame‖ for 
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the state of the relationship cannot be assigned in simple fashion to only one party; the 
relationship is much more complex, layered and dynamic.   
The streams of literature examined in this study are found to be incomplete in 
building a new understanding of the relationship between the Community Clinics and 
the provincial government.  Only partial answers to the research questions can be 
found by applying the theory and concepts discussed.  For instance, Hall‘s (1993) 
delineation of the conditions necessary for achieving policy change indicates that the 
accumulation of anomalies that existing policies cannot accommodate can result in a 
major shift in policy paradigms.  However, the small number of anomalies that the 
Community Clinics present to the policy-making process may make it unlikely that a 
major shift would occur.  The dominant ideologies concerning fee-for-service 
remuneration and the pre-eminent role of private medical practice remain firmly 
embedded within the medical establishment, although the provincial government has 
been trying to change this. 
The relationship between the Community Clinics and the government does not 
reflect the admittedly somewhat ideal situation that Vaillancourt (2008) 
conceptualizes for social economy organizations with respect to public policy 
construction.  Instead, the analysis shows that policy-making is not a collaborative 
process in which all stakeholders, including the Community Clinics, have access and 
participate as respected social actors.  Government does not appear to treat all partners 
equally, whether from the private sector or the social economy.  Government 
decision-makers do not appear to have established open, inclusive dialogue between 
themselves and the leaders of the Community Clinics, as Vaillancourt (2008) 
envisions.  The Community Clinics appear to remain, at best, minor instruments of 
implementing public policy.  They are co-producers, not co-constructors. 
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Stanbury (1993) notes that the outcomes of the relationship between business 
and the government are frequently ambiguous; the outcomes of the relationship 
between the Community Clinics and the government remain ambiguous in several 
respects.  The government continues to fund the Community Clinics but there is no 
clear indication that it will continue to do so.  There is no clear indicator of the 
government‘s policy toward the Community Clinics.  The results from this study only 
suggest that the Community Clinics may serve a competitive yardstick role, that they 
may be an incubator of innovation and a laboratory for testing new programs and 
services, and that their connection to the birth of Medicare influences the government 
to continue supporting them.  
There is also a suggestion in the literature on the role of ideas in public policy 
that existing policy is dependent, at least in part, on what has historically been the 
policy.  There is, in short, a sort of creeping incrementalism.  But lack of a clear 
public policy role indicates that government support for the Clinics can be categorized 
at best at level 2 in Hoyt‘s (1989) continuum – neutral with neither positive nor 
negative policies.  The government continues to provide funding but does not actively 
support the co-operative Community Clinic model.  It also places limits on their 
accessibility to Cabinet members and government MLAs.   Support from the 
politicians seems to be more ceremonial and symbolic than substantive.  There is, 
however, no ambiguity about where the balance of power resides – the government 
dominates the Clinics. 
Many social economy organizations are dependent on governments for 
significant portions of their funding, but not many co-operatives are in the same 
situation.  Some definitions of social economy enterprises separate those that earn 
most of their revenue from the market from nonprofit entities that are highly 
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dependent on government funding.  The various definitions of the social economy that 
appear in the literature generally encompass all of these – social enterprises that earn 
revenue in the market, nonprofits dependent on government funding, and co-
operatives, that can be both ―for-profit‖ and nonprofit-oriented. The Community 
Clinics are a special case in the constellation of social economy organizations, and are 
unique among co-operatives in Saskatchewan. 
Recent developments in primary health care suggest that if the Community 
Clinics reconceptualize themselves, their future may be more secure.  At present, 
there is a ―perfect storm‖ in the delivery of primary health care delivery in both the 
United States and in Canada.  An unusual combination of circumstances in health care 
is manifesting itself such that the Community Clinics may finally be able to secure a 
place at the health care policy-making table.  In Saskatchewan, the Ministry of Health 
announced an independent review in November 2008 to examine the health care 
system from the perspective of patients and their families (Government of 
Saskatchewan.  News Release.  November 5, 2008).    The recommendations of the 
―Patient First Review‖, if adopted by the government, would focus care on the needs 
of the patient, rather than the needs of the health care system, to address ―timely 
access, health care innovation, efficiency and patient satisfaction‖ (Government of 
Saskatchewan.  News Release. October 15, 2009).  The Clinics have an opportunity to 
position themselves as having long provided patient-focused care as well as 
possessing a significant record of innovation in the delivery of primary health care. 
In the United States, the recent passage of new legislation (Patient Protection 
and Affordable Care Act (PPACA; Pub. L. No. 111-148) that will expand provision of 
publicly-funded and -administered health care in a system similar to that of Medicare 
in Canada (The White House. Summary of Obama Plan) is causing considerable 
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controversy.   It is not within the purview of this research to examine health reform in 
the United States, but much of the controversy centers around the perceived intrusion 
of the government into what private health care providers regard as their domain.  At 
the core of the debate are questions about how the primary health care needs of people 
will be served and who may be left out. 
A reconceptualization of the Community Clinics to take into account their 
ability to serve patients first, to provide the innovation this situation calls for, and to 
do so as publicly-funded entities may be the best avenue toward policy change.  
Advocacy for a reconceptualized Community Clinic model must be accompanied by a 
solid cost-benefit analysis and rhetoric freed from the mythology of the Clinics‘ past. 
 
7.7 Directions for Future Research 
This research has been exploratory in nature and establishes a path to further 
explore the concept of the Community Clinics as hybrids.  Some of the implications 
for the Community Clinics for their autonomy and their ability to advance their 
advocacy agendas have been identified.  Further research is required to more fully 
understand what being a hybrid that is not quite a co-operative, not quite a public 
agency, and not really a private sector enterprise means.  Being a hybrid implies a 
degree of instability; additional research is necessary to identify the conditions under 
which hybrids would be sustainable, with specific reference to the policy 
environments that would enable sustainability. 
As noted in Chapter Two, there are growing streams of literature on the third 
sector and public governance (for instance, Pestoff 2009; Brandsen and Pestoff 2008) 
and the emergence of hybrids in the social economy (for instance, Evers 2005; Graefe 
2006).  There is also scope for further research to compare the experiences of the 
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Community Clinics with those of the third sector and other hybrid social economy 
organizations, in Quebec, Europe and elsewhere, particularly those involved in 
primary health care delivery. 
 More specifically, however, there is considerable scope to examine 
governments‘ treatment of and public policy on co-operatives in Canada.  The 
literature on how co-operatives fare with respect to their lobbying and advocacy 
efforts is quite dated (i.e., Fulton and Laycock 1990), and the literature on co-
operative legislation in Canada is also quite old (i.e., Axworthy 1990).  Research in 
these areas at both federal and provincial/territorial levels would address a large gap 
in the literature on co-operatives in Canada.  What is the impact of lobbying by all 
types of co-operatives on legislation?  What are the conditions necessary for effective 
influence on policy-making, especially those beyond having a sympathetic political 
party in power?  A closer examination of the Clinics‘ own use of lobbying processes 
would also inform strategy formulation by other co-operatives and social economy 
organization. 
 With respect to the Community Clinics, an updated cost-benefit analysis that 
compares the Clinics‘ efficiency to that of private medical practice similar to that 
prepared by Angus and Manga in 1990 would be an important addition not only to the 
literature but also to the Clinics‘ lobbying and advocacy strategies.   
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Appendix One – Co-operatives:  Definition, Principles and Values  
 
Co-operatives are voluntary associations organized and run on a democratic 
basis of one member, one vote in order to provide members with goods and services 
that they could not otherwise obtain.  These goods and services may be made 
available to those who are not members but who may benefit from access to them, for 
instance, a community.  Members participate economically (MacPherson 1996); that 
is, they contribute the capital on which co-operatives, at least initially, are run.  
Typically, this contribution of capital ensures that the members remain in control of 
their organizations.  However, there are instances where co-operatives receive all or 
part of their operational funds from outside organizations.  There have been few 
studies of how co-operatives manage and members maintain control under such 
circumstances. 
When people in Saskatchewan think of what a co-operative is, they might 
think of the local grocery store, the gas bar, the credit union, the daycare they send 
their children to, or the Community Clinics.  Co-operatives also exist elsewhere in 
Canada, North America and around the world, and there are many definitions of what 
a co-operative is.   The International Co-operative Alliance (ICA) issued a statement 
on the co-operative identity following extensive consultation with co-operative 
organizations around the world.  This document included the following definition: 
A co-operative is an autonomous association of persons united 
voluntarily to meet their common economic, social, and cultural needs 
and aspirations through a jointly-owned and democratically-controlled 
enterprise (MacPherson 1996). 
 
This is the definition used in this dissertation.  It emphasizes that co-operatives 
are associations but they are also enterprises that provide the means to meet their 
members‘ economic, social and cultural goals.  The economic and associational 
aspects of co-operatives are symbiotic; one does not exist without the other. 
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Co-operatives generally subscribe to a number of values that are also set out in 
the statement on co-operative identity: 
Co-operatives are based on the values of self-help, self-responsibility, 
democracy, equality, equity, and solidarity.  In the tradition of their 
founders, co-operative members believe in the ethical values of 
honesty, openness, social responsibility, and caring for others 
(MacPherson 1996). 
 
Seven related principles have been developed by which co-operatives operate. 
These are: 
1
st
 Principle:  Voluntary and Open Membership 
Co-operatives are voluntary organizations, open to all persons able to use their 
services and willing to accept the responsibilities of membership, without 
gender, social, racial, political, or religious discrimination. 
 
2
nd
 Principle:  Democratic Member Control 
Co-operatives are democratic organizations controlled by their members, who 
actively participate in setting their policies and making decisions.  Men and 
women serving as elected representatives are accountable to the membership.  
In primary co-operatives members have equal voting rights (one member, one 
vote), and co-operatives at other levels are also organized in a democratic 
manner. 
 
3
rd
 Principle:  Member Economic Participation 
Members contribute equitably to, and democratically control, the capital of 
their co-operative.  At least part of that capital is usually the common property 
of the co-operative.  Members usually receive limited compensation, if any, on 
capital subscribed as a condition of membership.  Members allocate surpluses 
for any or all of the following purposes: developing their co-operative, 
possibly by setting up reserves, part of which at least would be indivisible; 
benefiting members in proportion to their transactions with the co-operative; 
and supporting other activities approved by the membership. 
 
4
th
 Principle:  Autonomy and Independence 
Co-operatives are autonomous, self-help organizations controlled by their 
members.  If they enter into agreements with other organizations, including 
governments, or raise capital from external sources, they do so on terms that 
ensure democratic control by their members and maintain their autonomy. 
 
 
5
th
 Principle:  Education, Training and Information 
Co-operatives provide education and training for their members, elected 
representatives, managers, and employees so they can contribute effectively to 
the development of their co-operatives.  They inform the general public – 
particularly young people and opinion leaders – about the nature and benefits 
of co-operation. 
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6
th
 Principle:  Co-operation Among Co-operatives 
Co-operatives serve their members most effectively and strengthen the co-
operative movement by working together through local, national, regional and 
international structures. 
 
7
th
 Principle:  Concern for Community 
Co-operatives work for the sustainable development of their communities 
through policies approved by their members (MacPherson 1996). 
 
The International Co-operative Alliance (ICA) estimates that over 800 million 
people are members of co-operatives and that over half the world‘s population uses 
the services of a co-operative — including one in three persons in Canada.  Co-
operatives operate in all sectors and are found on all continents, provide over 100 
million jobs around the world, and constitute the largest number of voluntary, 
democratically-owned and -controlled organizations in the world (International Co-
operative Alliance website). 
 In Canada, there were 5,714 non-financial co-operatives with over $27.7 
billion in revenues, over 5.9 million members, and $17.7 billion in assets in 2005 (Co-
operatives Secretariat 2008).  Non-financial co-operatives in Canada employed close 
to 88,000 people, with over 77% being full-time.  Financial co-operatives, including 
caisses populaires, credit unions, and insurance companies, constitute a large 
component of the co-operative sector in Canada.  Credit unions and caisses populaires 
had over $181.3 billion in assets; seven co-operative insurance companies had $33.5 
billion in assets and their policy holders held 11.9 million certificates and policies 
(Co-operatives Secretariat 2008). 
 Closer to home, Saskatchewan had 1,306 co-operatives and credit unions in 
1998 (the latest year for which comprehensive data are available) with over $10 
billion in assets, close to $7 billion in revenues, and over 15,000 employees, and close 
to a million active members (Herman and Fulton 2001).  Again, they were active in 
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all sectors of the economy, including, for example, agriculture, finance, child care, 
health care, community halls and recreation, cable television, and the arts.  They 
ranged in size from a town hall in the smallest of communities to the largest of 
Saskatchewan‘s businesses.  Their economic and social impact on the province has 
been considerable (Hammond Ketilson et al. 1998).
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Appendix Two – Brief History of Medicare and Medical Care in Saskatchewan 
 
This appendix provides a brief overview of the history of medical care and 
Medicare in Saskatchewan to establish the historical, political and social context for 
the case study of the co-operative Community Clinics.   In conducting this study, it 
became apparent that the past is still very much present in the minds of some of the 
key informants interviewed.  Since much has been written about the Medicare crisis, 
this section concentrates on some key sign posts along the way to 1962. 
Saskatchewan is not only the birthplace of Medicare but also of a number of 
other innovations in the organization and delivery of health care, some of which were 
subsequently adopted on a national basis (Houston 2002; Lawson and Theriault 
1999).  These innovations arose out of the need for practical solutions to the 
challenges of life at the end of the 19
th
 and beginning of the 20
th
 centuries, including a 
harsh climate, sparsely distributed population and limited access to medical care, 
which was primarily available in larger centres (Badgley and Wolfe 1967; Rands 
1994; Lawson and Theriault 1999).  Just as co-operatives form on the basis of self-
help and mutual aid, so too did medical care solutions in Saskatchewan. 
According to Houston (2002), when Saskatchewan became a province in 
1905: 
…there were six hospitals in operation, four of them with nursing 
schools.  Their seventy-five beds served over 250,000 people.  In the 
1901 census, populations of the main towns were as follows:  Regina 
2, 249, Prince Albert 1,745, Moose Jaw 1,558, Moosomin 868, 
Yorkton 799, Battleford 609, and Maple Creek 382 (Houston 2002:12). 
 
 In response to the need for access to a doctor in rural locations, the Rural 
Municipality of Sarnia offered its doctor a retainer fee of $1,500 annually (Creighton 
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1970 quoted in Rands 1994: 4; Badgley and Wolfe 1967)
9
.  According to The Rural 
Municipalities Act passed in 1909, rural municipalities were responsible for the care 
of people within their boundaries who were unable to pay for medical care.  The 
population of rural Saskatchewan was growing quickly due to the inducements 
offered by the federal government‘s national settlement plan which provided land to 
immigrants (Rands 1994).  Rural doctors‘ income was dependent on the farm 
economy and therefore farmers‘ ability to pay for doctors‘ services.  The municipal 
plan allowed rural residents to receive medical care and doctors to be paid even when 
times were tough on the farm.  The Rural Municipalities Hospitals Act was amended 
in 1916 to allow municipalities to provide a grant to doctors to supplement their 
income providing the grant did not exceed $1,500 (Rands 1994: 22). 
In 1919 legislation was passed to allow municipalities to hire doctors on salary 
to provide free medical care to the municipalities‘ residents.  This was followed in 
1932 by permission for parts of municipalities to employ a doctor, or two or more 
municipalities to co-operate.  In 1935, the Towns and Villages acts were changed to 
allow for per capita assessments to hire a doctor.  Legislation passed in 1937 allowed 
$5,000 to be raised to hire a surgeon.  Finally in 1941, The Rural Municipalities Act 
was amended such that doctors could be paid on a fee-for-service basis from public 
funds (Rands 1994). 
The municipal plan spread quickly across the province:  ―By the time the CCF 
came to power in Saskatchewan in 1944, the residents of 101 of the province‘s 303 
rural municipalities, sixty villages and eleven towns with a combined population of 
200,000 were receiving medical services from salaried municipal doctors‖ (Lipset 
1950: 228).  When the Dirty Thirties hit the province, the government established a 
                                                 
9
 Lawson and Theriault 1999 say that the first municipal doctor plans was established in 1915, 
providing an annual salary of $2,000. 
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medical relief plan so that drought-stricken municipalities could maintain medical 
services.  However, many municipalities went without service (Rands 1994). 
 As well as being home to the first municipal doctor in North America 
(Houston 2002), Saskatchewan was responsible for several other important 
innovations in medical care: 
Saskatchewan was the first jurisdiction in North America to introduce 
free diagnosis and treatment for tuberculosis (1929), universal hospital 
insurance (1946), universal medical insurance (1962), and universal 
prescription drug insurance (1974-1982) (Lawson and Theriault 1999: 
251). 
 
Early in the 20
th
 century, Saskatchewan residents suffered from tuberculosis 
and there was a groundswell of grassroots action to tackle this disease.  The 
Saskatchewan Anti-Tuberculosis League was founded in 1911 and began providing 
treatment in 1917 at sanatoriums that it built and operated with donations and grants 
from provincial and federal governments (Houston 1991).  Although most patients 
had to pay part of the costs and the government provided a small per-diem, the 
treatment was costly and this bankrupted some patients and deterred others from 
seeking treatment.  In 1929 the Liberal government passed legislation to cover the 
costs in full through grants and assessments on all of the province‘s municipalities 
(Lawson and Theriault 1999: 232).  
Lawson and Theriault (1999) note that a similar service was demanded in the 
cities.  The government passed The Municipal Medical and Hospital Association Act 
in 1938, permitting ten or more people to incorporate a health insurance plan for its 
members:   
The first group of citizens to organize a medical service under the act, 
the Regina Mutual Medical Benefit Association headed by H. L. 
Fowler (manager of Consumers‘ Co-operative Refineries Limited), 
obtained applications from eight doctors to work in a co-operative 
clinic that was to be staffed by salaried physicians.  Foreshadowing the 
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SCPS‘ reaction to those doctors who were willing to work for the 
CHSAs in the 1960s, the Regina District Medical Society successfully 
pressured all eight applicants to withdraw from the project.  The 
cooperative organized a simple indemnity plan that provided coverage 
for their members‘ medical fees.  Similar fee-for-service plans were 
organized in Saskatoon, Prince Albert and Melfort (Lawson and 
Theriault 1999: 255). 
 
Badgley and Wolfe (1967) note that ―By opposing the medical co-op in 1939, 
the Regina doctors reasserted their commitment to private enterprise and to the fee-
for-service payment of their bills‖ (Badgley and Wolfe 1967: 17). 
The Mutual Medical and Hospital Benefits Associations together with the 
Saskatchewan State Hospital and Medical League, a large number of trade unions, 
and agricultural organizations recommended to the Sigerist Commission that doctors 
be paid on a salary basis (Lawson and Theriault 1999).  This was also the position of 
the Saskatchewan Federation of Agriculture which represented organized producer 
and consumer co-operatives. The Sigerist Commission (Report of the commissioner 
Henry E. Sigerist:  presented to the Minister of Public Health, October 4, 1944) was 
established by Tommy Douglas as Premier and Minister of Public Health after the 
CCF came to power in 1944 following the defeat of a Liberal government (Badgley 
and Wolfe 1967).  The purpose of the commission was to survey health services in 
Saskatchewan and make recommendations to the government regarding next steps 
(Tollefson 1963; Lawson and Theriault 1999; Rands 1994; Houston 2002).  The 
commission‘s recommendations included: 
 Establishment of a Health Services Planning Commission to 
implement health programs in the province. 
 Establishment of health districts for preventative medicine, 
organized around a hospital with x-ray, laboratory and 
ambulance services. 
 Establishment of a number of rural centres for maternity care. 
 Maintenance and further development of the municipal doctor 
plan and annual vacation with pay for the overworked and 
underpaid municipal doctors 
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 Education of the public so that they went to the central services 
in their health region instead of having the municipal doctors 
travel to them. 
 Free hospitalization for all residents of the province.  This 
would require additional hospital beds, including the 
establishment of a hospital attached to the College of Medicine 
in Saskatoon. 
 Remuneration of medical staff by salary (Report of the commissioner 
Henry E. Sigerist:  Presented to the Minister of Public Health, October 
4, 1944). 
 
Under intense pressure from the College of Physicians and Surgeons, the CCF 
government subsequently rejected the plan devised by its own health planners that 
called for the expansion of the municipal doctor plan into ―state-salaried medical 
service stationed in group practice clinics with some measure of lay control‖ (Lawson 
and Theriault 1999).  In spite of this, popular demand for group practice clinics 
continued.   
In 1946, the Saskatoon Mutual Medical and Hospital Benefits Association 
announced a plan to establish a group practice clinic with salaried doctors and 
satellites in neighbouring rural centres (Lawson and Theriault 1999).  The Saskatoon 
District Medical Society then established Medical Services Insurance (MSI), a doctor-
sponsored fee-for-service plan to compete with the co-operative and threaten its 
success.  MSI grew substantially and successfully deterred the expansion of lay co-
operatives and the municipal doctor plan.  Another group called Group Medical 
Services was established in Regina (Lawson and Theriault 1999). 
According to Tollefson (1963), the introduction of The Saskatchewan 
Hospitalization Act in1946 was a key step along the road to achieving a 
comprehensive medical care plan for Saskatchewan.  This was followed by the 
establishment of the first Health Region in the province with a prepaid plan of health 
insurance.  This was the Swift Current Health Region (Rands 1994; Tollefson 1963; 
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Lawson and Theriault 1999; Badgley and Wolfe 1967; Feather 1991).  This Region 
was, in fact, established by local residents, municipalities and medical personnel who 
were willing to experiment.  The provincial government contributed to the costs, but 
these were largely covered by the residents themselves through a personal tax, as well 
as an assessment through the property taxes collected by the municipalities.  Fee-for-
service payment provided about 75% of the total costs and the plan covered dental, 
medical and hospital care.  Although the Swift Current experiment was deemed a 
success, Tollefson (1963) notes that the provincial government did not pursue the 
establishment of other Health Regions until after the introduction of universal medical 
care coverage in 1962 (Tollefson 1963: 42). 
The federal government began contributing to the hospital plan in 1958 
(Badgley and Wolfe 1967).  Tommy Douglas had previously said that he would not 
advance a comprehensive medical care program until the federal government started 
to pay a share of the existing costs (Johnson 2004).  The province could not afford 
such a plan without federal contributions.  In 1959 Tommy Douglas announced his 
plans to establish a provincial plan based on five principles: 
(1) Pre-payment principle 
(2) Universal coverage 
(3) High quality service 
(4) Administration by the Department of Public Health or an agency 
responsible to the Government 
(5) Acceptability to both those providing and those receiving the 
services (Tollefson 1963: 45). 
 
By then, the number of municipal doctor plans had decreased substantially and 
the early medical co-operatives were also in decline (Lawson and Theriault 1999: 
256).   Douglas appointed an Advisory Planning Committee on Medical Care led by 
Dr. W.P. Thompson to ―carry out investigations and make recommendations to the 
Government relating to a program of medical care‖ (Tollefson 1963: 53).  The 
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committee was to have representatives of the government, the medical profession, the 
public and the College of Medicine.  Draft terms of reference for the committee were 
proposed to the College of Physicians and Surgeons but it would not agree to the 
terms and refused to participate in the committee until quality of care was removed 
from the terms.  The doctors objected to anyone outside the medical profession being 
involved in evaluating the quality of their services.  The Douglas plan became an 
issue – if not the issue – in the provincial election of 1960, which the CCF won. 
The work of the Thompson Committee was slow due to the medical 
profession‘s objections to the idea of publicly funded and administered medical care 
generally.   Badgley and Wolfe (1967) note that the government did not adequately 
engage the medical profession to develop lines of communication, and: 
Even more surprisingly, the provincial government had never 
separated the functions of the profession in licensing, setting standards, 
and self-discipline, from its trade-union or negotiating role in 
economic matters.  Since all of these powers, in Saskatchewan, rested 
in the same body with the same paid official executing policy on all of 
these matters, the profession was in a much stronger position to control 
dissenters, particularly since the composition of the nine-man Council 
of the profession changed very slowly (Badgley and Wolfe 1967:29). 
 
Ultimately, the Thompson Committee issued an interim report in September 
1961, with a minority report from the College of Physicians and Surgeons (Tollefson 
1963).  The interim report recommended a comprehensive, universal plan to be 
publicly administered by the province, and recommended the establishment of an 
independent commission to administer the plan.  The report also recommended fee-
for-service remuneration for physicians, although some committee members did want 
alternate forms of payment such as salary or capitation
10
 (Tollefson 1963). 
                                                 
10
 Capitation is a system where physicians are reimbursed on the basis of a set amount for each patient 
seen.  It has been criticized for encouraging physicians to ―cherry pick‖ healthy patients so as to boost 
the number they can see.  Patients who are not in good health require more time and effort, thus 
limiting the number of patients that can be seen.  See, for instance, Pearson, Sabin and Emanuel 1998. 
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The representatives of the College of Physicians and Surgeons along with the 
representative from the Chamber of Commerce issued a minority report in 
disagreement with the committee‘s interim report.  The College disagreed with the 
need for a mandatory universal plan administered by a single insurer – the 
government.  The doctors wanted to continue to operate their own insurance plans 
under Group Medical Insurance and Medical Services Insurance, arguing that 
residents should be able to obtain their care privately (Tollefson 1963). 
Nonetheless, the Premier pushed ahead with the legislation required to 
implement the recommendations of the majority report.  It was introduced on October 
25, 1961 and enacted on November 17 (Tollefson 1963; Badgley and Wolfe 1967).  
The Medical Care Insurance Commission was established on January 9, 1962 
(Tollefson 1963; Rands 1994).   The College then refused to participate in the 
commission because the government had promised to give it an opportunity to review 
the bill and make its recommendations regarding any changes before it was 
introduced into the Legislature.   Badgley and Wolfe (1967) state that: 
There is little doubt that the Minister of Public Health, Mr. Erb, and his 
senior advisors acted unwisely in not making the draft legislation 
available to the profession earlier than they did.  The annual meeting of 
the profession was in progress at the time the legislation was being 
enacted in mid October 1961, and no one who was present could have 
failed to sense the wave of anxiety that pervaded the assembly 
(Badgley and Wolfe 1967: 40). 
 
Physicians felt that their freedom to practice would be restricted and that the 
plan would lead to them becoming salaried employees of the state, which was to be 
avoided at all costs.  Implementation of the plan was to take place on April 1, 1962 
but was delayed to July 1, 1962 because of the time needed to set it up (Rands 1944).  
In the meantime, the doctors gained political support from the Liberal 
government and the public and threatened to strike if the government did not concede 
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to their demands (Johnson 2004; Badgley and Wolfe 1967).  The government began 
to recruit doctors to provide medical services if a strike occurred.  Although the 
government and the doctors tried to negotiate an agreement, this was not possible.  
The doctors withdrew their services on July 1.  Emergency services were provided at 
29 hospitals across the province. 
The strike lasted 23 days (Rands 1994; Johnson 2004; Tollefson 1963; 
Lawson and Theriault 1999).  This was a time of complete upheaval in the province.  
Keep Our Doctors groups were organized across the province by citizens who feared 
losing their local doctors and access to medical services (Johnson 2004; Tollefson 
1963; Badgley and Wolfe 1967).  Government ministers and officials were harassed 
and threatened.  The doctors brought in to replace striking ones were also treated this 
way.  In some cases, they could not obtain hospital privileges or licenses to practice 
(Lawson and Theriault 1999; Rands 1994; Tollefson 1963).  The newspapers in the 
province sided with the Liberals and the doctors on strike; the out-of-province press 
criticized the doctors (Johnson 2004; Press coverage of Medicare, Presentation of 
Hon. A. E. Blakeney February 19, 1963 to Canadian Managing Editors‘ Conference; 
Badgley and Wolfe 1967). 
The government in the meantime tried to continue negotiations with the 
College of Physicians and Surgeons.  Some progress was being made because pubic 
opinion started to shift away from the doctors and not all of the doctors were behind 
the College in its fight with the province.  They gradually started going back to work. 
The Premier had asked Lord Stephen Taylor from Britain to come to the 
province to advise the government; however, when he arrived, he assumed the role of 
mediator in the strike (Johnson 2004; Badgley and Wolfe 1967).  He was a well-
known physician in Britain and had been involved in setting up its National Health 
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Service.  Because he was a doctor, he was able to meet with both parties to the dispute 
and he drafted an agreement that both were able to sign.  He arrived on July 16 and 
the strike ended on July 23, 1962 with the signing of the Saskatoon Agreement 
(Johnson 2004; Tollefson 1963; Rands 1994). 
The act which enabled the first medical co-operatives to be established still 
existed and when the doctors went on strike, some 38 communities began to organize 
or set up Community Clinics to provide medical services (Tollefson 1963; Rands 
1994; Lawson and Theriault 1999; Badgley and Wolfe 1967).   Many disbanded when 
the Saskatoon Agreement was signed.  Others carried on with a strong belief in 
member ownership and control over their health care, working in partnership with 
doctors who also believe in lay participation.  Three remain in the province. 
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Appendix Three – Letter Seeking Permission to Interview 
 
October, 2005 
 
 
Dear: 
 
RE:  Permission to Interview Officials 
 
I am a PhD candidate at the Centre for the Study of Co-operatives at the University of 
Saskatchewan.  I am studying the relationship between the co-operative community 
health clinics and the provincial government, focusing on the period since the 
Wellness approach and Health Reform became priorities of the New Democratic 
Party following its return to power in the election of 1991.  My supervisor is Dr, Lou 
Hammond Ketilson, Director of the Centre for the Study of Co-operatives. 
 
As part of my work, I plan to interview key people involved in health care provision 
in the province, including elected and appointed officials.  The interviews, which 
would be audio-taped with the participants‘ permission and last approximately one 
hour, will involve questions about the role that the clinics should play in the delivery 
of primary care in Saskatchewan.   The interviews will be transcribed and copies 
forwarded to participants to ensure that the transcriptions accurately capture their 
views and responses.  
 
Every possible measure will be taken to ensure that the identity of the participants is 
kept confidential.  This research will form part of my dissertation entitled:  ―The 
Relationship between Saskatchewan‘s Community Health Care Clinics and the 
Government of Saskatchewan:  Toward a New Understanding‖ and may subsequently 
be published in scholarly journals and other venues. 
 
I therefore request permission to interview you and the senior administrator (or 
designate) in your organization.  I will call your office in approximately one week to 
arrange a time at your convenience.  If you have any questions, I can be reached at 
(306) 966-6660. 
 
I hope you will agree to participate in this research. 
 
Thank you for your attention to this matter. 
 
Sincerely, 
 
 
Rochelle Smith 
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Appendix Four:  Semi-Structured Interview Guide for Clinic Participants 
 
The following questions identify the main areas that the researcher intends to 
explore through the personal interviews.  The questions are intended to guide the 
participants and garner their thoughtful responses.  It is expected that in some cases, 
depending on the nature of the response, the discussion might go outside the expected 
scope of the interview.  The respondents will be allowed and encouraged to tell the 
stories they think are the most important. 
 
Questions for Discussion with Interview Participants: 
 
This research is looking at the relationship between the community health 
clinic co-operatives and the provincial government since the return of the New 
Democratic Party (NDP) to power in 1991 and up to the present.  Health reform 
became and has remained a major initiative of the government, with 
expenditures on health care constituting the largest portion of its expenditures. 
 
1. What role do you think the community health clinic co-operatives play in the 
provision of health care services in the province? 
 
2. What services do the clinics provide? 
 
3. What are the advantages of delivering health care services using the co-operative 
model? 
 
4. Disadvantages? 
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5. What challenges and/or opportunities do the clinics face in their operations? 
 
6. What formal relationships have been created with institutions, agencies and 
professionals in the community? 
 
7. What informal relationships have been established with facilities and 
professionals in the community? 
 
8. How well has the co-operative model worked in promoting government health 
policy objectives, i.e., in terms of such things as providing integration/continuum 
of health care services, community-based services, promotion/prevention? 
 
9. How would you describe the relationship of the community health clinic co-
operatives with the provincial government?  With the Regional Health Authority?  
With the medical profession? 
 
10. What aspects of the relationship are positive?  Negative? 
 
11. Have these relationships changed over time and how? 
 
12. Is there a difference between how government officials regard the clinics and how 
the elected members of the government regard them?  What is that difference? 
 
 210 
 
 
13. What needs do the community clinics have which are not currently being met by 
government?  How could they be met? 
 
14. Does the political cycle of the provincial government (elections every four years 
or so) affect the clinics, and, if so, how? 
 
15. How successful have the clinics‘ lobbying efforts been? 
 
16. There have been numerous royal and other commissions into health care reform, 
both in Saskatchewan and at a national level.  Perhaps the most important in 
Saskatchewan‘s case are the Fyke Commission and the Romanow Commission.  
Did these commissions address the co-op health care clinic model?  Did the co-op 
model receive adequate attention in either commission‘s report? 
 
17. Where do you think the clinics will be in five years?  Ten? 
 
18. Are there any significant trends in the delivery of health care that may impact on 
the clinics in the future? 
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Appendix Five–Semi-Structured Interview Guide for Non-Clinic Participants 
The following questions identify the main areas that the researcher intends to 
explore through the personal interviews.  The questions are intended to guide the 
participants and garner their thoughtful responses.  It is expected that in some cases, 
depending on the nature of the response, the discussion might go outside the expected 
scope of the interview.  The respondents will be allowed and encouraged to tell the 
stories they think are the most important. 
 
Questions for Discussion with Interview Participants: 
 
This research is looking at the relationship between the community health 
clinic co-operatives and the provincial government since the return of the New 
Democratic Party (NDP) to power in 1991 and up to the present.  Health reform 
became and has remained a major initiative of the government, with 
expenditures on health care constituting the largest portion of its expenditures. 
 
1. Do you think the community health clinic co-operatives have a role to play in the 
provision of health care services in the province? 
 
2. If so, what should that role be? 
 
3. If not, why not? 
 
4. What, if any, formal relationships does your organization have with the clinics? 
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5. What informal relationships have been established in the community, e.g. 
regarding professionals or facilities? 
 
6. What aspects of the relationships are positive?  Negative? 
 
7. Are there advantages to the co-operative clinic model?  Disadvantages? 
 
8. A number of studies have been done that indicate that the clinics are more cost-
effective than private practices in the delivery of health care services.  For 
instance, the Angus and Manga report of 1990 found that the clinics‘ overall costs 
per patient were lower.  Clinic patients had shorter hospital stays and lower 
prescription drug costs.  Given these findings, do you think that the co-operative 
clinic model should given more profile in the provincial government‘s efforts to 
contain costs? 
 
9. Do you think that there is any difference in the quality of health services delivered 
between the co-op community clinics and private practices? 
 
10. The Saskatchewan provincial and government governments have just announced a 
national campaign to raise awareness of primary health care, focusing on four 
pillars, including: 
 Health care providers working in teams, 
 Improved sharing of information among health care providers and patients, 
 Better access to health information, and  
 Healthy living. 
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11. The co-operative community clinics have been actively pursuing these pillars 
since their inception.  Do you think that the governments should incorporate the 
co-op clinic model into this national campaign? 
 
12. Saskatchewan is traditionally viewed as a stronghold of the co-operative 
movement and as an innovator in health care delivery and reform, yet the co-op 
delivery model for health care does not seem to have grown and developed to the 
extent that it could.  Are there barriers to this growth and development?  If so, 
should they be removed?  
 
13. What are your organization‘s plans for primary health care services?  Where do 
you hope they will be in five years?  Ten? 
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Appendix Six – Interview Consent Form 
 
Interview Consent Form 
 
You are invited to participate in a study called:  The Relationship between 
Saskatchewan’s Co-operative Community Health Care Clinics and the Government 
of Saskatchewan:  Toward a New Understanding 
 
Researcher:  ______Rochelle Smith______ ________________ (name) 
  
                     ______Centre for the Study of Co-operatives_____ (address) 
 
                     ______University of Saskatchewan_____________ 
 
                     ______101 Diefenbaker Place_________________ 
 
                     ______Saskatoon SK  S7N 5B8________________ 
 
                     ______(306)966-6660_______________________ (phone) 
 
Purpose and procedure:  I would like to receive your responses to some questions 
about the relationship between the community health clinic co-operatives and the 
provincial government in Saskatchewan.  You have been selected because (of your 
position as a clinic administrator/as a chairperson of a clinic board of directors/as an 
official of the provincial government who deals with clinic funding/as an expert in the 
health care industry/as an elected official of the Government of Saskatchewan/as a 
representative of a health organization in Saskatchewan).  This research project is co-
ordinated by the Centre for the Study of Co-operatives at the University of 
Saskatchewan.  The results of this research will constitute Ms. Rochelle Smith‘s 
dissertation requirement for a PhD in Interdisciplinary Studies, Co-operative Theme.  
The research is partially funded by the  
Centre for the Study of Co-operatives. 
 
The purpose of this dissertation is to explore the relationship between the three co-
operative health care organizations in Prince Albert, Regina and Saskatoon, 
Saskatchewan and the Government of Saskatchewan.  How have these relationships 
evolved over time and how have the clinics survived changing legislative, regulatory 
and policy environments? What factors have influenced the provincial government‘s 
position on the co-operative community clinic model?  Is there a difference in how the 
elected government officials and how the bureaucrats view the co-operative 
community clinic model? These are the questions this research aims to examine.   
 
Your participation in this study is appreciated and completely voluntary.  It is 
expected that the interview should last approximately one hour.  You may withdraw at 
any time without penalty during this process should you feel uncomfortable or at risk.  
All interviews will be audio taped if you agree, and you have the right to shut off the 
recorder at any time you choose.  You should also feel free to decline to answer any 
particular question(s).  Should you choose to withdraw from the study, no data 
pertaining to your participation will be retained. 
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Potential risks:  You should be aware that controversial remarks may have negative 
consequences for your relationships with others involved in community health care 
co-operatives in Saskatchewan.  If Ms. Smith wishes to quote you, she will seek your 
permission beforehand. 
 
Potential benefits:  Your participation will help document the nature of the 
relationship between the community clinics and the provincial government.  Findings 
from this research may help to inform policy decisions made within the co-operative 
sector and the provincial government. 
 
Storage of data:  The transcripts and original audio recording of the interview will be 
securely stored by the Supervisor (Dr. Hammond Ketilson) at the Centre for the Study 
of Co-operatives for a period of at least five years. 
 
Confidentiality:  Because of the relatively small number of people involved in 
administering and overseeing the co-operative health clinics in the province, and the 
need to identify and describe the nature of the relationship between the provincial 
government and the clinics, there are challenges around keeping the identities and 
opinions of the participants confidential.  You are therefore asked to participate with 
the understanding that your views may be made public through the various modes of 
dissemination described below.  If you choose not to participate, your wishes will be 
respected. 
 
The research conclusions will be published in a variety of formats, both print and 
electronic.  These materials may be further used for purposes of conference 
presentations, or publication in academic journals, books or popular press.  
 
Your de-identified data may be used by other researchers in the future.  You have the 
right to refuse to allow your data to be used by other researchers in the future. 
 
Right to Withdraw:  You may withdraw from the study for any reason, at any time, 
without penalty of any sort.  If you choose to withdraw from the study, any 
information that you have contributed will be deleted.  You will be informed of any 
major changes that occur in the circumstances of this study or in the purpose and 
design of the research that may have a bearing on your decision to remain as a 
participant. 
 
Questions:   If you have any questions concerning the study, please feel free to 
contact the Researcher at the number provided above. 
 
This study was approved on ethical grounds by the University of Saskatchewan 
Behavioural Sciences Research Ethics Board on October 28, 2005.  Any questions 
regarding your rights as a participant may be addressed to that committee through the 
Office of Research Services (966-2084).  Participants from outside Saskatoon may 
call the Ethics Office collect.  
 
Consent to Participate:  I have read and understood the description provided above; 
I have been provided with an opportunity to ask questions and my questions have 
been answered satisfactorily.  I consent to participate in the study described above, 
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understanding that I may withdraw this consent at any time.  A copy of this consent 
form has been given to me for my records. 
 
 
 
______________________________  __________________ 
(Signature of Participant)    (Date) 
 
 
______________________________  ___________________ 
(Signature of Researcher)    (Date) 
 
 
 
Use of data by future researchers:  I understand that my de-identified data may be 
used by future researchers.   
 
 
I agree that my de-identified data may be used by future researchers. 
 
 
I refuse to allow my de-identified data to be used by future researchers. 
 
 
 
______________________________     _____________________ 
(Signature of Participant)    (Date) 
 
 
 
______________________________  _____________________ 
(Signature of Researcher)    (Date) 
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Appendix Seven: 
 
Division of Powers between Federal and Provincial Governments  
Co-operatives‘ attempts to influence government policy are led by the 
Canadian Co-operative Association (CCA), the apex organization representing 
English-speaking co-operative organizations in Canada
11
.  The CCA may be seen as 
having limited clout because of the diversity of its members.  Where governments 
normally prefer to deal with specific sectors and their associations (for instance, the 
Canadian Manufacturing Association), CCA represents co-operatives operating in all 
sectors of the economy.  Further, government officials do not normally think of co-
operatives when designing policies and programs, let alone think of them as being 
affected differently than private firms.  This also has the effect of reducing CCA‘s 
profile (Fulton and Laycock 1990: 150). 
Fulton and Laycock further note that, contrary to what might reasonably be 
expected, co-operatives do not benefit from any special legitimacy that might be 
accorded them because of the affinity of their democratic structures to those of 
government.  Governments need quick decisions on public policy, and group 
participation in policy communities ―requires a level of political autonomy for the 
business association which is simply incompatible with the democratic character of a 
third-tier co-operative organization‖ (Fulton and Laycock 1990: 151). 
The first challenge arises because of the division of powers between the 
federal and provincial governments.  Canada‘s constitution divides the powers of the 
state into federal and provincial/territorial responsibilities (Constitution Act 1982, 
being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c.11).  The federal 
government, for instance, is responsible for matters affecting the whole country such 
                                                 
11
 French-speaking co-operatives are represented by le Conseil Canadien de la Coopération. 
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as national defense, international trade and immigration.  The provinces/territories are 
responsible, for instance, for municipal government, education and health care. 
Every level of government has numerous levels of regulatory agencies, boards 
and commissions, resulting in greatly increased work for co-operatives to effectively 
bring their concerns to the attention of those in power.  With respect to co-operative 
legislation, the federal government has responsibility for regulation of a small number 
of co-operatives that do business mostly on an interprovincial basis (Canadian 
Cooperatives Act, S.C. 1998, C-1.7).  At the federal level, the agency responsible for 
addressing co-operative matters is the Co-operatives Secretariat, located in the 
Department of Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada.  Although it does not have a 
statement of what the federal government‘s policy on co-operatives is, the 
Secretariat‘s mission and mandate are to: 
 
Our Mission  
 
The Co-operatives Secretariat is dedicated to economic growth and social 
development of Canadian society through co-operative enterprise.  
 
Our Mandate  
 
Ensure that the needs of the co-operative sector are taken into account by the 
federal government, especially in the development of policies and programs.  
 
Inform the federal government's key players about the role and the 
potential of co-operatives in the development of Canadian society and 
its economy.  
 
Foster a beneficial exchange of views among the federal, provincial 
and territorial governments, co-operatives, academics and other 
stakeholders engaged in the development of co-operatives.  
 
Facilitate interaction between co-operatives and the federal government.  
 
Provide governments, key economic stakeholders and the general 
public with information that promotes an accurate understanding of co-
operatives and the co-operative model of enterprise 
(http://www.agr.gc.ca/rcs-src/coop/index_e.php?s1=info&page=intro). 
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The federal Co-operatives Secretariat was established in response to the 1984 
National Task Force on Co-operative Development (Co-operative Union of Canada 
1984) which requested a small supporting agency within the federal government to 
address their needs.  Fulton and Laycock note that:  ―The proposal for a secretariat has 
since then become one of Canadian co-operative leaders‘ clearest expressions of 
intent to establish closer and formal ties to the state‖ (Fulton and Laycock 1990: 152). 
This they see as a major departure from the usual position of anti-statist neutrality 
assumed by co-operatives and as posing a danger to maintaining the ―democratic 
character of inter-co-operative and intra-co-operative activity.‖  Establishment of the 
secretariat is viewed by Fulton and Laycock as translating into less autonomy for co-
operatives, and a somewhat ironic move: 
…co-operatives are asking the Canadian state to play the principal role 
in assisting co-operatives to provide an alternative to what the task 
force describes as the unresponsive, bureaucratic institutions of the 
state.  The state is to help co-operatives save Canadians from the state 
(Fulton and Laycock 1990: 153). 
 
In the case of the secretariat, it is doubtful that its existence has resulted in less 
autonomy for co-operatives.  The secretariat itself must struggle to gain the attention 
of other departments and agencies with respect to co-operative issues and concerns, 
and since its establishment, it has not developed a policy statement to set out how the 
federal government intends to support and work with co-operatives.   
The Co-operatives Secretariat tries to bring the co-operative model and co-
operative sector issues and concerns to the attention of officials in other federal 
government departments.  Perhaps the most important initiative that the Co-operatives 
Secretariat has undertaken over the past few years is the Co-operative Development 
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Initiative, through which the federal government provides support for co-operative 
development.
12
 
 
Provincial Jurisdiction 
 The provinces are responsible for legislation for incorporation of co-
operatives, which has been quite uniform across the provinces since World War II 
(Fulton and Laycock 1990).  Its purpose is the same as that for private sector firms – 
to provide a legal environment within which this form of enterprise may achieve its 
socially legitimate objectives.  Co-operative Community Clinics in Saskatchewan 
have two options for incorporating.  The Mutual Medical and Hospital Benefits 
Association Act
13
 was passed in 1938, permitting ten or more people to incorporate a 
health insurance plan for its members; it was this act that later allowed the 
establishment of the Community Clinics during the Medicare crisis.  They can also 
incorporate under The Co-operatives Act 1996.  Incorporation is done through the 
Department of Justice‘s Corporations Branch. 
Axworthy (1990) discusses the constraints that co-operative legislation places 
on co-operative organizations with respect to their prescribed structure, powers of 
control and decision-making, and member participation.   It is argued that what he 
speaks to is the theoretical underpinnings and systemic constraints in legislation that 
lead to principal-agent problems in co-operatives.   Provincial governments differ in 
their treatment of co-operatives on the basis of the number and economic force of co-
operatives of different regions, and on the basis of the strength of co-operatives in the 
                                                 
12
 The initiative has two components: one which provides funding to support projects that explore 
innovative uses of the co-operative model; the other which provides technical assistance to groups that 
want to start a co-operative or require assistance in managing existing ones.  The latter is managed 
jointly with the Canadian Co-operative Association and le Conseil Canadien de la Coopération. 
13
 The Department of Health plans to repeal this act in the near future.  There is only one community 
clinic incorporated under the act and it is in the process of securing a continuance under The Co-
operatives Act 1996.  Possible implications of this change are discussed in the next chapter. 
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provincial economy.  The entity within government to address co-operative (and 
credit union) issues and concerns thus also varies. Responsibility for the incorporation 
of co-operatives and credit unions is usually separated from the entity that handles co-
operative policy, program and development
14
.  
                                                 
14
In some provinces/territories, it appears that there is no entity dealing with co-operative policy, 
programs and development at all.  This is quite difficult to determine from information available on the 
provinces‘ and territories‘ web sites.  Co-operatives are required by law to incorporate as legal entities 
so there is at a minimum an incorporation and registry function.  In British Columbia and Alberta, for 
instance, there is only the registry and incorporation function.  In Manitoba, a Cooperative 
Development Services unit exists within the Department of Agriculture, Food and Rural Initiatives 
under the Community, Cooperative and Regional Development Initiatives Branch, and the Registrar of 
Cooperatives is in the Finance department.  The Cooperative Development Services unit also performs 
policy and program development functions. 
In Ontario, the Financial Services Commission of Ontario handles incorporation.  In Quebec, 
there is a dedicated unit within the department of Developpement Economique, Innovation et 
Exportation.  Nova Scotia has a Co-operatives Branch in Service Nova Scotia and Municipal Relations 
Department; the branch combines the incorporation and registry functions with startup assistance, 
advisory services, inspections and winding-up services.   In Prince Edward Island, there is an Inspector 
of Co-operatives in the Consumer, Corporate and Insurance Services Division of the Office of the 
Attorney General.  In Newfoundland, the Corporate Registry is in the Commercial Registrations 
Division of the Department of Government Services.  In the North West Territories, the Department of 
Justice has a Corporate Registries with a Registrar of Co-operatives, with some support on how to 
incorporate from a program officer at the Department of Industry, Tourism and Investment.  In the 
Yukon, incorporation is done through Corporate Affairs, Consumer and Safety Services, Department of 
Community Services but there is no formal legislation, policy or organizational support for co-
operatives.  In Nunavut, the legislation and policy framework is being borrowed from the North West 
Territories but there are plans to develop its own in the near future. 
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Appendix Eight:  Principles of Medicare, Canada Health Act 
According to the federal Canada Health Act, the principles of Medicare are: 
Public Administration: This criterion applies to the health insurance 
plans of the provinces and territories. The health care insurance plans 
are to be administered and operated on a non-profit basis by a public 
authority, responsible to the provincial/territorial governments and 
subject to audits of their accounts and financial transactions.  
 
Comprehensiveness: The health insurance plans of the provinces and 
territories must insure all insured health services (hospital, physician, 
surgical-dental) and, where permitted, services rendered by other 
health care practitioners.  
 
Universality: One hundred percent of the insured residents of a 
province or territory must be entitled to the insured health services 
provided by the plans on uniform terms and conditions. Provinces and 
territories generally require that residents register with the plans to 
establish entitlement.  
 
Portability: Residents moving from one province or territory to 
another must continue to be covered for insured health care services by 
the "home" province during any minimum waiting period, not to 
exceed three months, imposed by the new province of residence. After 
the waiting period, the new province or territory of residence assumes 
health care coverage.  
 
Residents temporarily absent from their home provinces or territories, 
or from the country, must also continue to be covered for insured 
health care services. This allows individuals to travel or be absent, 
within prescribed limits, from their home provinces or territories but 
still retain their health insurance coverage.  
 
The portability criterion does not entitle a person to seek services in 
another province, territory or country, but is more intended to entitle 
one to receive necessary services in relation to an urgent or emergent 
need when absent on a temporary basis, such as on business or 
vacation.  
 
If insured persons are temporarily absent in another province or 
territory, insured services are to be paid at the host province's rate. If 
insured persons are temporarily out of the country, insured services are 
to be paid at the home province's rate.  
 
In some cases, coverage may be extended for elective (non-emergency) 
service in another province or territory, or out of the country. Prior 
approval by one's health insurance plan may also be required.  
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Accessibility: The health insurance plans of the provinces and territories                   
must provide: 
 
 reasonable access to insured health care services on uniform terms 
and conditions, unprecluded, unimpeded, either directly or 
indirectly, by charges (user charges or extra-billing) or other means 
(age, health status or financial circumstances);  
 reasonable access in terms of physical availability of medically 
necessary services has been interpreted under the Canada Health 
Act using the "where and as available" rule. Thus, residents of a 
province or territory are entitled to have access to insured health 
care services at the setting "where" the services are provided and 
"as" the services are available in that setting;  
 reasonable compensation to physicians and dentists for all the 
insured health care services they provide; and  
 payment to hospitals to cover the cost of insured health care services 
(Canada Heath Act, 1984, c.6.). 
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Appendix Nine:  Agreement Between Community Clinic A and Regional Health 
Authority 
 
 The agreement is as follows, with the name and location omitted to maintain 
confidentiality: 
The Community Clinic 
 
and  
 
Regional Health Authority 
(operating as the Health Region)  
 
Principles of Partnership 
 
The Community Clinic and the Health Region share a similar vision 
for supporting and enhancing health in the Health Region.  For both, a 
closer, more defined, interdependent relationship is beneficial.  This 
collaboration will directly benefit both organizations by promoting 
changes in the delivery of services that will enhance health in the 
communities mutually served.   
 
Advocating on behalf of the client is a mutual goal of the 
organizations.  This advocacy role can be strengthened by both 
organizations cultivating an interdependent relationship.  This will 
have a positive impact on the determinants of health and ultimately 
improve the quality of health of the community. 
 
The following principles are a partnership framework meant to be built 
upon and embraced as the partnership becomes more defined:  
 
 The Community Clinic, the Health Region and other care providers are 
interdependent and need to operate collaboratively while 
demonstrating respect for each other‘s independence.   
 
 Building and maintaining alliances serves the community well.  
Building pride and celebrating unique attributions contributes to the 
community and its health and well-being.   
 
 Each organization will endeavor to provide information and input into 
future plans. 
 
 Each organization will strive for clarity of its mandate and 
communicate these to each other and the community at large.   
 
 Each health agency has respective policies and decision-making 
processes that will be respected and communicated appropriately.   
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 Consultation among health providers will be encouraged and facilitated 
in the best interests of the shared clientele.  
 
 Each Board will provide for ongoing communication at the Board level 
and encourage open, two-way communication amongst all health 
providers and the community that is jointly served.   
 
Goals of Partnership 
 
Between: 
 
Regional Health Authority, 
(operating as the Health Region) 
 
-and- 
 
The Community Clinic 
 
 
1.0 The Community Clinic and the Regional Health Authority 
will work in partnership to efficiently, economically and 
effectively provide high quality primary health services to 
the population we jointly serve.   
 
 
 
Objectives: 
 
 a) Work in partnership to identify and address 
primary health care needs in the health region. 
 
 b) Work in partnership to prevent and manage 
chronic diseases in the health region. 
 
 c) Work together to identify and address the 
health support needs of populations with poor health 
outcomes.  
 
 d) Make effective, efficient and economic use of 
our health care resources. 
 
2.0 Maintaining and Strengthening our Partnership: 
 
Objectives:  
 
a) Representatives of the clinic and HR will meet regularly to review 
the Principles, Goals, Objectives and Action Plans of the 
Partnership to ensure that there is an ongoing progress to achieve 
positive outcomes for the health of the community. 
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The clinic and the Regional Health Authority will maintain communication 
about the primary health planning processes (Clinic A unpublished document). 
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Appendix Ten:  Search Results Using Weft Software 
 
Endogenous Characteristics of Community Clinics 
 
 
Search Terms Clinics Politicians Govt Officials Health Regions Others 
'autonomy'  3 1 0 1 0 
'governance'  4 3 1 3 1 
'board of directors'  1 1 1 1 0 
'boards'  3 4 2 2 1 
'community based'  0 1 0 0 0 
'community-based'  2 1 0 1 0 
'interdisciplinary'  2 1 1 1 0 
'multidisciplinary'  2 0 0 1 0 
'primary health care'  4 3 2 3 1 
'model'  6 4 2 3 1 
'democra'  4 3 1 2 0 
'own'  6 4 2 3 1 
Total 37 26 12 21 5 
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Exogenous Characteristics of Community Clinics 
 
 
Search Terms Clinics Politicians Govt Officials Health Regions Others 
'perception'  2 3 0 1 1 
'perceive'  2 2 0 0 1 
'anomaly'  1 1 0 0 0 
'belief'  0 2 0 0 0 
'believe'  4 4 1 2 1 
'centralize'  0 0 0 2 0 
'centralization'  0 1 0 1 0 
'centralizing'  1 0 0 0 0 
'region'  5 4 2 3 1 
'integrate'  1 0 0 3 1 
'integration'  2 1 1 0 0 
'efficiency'  0 2 2 2 0 
'efficient'  4 3 1 2 1 
'account'  5 2 0 2 1 
'co-ordinate'  0 0 0 0 1 
'old'  3 3 2 2 0 
'young'  3 3 1 2 0 
'past'  4 1 1 2 0 
'present'  3 3 0 2 1 
'current'  6 3 1 2 1 
'belong'  2 0 0 2 1 
'depend'  3 3 1 0 1 
'power'  3 2 1 1 1 
'control'  4 4 0 2 1 
'fund'  5 3 2 3 1 
'mandate'  1 0 1 1 0 
‗decision-making'  1 0 0 2 0 
Totals 65 48 17 39 15 
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Government Intervention 
 
 
Search Terms Clinics Politicians Govt Officials Health Regions Others 
‗access'  4 2 2 2 1 
'Saskatoon Agreement'  2 2 0 0 0 
'law'  0 3 2 0 0 
'legislation'  0 0 2 1 0 
'MLA'  4 2 0 0 0 
'Minister'  5 4 1 0 1 
'ministers'  3 2 0 0 0 
'cabinet'  2 3 0 0 0 
'official'  4 1 2 1 0 
'bureaucrat'  5 4 1 0 1 
'bureaucracy'  5 1 1 1 0 
'participa'  1 3 1 1 1 
'power'  3 2 1 1 1 
'control'  4 4 0 2 1 
'controlling'  1 1 0 0 1 
'controlled'  2 0 0 0 1 
'Saskatchewan Medical 
Association'  
2 0 1 1 0 
'SMA'  5 4 2 3 0 
'physician'  4 3 2 2 1 
'doctor'  6 4 1 3 1 
'medical profession'  3 4 1 0 0 
'information'  3 1 2 3 1 
'policy'  4 3 2 3 1 
'public policy'  0 1 1 0 0 
'policy process'  0 1 0 0 0 
'new democratic party'  0 1 0 0 0 
'ndp'  4 2 1 1 1 
'liberal'  1 2 1 0 0 
Totals 79 60 27 25 13 
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Influence Processes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Search Term Clinics Politicians Govt Officials Health Regions Others 
'advoca'  3 1 0 1 1 
'lobb' 2 3 0 0 0 
'participa'  1 3 1 1 1 
'interest group'  1 1 0 0 0 
'Saskatchewan Medical 
Association'  
2 0 1 1 0 
'SMA'  5 4 2 3 0 
'physician'  4 3 2 2 1 
'doctor'  6 4 1 3 1 
'medical profession'  3 4 1 0 0 
'federation'  6 1 0 1 1 
Total 33 24 8 12 5 
